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1 Introduction and research questions 
 
1.1 PEOPLE ON THE MOVE 
 
In the last 20 to 30 years people have travelled more often and further. Worldwide, more people 
have obtained access to car and air transport, and road traffic movements have grown strongly. 
In Europe, total passenger road kilometres doubled since 1980 (see Figure 1.1). The significant 
rise of traffic of people was enabled for a great part by the rise of (real) income levels per capita. 
Since 1980, EU economies expanded by 80% (OECD, 2006). Furthermore, the decline of the 
average size of European households has stimulated passenger transport, since it demands more 
individual transport. In 1970, for example, there were 5.5 million single-person households in 
Germany; in 1994, there were 12.7 million (+130%). In the same period the population grew only 
5% (SBD, 2009). 
Movement of people has not only grown in distance, but also gained in ease and safety. In the 
Netherlands, the number of people that died in road traffic accidents in 2004 was a quarter of 
those in1972 (see Figure 1.2). Improvements in technology and infrastructure have enhanced 
the comfort of travelling. Available time for leisure trips has also increased. All in all, most 
people have enjoyed greater freedom to travel, entailing great merits for many. 
However, alongside these gains in freedom to travel there are some clear drawbacks. Societies, 
in particular urban areas, have been burdened with severe impact from transport activities. 
Congestion, harmful emissions, traffic accidents, noise, scarcity of fossil fuels, fragmentation of 
landscape, scarcity of space and even social alienation have been identified as problems 
associated with contemporary mobility systems (Adams, 2005). The principal problem arising 
from traffic congestion, for instance, is the time and costs lost by transport users. Further, 
congestion contributes to local air pollution which damages human health. Many of the 
substances emitted have been linked to health problems ranging from minor irritation to 
carcinogenic qualities (WHO, 1999). Figure 1.3 illustrates that congestion in urban areas is 
growing. Figure 1.4 shows that emission of greenhouse gases from road transport has steadily 
grown as well. The emission of PM and NOx has decreased, though locally they are still above 
critical levels. 
Policymakers at local, national and international levels have been challenged firmly to deal with 
these negative effects of mobility. Mobility issues are multi-faceted, since they include social, 
economic, ecological as well as technological aspects. Policy concerns are typically intercon-
nected and cross several policy fields. Societal stakeholders have conflicting perceptions of the 
problem, whereas gains and burdens of transport activities are distributed unevenly over various 
societal groups. 
Transport policies have been partially successful in the last 20 to 30 years. The increase of safety 
levels and decrease of polluting gases (such as particulate matter, nitrogen oxides, as seen in 
Figure 1.2) can be attributed directly to transport-related policies. However, some effects have 
remained critical or have even grown. Congestion levels and greenhouse gas emissions are the 
main examples of this. It raises the question how policies concerning these two issues can be 
improved. 
The outcomes of transport policies are often difficult to understand, let alone predict, and 
possibly they can be enhanced by deeper understanding of recent transport sectoral dynamics1.  
                                                                        
1 Clearly, this is not the only way to enhance policy outcomes. 
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Figure 1.1: Passenger 
transport trends by modes in 
the EU, 1970-2003 
(passenger-km) (Source: 
OECD 2006). 
  
 
Figure 1.2:  Traffic casualties 
in The Netherlands, 1950-
2005  (Source: MVW, 2006) 
 Figure 1.3: Congestion levels 
in U.S. cities (source: Schrank 
and Lomax, 2007). 
Comparing congestion 
patterns across countries and 
regions is not easy, since 
indicators and assumptions 
used are often fairly diverse. 
The general pattern in Europe 
and North America is 
nevertheless that congestion 
in urban areas is growing 
(OECD, 2007). 
  
 
Figure 1.4: Emissions from 
(European) road transport 
are declining, except for 
greenhouse gases (source: 
Eurostat). PM10 refers to 
particles of 10 micrometers 
or less. While greenhouse 
gases contribute to climate 
change, particulates and NOx 
have a significant impact on 
human health. 
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With sectoral dynamics we mean the nature of change and innovation of important (passenger) 
transport practices in the last fifteen years. Understanding these dynamics facilitates influencing 
the dynamics towards policy aims.  
In this thesis we therefore study the innovation of a few important practices and technologies. 
We address questions such as how new (supposedly cleaner) technologies, for instance hybrid-
electric vehicles, emerged. How did travel behaviour of urban commuters change? What has 
been the role and impact of regulation? Transport technologies and practices exist in numerous 
forms and modalities, ranging from international air transport, to public transport bikes in your 
neighbourhood. Some changes take place at a rapid pace, some slow. We chose to focus on two 
cases in particular: one transport technology (car engine technology), and one mobility practice 
(Park-and-Ride facilities, abbreviated as P+R). P+R is a service provided by a city to motorists 
who can park their vehicle at the edge of a city (centre) and continue their journey by means of 
public transport. The two cases may play a prominent role in the mitigation of greenhouse gas 
emissions and congestion levels, respectively. The cases have their own distinct dynamics, one 
with a strong technological component, and the other with a strong social-behavioural and 
(local) policy component. We analyze these developments longitudinally, in a time-span of about 
fifteen years, in order to be more sensitive to the intrinsic patterns of change in the cases 
(compared to ‘one-shot’ case studies). 
In summary, studying the emergence of novel technologies and practices aims to contribute to a 
deeper understanding of the dynamics of recent innovation in car engines and urban car use 
(what happened and why?), in order to advance theories of innovation. In addition to such a 
theoretical contribution, the analysis hints at the effectiveness of regulation and policies. This 
delivers a second contribution: providing transport policy practitioners with systematic insights 
in their sector to improve policy making. 
 
 
1.2 THEORIES ON INNOVATION  
 
Innovation refers to the emergence of new products, processes or practices. Studies in various 
scientific fields have addressed emergence of new technology and innovation. Broadly there are 
two strands of literature. The first and oldest strand consists of innovation scholars from 
economics and related fields. In this strand Joseph Schumpeter (1883-1950) is one of the 
founding fathers, who referred to innovations as product and service innovations, technological 
innovations, process innovations, organizational and managerial innovations, conceptual and 
institutional innovations. Schumpeter (1934) bequeathed us with a scheme of technological 
change consisting of invention - the first practical demonstration of an idea; to innovation - the 
first commercial application of an invention to the market; to diffusion - the spread of the 
innovation into the market. His concept of innovation as creative destruction of established 
practices suggests that firms search for innovation to provide them with temporary market 
power, eroding the profits and position of established firms. His work is often labelled as 
evolutionary although he himself was opposed the use of this label. 
From the early 1980s onwards, a new wave of economists revitalized evolutionary theorizing of 
innovation (Nelson and Winter, Dosi, Saviotti, Metcalfe, Bessant). This strand of literature has 
moved beyond the simple linear model, and regards innovation as a process of matching 
technical possibilities to market opportunities, involving multiple interactions and types of 
learning. Authors typically view innovators as proposing - and bringing into reality - solutions to 
problems, creating technological variety. Of the possible options that emerge, some get selected 
to the exclusion of others. Agents are boundedly rational, operating in a changing competitive 
landscape, with uncertain outcomes. 
thesis_Dijk_v07.pdf
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Evolutionary models have given less thought to the role of the social context (or embeddings) of 
technology, e.g. social institutions and demand structures. After 1990 more authors have been 
hinting at a co-evolutionary approach, which seeks to include dynamics of institutions in 
particular (e.g. Nelson 1994). However, as Saviotti (2005) notices, these dynamics are still poorly 
understood. 
A second strand of innovation literature originates from sociology and history of technology2. 
From the 1980s onwards, authors in this strand have emphasized the social context in which 
technology is created and used (Bijker, Hughes, Pinch, Latour). A key concept is social construc-
tion of technology (SCOT), where ‘technology’ is viewed not as an objective entity (as in 
economic and technical studies), but rather described ‘through the eyes of social groups’. These 
authors demonstrated how various social interpretations of technology drive trigger directions 
of technological development. 
However, both strands of literature likely provide only partial answers of how and why 
innovation of such a multi-faceted issue as car mobility takes place. Economic (co-) evolutionary 
innovation studies based on the assumption of an objective innovation neglect the various social 
meanings a technology or product may have to different people. The social dynamics during 
technological change are overlooked. SCOT literature on the other hand neglects techno-
economic characteristics of the innovation (such as prices, research investment levels) and scale 
and learning mechanisms. Since the second half of the 1990s some authors have sought 
integration of the two strands, dealing with the limits of both. Rip and Kemp (1998) elaborated 
the co-evolution of ‘the social’ and ‘the technical’, analysing the emergence, transformation and 
decay of socio-technical systems. Their ‘multi-level’ model of innovation distinguishes between 
the macro level of the socio-technical landscape, the meso level regime, and the micro level 
niche. Geels (2005) worked out the key idea that radical innovations come about through 
interactions between processes at these three levels. That is: the breakthrough from niche to 
regime level occurs gradually, as a new technology ‘branches’ or ‘penetrates’ different 
application domains, before entering mainstream markets. These studies have highlighted more 
than previous studies the patterns in which established technologies are sometimes abandoned 
and overthrown by emerging niches. 
Whilst appreciating this contribution, a number of scholars have also pointed to drawbacks of 
these studies and the MLP. Shove and Walker (2007) critically appraised studies in this field, 
finding they are typically distanced, even voyeuristic, making few claims about how individuals 
and organisations can [or] might ( . . . ) act to affect the processes in question ( . . . ) p.764). 
Genus and Coles (2008) have suggested, amongst other things, that the model undervalues the 
role of agency (p.1440), i.e. focuses more on interaction patterns of actors, whilst neglecting 
their intentions. They also find a tendency to focus on ‘winning’ technologies (p.1444). Others 
suggested that the studies have been less explicit on the mechanisms or key processes that drive 
the patterns of change of the niche and regime (Negro 2007). Interactions between niche and 
regime are claimed to be important, yet the interactions are not specified in term of feedback 
processes. In summary, the MLP has put less emphasis on stakeholder perspectives and their 
role in key processes of niche and regime interaction. Consequently, studies of the MLP have 
been less sensitive for the variety of possible innovation paths, other than the ‘winning’ or 
prevailing transition in a specific case. 
In this thesis we elaborate a co-evolutionary approach to innovation, building upon the 
integrating bridge of evolutionary economics and sociology of technology, initiated by Rip, Kemp 
and Geels. We develop a micro-macro model (more familiar to the economic tradition), thus 
                                                                        
2 Though this strand hardly uses the term innovation, but instead technology, artifact or technology in 
development. 
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deviating from the three-levelled niche, regime and landscape model. At the micro level, the 
innovation is described through the eyes of stakeholders, whereas at macro level aggregated 
indicators such as total sales and prices are incorporated. We hold (groups of) actors as the basic 
element of analysis, stepping into their shoes, mapping their mental framing and attitudes. A 
frame is the way in which the innovation is described or interpreted by an actor. Further, in this 
thesis we extend the notion of feedback effects through scale and learning with the effect of 
consumer taste formation, including social connotation. We discuss the advantages and 
disadvantages of this approach for the notion of co-evolution. We aim to contribute to 
evolutionary economic co-evolutionary studies (in the neo-Schumpeterian tradition), as well as 
to co-evolutionary approaches in the broader field of innovation studies. 
 
 
1.3 CASE STUDIES 
 
The two cases we address, innovation of car engines and of urban car parking, are interesting for 
a co-evolutionary approach, since in both cases the introduction of new ‘hardware’ (technology 
and/or infrastructure) goes together with adaptations of ‘software’ (soft things such as 
stakeholder perspectives and institutional factors). Moreover, both innovations emerge in a 
sector with an established dominant design or socio-technical regime (Kemp et al., 1998), and 
the novelties interact with that regime, with possible transformative impacts. 
The car engine sector has been dominated by internal combustion (IC) technology for more than 
a century now. The engines constructed by Otto, Daimler and Benz in the 1880s have been 
greatly improved since then, though they are in principle surprisingly similar to today’s engines. 
We refer to the ICE regime as the social grammar around the dominant technology, ICE, such as 
market structure, user perspectives and practices (reflecting their preferences and endorsed 
social connotations), producer skills, capabilities and perspective, regulations, and supporting 
institutions. In addition to established gasoline and diesel IC engines, electric vehicles have (re-) 
emerged as a market niche in the 1990s. For suppliers, full electric vehicles require a consider-
able extension of their technology competences and skills, since the character of electric 
components significantly differs from the IC ones. For users too, driving an electric vehicle 
means a drastic reduction of vehicle autonomy (compared to ICE) and another way of refuelling. 
An alternative refuelling infrastructure would be required to support the wider use of these 
vehicles. Regarding these differences in the social and institutional context, electrical vehicles 
can be identified as a niche outside the ICE regime. 
As an intermediate solution, hybrid-electric vehicles have emerged on the market after 1997. 
They combine an IC engine with an electric engine. Vehicle autonomy and refuelling are similar 
as to ICEs. For suppliers, hybrid-electric vehicles require a significant extension of their 
technology competences and skills, as in the case of electric vehicles. Hybrids are typically more 
expensive than ICEs, but have a higher fuel economy. Various owners see their vehicle as 
‘socially responsible’, as ‘the right vehicle for society’. In the context of increasing oil prices, 
stricter emission regulation and rising environmental concerns this type of vehicle has gained 
market shares of a few percentages in Japan, the United States and various European countries. 
In a longer time frame, the co-existence of the emerging electric and hybrid-electric niche and 
the dominant ICE regime can be mapped out as follows. Figure 1.5 draws a typology based on 
two dimensions. The first dimension is the level of the change. It refers to the rate at which 
suppliers refine their skills and competences on a technology or the rate to which user perspec-
tives or regulatory settings adapt. Change may be fast or slow. The second dimension of the 
typology is the location of (the majority of) the change. This may be located inside the regime or 
outer-regime. So, niches may develop inside (or close to) the dominant regime, or outside 
(further away). 
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Figure 1.5: Typology of innovation trajectories (combining notions of Abernathy & Clark (1985) and Geels and 
Kemp (2007). 
 
The typology helps to see that, in general, the emergence of hybrid-electric and electric vehicles 
may follow four scenarios. First, change can be strong and located within the ICE regime 
(bottom, right). This delivers ‘transformation’ of the regime, and redirection of the trajectory. 
The established technology, ICE, is gradually substituted with a new one (e.g. low-emission ICEs 
or mild hybrid-electrics). The user practices and institutions however are here sustained. 
Second, change can be strong and located at the outer-regime electrical niche (top-right). Here, 
transition or switch to a new trajectory occurs. The new technology, e.g. full-electric vehicles, 
may lead to adaptation of user practices, for example to another way of refuelling, reduction of 
the average length of the trips, and to combining car trips with public transportation. New 
infrastructures for electric refuelling will be built, whereas petrol stations deteriorate. New 
suppliers may enter the market. The dominant momentum switches from the regime trajectory 
to the former (outer-regime) niche trajectory, which then speeds up non-linearly. 
Thirdly, change can be slow and located within the regime (bottom, left). Some incremental 
innovation takes place in the regime, cumulatively shaping a trajectory of slow refinement of ICE 
technology. Mostly, there is ‘reproduction’ of existing actor perspectives, practices and 
technologies of the regime. 
Fourth, change may be slow and located mainly outside the regime, as alternative to the 
dominant design (top, left). Here, diversification takes place, since the regime stays in place, but 
co-exiting niches become slightly stronger. 
In this thesis we will study the actual trajectories of (hybrid-)electric engine technologies. The 
research questions in this case study will be summarized in the next section. 
In our second case, urban car parking, we find a new practice, P+R, emerging in the context of a 
dominant practice: parking in the city centre. One way to define the regime, i.e. the social 
grammar around the dominant practice, is by using a typology of vehicle ownership and (urban) 
vehicle use, see Figure 1.6. The typology presents the entire field of urban passenger mobility. 
Vehicles may be owned individually or by an organization, and may be driven individually or 
involve collective use. In the upper-left quadrant we find the practice in which a vast majority of 
travellers is involved: private car use with parking at the destination. This practice is possible 
through an enabling infrastructure of on-street parking spaces as well as off-street parking 
garages, operated by both private and public organizations. We denote the dominant urban car 
parking regime as the practice of parking in the city centre as such, including the perspectives of 
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corresponding motorists, and the perspectives and arrangements of private and public 
organizations who supply parking spaces. In the bottom-right quadrant we find collective use of 
publicly owned vehicles, i.e. public transportation. In most urban areas this is a second but 
smaller regime, enabled by a network of buses, trams, metro and or trains. 
 
 
Figure 1.6: Typology of urban passenger mobility (adapted from Orsato (2009)) 
 
In this context P+R is introduced in many cities as a facility to accommodate intermodal travel. 
The sites offer parking of the privately owned car, and transfer to either public collective 
transport (buses, metro etc.) or public bikes. Travellers opting for P+R must change their 
perspective of their car. They must leave an idea behind of the car as the machine that takes 
them anywhere they want. They must embrace a significant symbolic-cultural change which 
reframes the car as a means to access public transport, rather than a door-to-door personal 
transport mode. Therefore, P+R can be identified as a niche in urban passenger transport, 
outside the dominant regime of parking in the city centre. Both niche and regime co-exist within 
a context of one market for urban parking. Finally, as in the first case study, this case is 
interesting for a second reason. The P+R niche may become a ‘working’ configuration that 
shapes and reshapes the regime, potentially overthrowing the regime of high central parking 
intensity. 
In this thesis we will study the actual innovation trajectories of P+R in European cities. We 
specify the research questions in the two case studies in the next section. 
 
 
1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
The focus of this thesis can be summarized in the following research questions: 
1. How to combine the objectivist approach of evolutionary economics, with its attention to 
prices and markets, with the constructivist approach of SCOT (social construction of tech-
nology), with its attention to frames and actor groups? 
2. Is a co-evolutionary approach a reasonable and relevant approach to study the emergence 
of (H)EVs and P+R, regarding: 
a. the diffusion dynamics it highlights? 
b. what it learns about path dependence and path creation (i.e. niche-regime dynamics)? 
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c. the incorporation of both aggregate and agent-based elements so as to give a micro-
underpinning of macro patterns with feedback loops from macro to micro? 
3. Can we measure user frames and social connotations of innovations and incorporate the 
results in computer simulations and in historic-analytical analyses of socio-technical 
change? 
4. Does the incorporation of competing technologies in a diffusion model lead to different 
results? 
5. What is the value of a co-evolutionary conceptualization of innovation dynamics for policy? 
Does it lead to different policy implications than the economic welfare perspective and 
those of the innovation system perspective? 
 
Obviously, questions 1 and 2 relate to the theoretic side of this thesis, while questions 3 and 4 
relates to the methodology, and question 5 to the policy side. 
 
 
1.5 METHODOLOGY AND OUTLINE 
 
In chapter 2 we address the state of the art of theories on innovation. We discuss some gaps in 
the literature, some of which are our research questions. We provide initial answers (hypothe-
ses) to some of these questions in the form of a conceptual (co-evolutionary) framework. This 
framework is applied in the remainder of the thesis, and appraised in the concluding chapter. 
Chapter 3 goes into the research methodologies we apply. 
In chapter 4 to 10 we make two successive steps: historic-analytic approaches to the cases (what 
has happened?), and future exploration (what could happen?). In the first step the recent (15-
year) history in car engine technology and P+R is described in terms of the conceptual frame-
work. A special focus is put on mental frames of actor groups and shifts therein. The frames of 
car consumers are studied longitudinally; frames and attitudes of car firms are analyzed. Policy 
frames of local governments are studied with regard to P+R. 
The second step is future exploration. In chapter 9 we develop scenarios, supported by a 
simulation approach. Informed by the data of recent developments in the case study, we 
formalize actor frames and attitudes, and make assumptions on the decision processes. This 
delivers a simulation analysis of the interplay of demand and supply, modelling various possible 
trajectories. Two scenarios for the future of (hybrid-)electric vehicles are developed and 
discussed. 
The second step (what could happen?) includes a policy discussion in chapter 10. After taking 
account of the analysis in the forgoing chapters, we explore effective ways for policymakers to 
stimulate cleaner car engines and use of P+R in cities. 
Chapter 11 draws conclusions on our five research questions and discusses the merits and 
drawbacks of our approach. 
In this thesis historical explanatory case studies are combined with building future scenarios. 
Discourse analysis, quantitative modelling, as well as statistical analyses are brought together in 
this study. 
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2 Theorizing innovation 
 
In this chapter we review the state-of-the art of innovation theories. Our review seeks which 
theories are most applicable for analyzing innovation in (car) mobility technologies and 
practices, such as emergence of hybrid-electric vehicles, and emergence of Park-and-Ride (P+R). 
We distinguish between objectivist, subjectivist, and system perspectives. We denote subjectiv-
ist3 perspectives as approaches that describe innovations through the eyes of members of social 
groups. The interpretations of these individuals and organizations are thus a basic element in 
the analysis. In other words: the actor-technology relation is key. Objectivist4 approaches on the 
other hand, focus on the more objective characteristics of technology, for instance trends in 
efficiency rates, processor speed, prices and sales levels (i.e. diffusion rates). Difference in 
interpretation of one technology between different social groups is typically neglected. A third 
type of approaches, system approaches, seeks to integrate elements of the previous two in one 
framework5. The three types of approaches to innovation that we distinguish leave however a 
number of relevant issues unresolved. Section 2.4 presents a framework, complementing to the 
system approaches, for studying some of these issues. 
 
2.1 OBJECTIVIST PERSPECTIVES 
 
Economic studies 
As introduced in chapter one, the Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter (1883-1950) is 
regarded a founding father of innovation theories, explaining why firms search for innovation. 
He described innovation as a shift in production function (of a firm, an industry or an entire 
country), that may be due to technical progress in a narrow sense - that is, product or process 
innovation - or the opening up of a new market, the acquisition of a new source of raw 
materials, or a structural reorganization of an industry (Schumpeter, 1935). His concept is 
unusually broad and dynamic for an economist by considering product and process technology 
aspects together with industry and market aspects. The (neo-) classical school, by contrast, 
treats innovation essentially as an investment problem faced by rent-seeking agents. According 
to the neo-classical view, if the costs of innovation (the costs of research and development, 
marketing and so on) match the benefits in terms of expected benefits for the innovator, an 
investment of money and effort will be made. In the footsteps of Schumpeter, especially in the 
last quarter of the 20th century, a new wave of economists revitalized evolutionary theorizing of 
innovation, also considering the broader institutional context. This strand of innovation theory 
provides the basis for explaining why technology is so highly patterned and why it exhibits so 
much stability. Abernathy and Utterback (1978), in their book Patterns of industrial innovation, 
distinguish three phases in the emergence and development of a technology. In the first phase, 
when the technology emerges, product innovation is intense, and product variety widens. In the 
second, transitional phase competition between products (or regulatory standards) takes place, 
competing for a dominant design. The emergence of this opens way to standardisation and mass 
                                                                        
3 Subjectivism is a philosophical tenet that accords primacy to subjective experience as fundamental of all 
measure and law. In an extreme form, it may hold that the nature and existence of every object depends 
solely on someone's subjective awareness of it. It is also referred to as interpretivism. 
4 Objectivism is the belief that reality is mind-independent. It is synonymous to philosophical realism. 
5 Note that the subjectivist-objectivist grouping of approaches is not always easy. Some concepts that I label 
as ‘objectivist’ may even include ‘subject’ characteristics. Still, when they neglect characterizing the subject- 
innovation relation (cf. Emirbayer 1997), we affirm they are not subjectivist. 
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production. The third phase is that of a mature technology, where innovation continues but only 
gradually. Following this line of enquiry, Freeman and Perez (1988) studied cycles in technologi-
cal development and economic returns, pointing to a cyclical pattern of incremental versus 
radical innovation. The first refers to a phase of continuous gradual improvement of many 
products, processes and services. By contrast, at discontinuous events the gradual process is 
punctuated by radical innovation, often involving a combined product, process and organiza-
tional innovation. Between such (rare) discontinuous events, technologies and systems exhibit a 
great amount of stability. As a simple illustration of a mature technology one may compare a car 
engine in 1950 with one produced in 2000, and see how remarkably similar they are. 
One of the explanations for this great amount of stability of established technologies is that 
innovators (i.e. firms or engineers) are constrained in what they know and what they believe is 
possible. Nelson and Winter (1982) stressed that these bounds of engineers and designers stem 
from shared socio-cognitive models of problems and possible solutions, directing the search, 
research and development process. Extending this idea, Giovanni Dosi proposed that innovators 
operated within a ‘technological paradigm’. The choice of technical problems worth solving and 
the approaches used to solve them tend to restrict proposed solutions along particular avenues. 
Cumulatively, a technological trajectory is set out that provides incremental innovation rather 
than radical. 
Following the same line of thought, Brian Arthur and Paul David developed models to study 
technological competition between competing designs. Their case studies and models have 
illustrated how an initial advantage of the existing path is self-reinforced through processes of 
increasing returns to adoption as a result of scale and learning or network effects. This is the 
notion of path dependency that is now widely acknowledged among scholars in technical 
change. 
Business scholars have addressed innovation from an entrepreneurial perspective. These studies 
are mostly centered on finding effective firm strategies for successful innovation. Authors have 
argued that, apart from Research and Development (R&D) expenditures, some firms become 
persistent innovators due to dynamic economies of scale and learning by doing. Economies of 
scale may be utilized by any size firm expanding its scale of operation. It entails the fall of 
average cost per unit as scale is increased. Typically, benefits stem from purchasing, manage-
ment and marketing. Economies of scale are also derived partially from learning by doing. This is 
the learning associated with accumulative production of a given item, improving the producers’ 
skills, subsequently reducing production time and cost. Some authors in this field distinguish 
between technological and organizational capabilities, and have stressed the role of organiza-
tional learning (Leonard-Barton, 1992; 1995; Von Hippel and Tyre, 1995). Others have hinted at 
the importance of consumer involvement. Apart from direct consumer involvement in product 
development, firms learn from the market how much commercial potential a technology has. 
They learn about consumer preferences and how they evolve. The critical role of these 
user/producer interactions has been pointed out by Lundvall (1988) and Von Hippel (1988). 
Firms learn especially from emerging market niches with new technologies, from their own 
customers but also from customers of competitors. It will shape their business strategy and re-
evaluate their current technological competences. The lessons will also guide future R&D 
investments toward better market application of technologies. 
In their application evolutionary models have been focussing on firms and industries and on 
process innovations related to production efficiency. They have given less thought to the role of 
the social context (or embeddings), e.g. social institutions and demand structures. After 1990, 
more authors have been hinting at a co-evolutionary approach, which seeks to include such 
institutions in particular. Norgaard (1984) was the first to use the concept of co-evolution 
explicitly in a socio-economic context. He proposes to understand societal change or develop-
ment as a co-evolutionary process, i.e. co-evolution between cultural systems (where he means: 
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social organisation, knowledge, technology, values) and ecological systems. Norgaards explana-
tion of change goes beyond ‘interactive determinism’, hence is different from cause and effect 
thinking. The terms ‘to co-evolve’ and ‘co-evolution’ that he uses, refer to an ongoing positive 
feedback between components of evolving systems. He explains how ‘positive feedback’ tears a 
system away from its (old) equilibrium (but may reach a new one, out of multi possible ones). 
Negative feedback tends to bring a system back in its equilibrium. Though negative feedback 
models are convenient for understanding and design, the natural and social processes and their 
interactions that we observe do not lead to equilibrium conditions (Norgaard, 1994, p.82). Co-
evolutionary models of systems on the other hand, he notes, can readily be thought of as 
providing their own change from within, or endogenously. 
Nelson (1994) worked out the life-cycle of technology (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978) in terms 
of co-evolution of industry structure and supporting institutions with the technology. Nelson 
questions the universality of this original story. It will fit better for industries where the product 
is a ‘system’, and where customers have similar demands. For industries where consumer needs 
are divergent and specialized (such as the pharmaceutical industry) it is less likely applicable. 
Nelson also points to a third component to the co-evolution of technology and industry 
structure: supporting institutions. He argues they are not simply an outcome of the prevailing 
technology, but co-evolve with the technology and industry structure. Examples are industry 
associations and quality standards. 
Other scholars have provides case-specific applications of a co-evolutionary approach. 
Rosenkopf and Tushman (1998) provide a case-study application on co-evolution of networks of 
communities of practitioners and technology in the flight simulation industry. They work out 
how inter-organizational networks and communities socially construct technological change; in 
turn, technological outcomes determine the evolution of organizations and communities. 
Rosenkopf & Tushman develop a set of propositions on the emergence, growth and re-
formation of “cooperative technical organizations” (CTO) networks, and explore how the 
evolution of these networks both shapes and is constrained by technological outcomes in the 
flight simulation industry. They argue that varying levels of technological uncertainty between 
eras of ferment (high uncertainty) and eras of incremental change (low uncertainty) engender 
fundamentally different modes of network evolution: social construction during eras of ferment, 
and technological determinism during eras of incremental change. More than previous studies, 
this study identifies specific mechanisms than constitute the co-evolution (of CTO’s and 
technology). 
Jacobides and Winter (2005) provide a framework on capabilities co-evolving with transaction 
cost, to understand how firms make choices with respect to vertical scope. This is done through 
the identification of the specific evolutionary mechanisms that determine vertical scope over 
time. They identify four key evolutionary mechanisms, which explain how capabilities affect 
scope, and how scope affects capability. 
Van den Bergh and Stagl (2003) propose a framework for studying the co-evolution between 
economic behaviour and institutions. They examine the interaction between social institutions 
and the behaviour of individuals and groups. They discuss mechanisms of how institutions 
influence, enable or constrain behaviour of individuals, and mechanisms of how interaction 
among individuals influences institutions: altruism, co-operation, individuals forming groups, etc. 
They conclude that, if one aims to formalize the entire set of two way interactions between 
individuals and institutions, then a multi-layered structure is required, and this would go beyond 
simple evolutionary game models. 
Windrum and Birchenhall (2005) present a formal multi-agent model that explicitly includes 
consumers in addition to firms. In their model the nature and direction of technological 
innovation is determined by the interaction of heterogeneous consumer preferences and 
heterogeneous firm knowledge bases at the micro level. Since the two populations exercise a 
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strong selective force for each other one can speak of a co-evolution between consumers and 
firms. Conceptually, the article resembles an argument of Saviotti (2005, p.19) to address co-
evolution of demand and supply: Demand is created gradually as an innovation diffuses and as 
various forms of learning take place, both on the consumer and of the producer side. These forms 
of learning are mutual ( . . . ). Thus we can say that demand and supply co-evolve during the life 
cycle of a technology ( . . . ), which means that their institutions co-evolve. 
In summary, co-evolutionary approaches in economics are employed increasingly, mostly to 
include the role of institutions in technological development. Our short overview confirms that 
co-evolution is useful as a framework to single out a small number of components of a complex 
innovation system in order to study their interacting evolution, since it gives us an analytically 
more tractable problem. Notions and mechanisms from various research fields can be drawn in 
and integrated. Many of the contributors above have done this. Nevertheless, as Saviotti (2005) 
notices, the current understanding of co-evolving institutions and technologies is still poor. The 
notion of co-evolution is defined rather loosely in most publications. It tends to be used for any 
two or more variables that are partly dependent on each other; as a new term for all interaction 
phenomena. Van den Bergh et al. (2006) have provided a stricter definition, referring to co-
evolution as processes where two variation and selection processes, comprising two or more 
populations or systems, interact or mutual interfere. This definition we follow in this thesis. We 
further stress that without explicating the processes or mechanisms that constitute co-evolution 
in a specific case, the term becomes merely a synonym to interaction or co-dynamics (where co-
dynamics are simple dynamic changes reciprocally occurring between two or more identified 
systems). So, a co-evolutionary approach is (more) reasonable when it is explicit about the key 
processes underlying the coevolving components. 
 
Innovation diffusion studies 
One field that includes objectivist approaches to innovation is innovation diffusion studies. It has 
its origin in social geography (Sauer, Hägerstrand), and was later adopted in marketing studies. 
The focus in most diffusion studies is on aggregate patterns, which are often found to be S-
shaped. Rogers (1983) mentions five characteristics of an innovation that help to explain their 
difference in rate of adoption curves: (1) relative advantage, (2) compatibility, (3) complexity, (4) 
triability, and (5) observability. He offers a typology of adopters based on when they adopt but 
does not offer a dynamic model of innovation diffusion in terms of endogenous and exogenous 
mechanisms. 
For explaining S-shaped diffusion patterns there are two models. The most well-known and 
widely applied model is the epidemic model pioneered by Bass (1969). It builds on the premise 
that what limits the speed of usage is the lack of information available about the new technol-
ogy, how to use it and what it does. Information diffusion is governed by social contacts and 
marketing. Epidemic models have been widely applied in curve-fitting exercises (Bass, 1986; 
Mahajan et al., 1990). Supply factors and changes in the environment are typically neglected, or 
incorporated in a crude way. Mahajan et al. (1990) identify nine crude assumptions, three of 
which are: 
• Total market potential of a new product (= final number of adopters) stays constant in time. 
• Diffusion of an innovation is independent of all other innovations. 
• The nature of an innovation does not change over time 
Although Mahajan et al. and others (for example Lee et al., 2006) mention studies that 
overcome several assumptions, the models remain one sided in explaining the driving forces of 
innovation diffusion processes (still spread of information). Other relevant feedback effects, 
such as progressive improvement of the product (affecting adopter attitudes), remain neglected. 
The second type of models explaining S-shaped diffusion patterns incorporate some micro 
theory. These models are referred to as rational choice models, or threshold models. They are 
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typical economic models in which any actor is expected to adopt an innovation the moment it 
becomes economic to do so. Supply aspects such as the techno-economic characteristics of an 
innovation can be incorporated in this type of model (as being done in Ireland and Stoneman, 
1982). The model is mostly applied to the diffusion of production technologies, often using size 
as critical variate (David, 1969; Davies, 1979). Bigger companies are expected to adopt earlier 
because of economies of scale advantages or available capabilities. Bonus (1973) applies a 
threshold analysis to the diffusion of household durables (cameras, TV sets, and automobiles), 
using income as the critical stimulus. 
Both types of diffusion models are widely and successfully applied to simple as well as to 
complex technologies, but learning as well as social and institutional aspects are typically poorly 
integrated. The social embedding of technologies has been addressed more profound by 
subjectivist approaches, to which we turn now.  (Emirbayer, 1997) 
 
 
2.2 SUBJECTIVIST PERSPECTIVES 
 
Science, Technology and Society (STS) Studies 
Sociology of technological change came of age in the 1980s, mostly in reaction to the linear 
model of innovation (dating back to Schumpeter), referred to as technological determinism. 
Scholars in this field objected to the assumption of new generations of technology succeeding 
each other in a linear sequence from ideas and inventions of technicians, to development and 
design, to market implementation (Smith and Marx, 1994), finally shaping society. By contrast, 
Science, Technology and Society (STS) studies, as this field is usually referred to, emphasize the 
role of societal actors in technical development. Within STS, different approaches have been 
taken. The Social Construction of Technology (SCOT) takes a constructivist approach, where the 
innovation is not described as an objective entity, but rather through the eyes of members of 
social groups (e.g. Bijker et al., 1987; Bijker, 1995). Such groups may be producers, policymakers 
or users, but also categories like men, women, or businessmen. Different social groups may 
interpret an artefact differently, e.g. what they like about it, what meaning they attach to it, 
what they experience as problems, what they regard as possible solutions. Hence, the artefact 
has interpretative flexibility, and various technological frames may exist for one and the same 
technological hardware. Bijker recognizes a technological frame as structuring the interactions 
among members of a social group, similar to Kuhn’s paradigm (Kuhn, 1962)6. Individual actors 
will have a certain degree of inclusion in the ‘frame’. High inclusion means that an actor acts, 
interacts, and thinks to a great degree in terms of that frame. Since development of technologi-
cal artefacts is often triggered by problems that relevant actors experience with it, perceptions 
of social groups are essential for understanding the development of a technology, scholars of 
SCOT argue. (Dosi, 1982) 
Other authors have elaborated on these notions. Oudshoorn and Pinch (2003) stress that 
formation of the social frame (or script) of novel products should be understood as a process 
involving users as well as designers. Designers are important by shaping the initial forms, 
functions and meanings of objects. Users, by their different ways of interpreting, using and 
talking about technologies, further contribute to their social shaping, including the attribution of 
symbolic meanings to the product. This is part of what some call the domestication process of a 
                                                                        
6 The concept of ‘technological frame’ of a social group has some similarity with ‘technological paradigm’ 
(Dosi, 1982, p.152): a "model" and a "pattern" of solution of selected technological problems, based on 
selected principles derived from natural sciences and on selected material technologies. Both concepts 
denote socio-cognitive characteristics of actors towards a technology.  
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product into daily life (Lie and Sørensen, 1996). In the field of marketing the symbolic meaning 
or value that goods and services hold is well established too (e.g. Douglas and Isherwood, 1979), 
though there it is more distinct from the functional value. In both fields the symbolic value is as a 
social connotation or meaning attributed to the product, and consumers will have a certain 
degree of inclusion in such a social construct. It may be positive or negative (even at the same 
time, for different groups of consumers), thus adding value in the eyes of a consumer, or 
decreasing it. The Sport Utility Vehicle (SUV) for instance, has for a large group of car drivers 
symbolic associations of ultimate status, power and freedom, as its user is able to control a 
powerful machine, and is capable of crossing any terrain. For others, by contrast, SUVs are 
exponents of decadence, of spilling of petrol, and of insolence, which makes them in the 
Netherlands facetiously called PC-Hooft tractor (after the posh P.C. Hooftstreet in Amsterdam). 
Obviously, social meaning or connotation is multidimensional, fluid, and therefore often hard to 
pin down. 
There are more approaches within STS, though we will not address them all thoroughly here. 
Most notably among them is Actor Network Theory (ANT), which highlights the importance of 
linkages between actors and artefacts. The combination of actor and network means that there 
are no actors without networks. Artefacts do not work unless they are placed in a wider 
configuration that works (Rip and Kemp 1998). A third approach in STS, known as Large 
Technical Systems theory (LTS, Hughes, 1983) is a socio-technical mode of analysis, approaching 
the technological artefact as one component in a system with a variety of other components, 
such as the supporting infrastructure, related technologies, user groups, producers, legislation, 
etc. In general, studies in STS have elaborated how new technologies and technological systems 
come about and function, but devote less attention to how established technologies and 
practices are sometimes abandoned or radically transformed. 
The merit of these subjectivist approaches is at least twofold. First, authors demonstrated how 
various social interpretations of technology drive various directions of technological develop-
ment. Therefore, technology should not be viewed as a sole objective entity (as in economic and 
technical studies), but rather be described ‘through the eyes of social groups’. 
Secondly, the subjectivist approach has convincingly stressed that the ‘burden’ of history in the 
emergence of novelty is not the only force. By strategic choices of agents, entrepreneurs, users 
or policymakers may stimulate creation of new paths (Garud and Karnoe, 2001; 2003). Rather 
than being passive observers in a stream of events, entrepreneurs, users and policymakers are 
able to reflect and act pro-actively towards a certain goal; a goal that may go against dominant 
social conventions. 
 
 
2.3 SYSTEM APPROACHES 
 
In system approaches to innovation linkages between elements are central. Since an element 
may be social as well as non-social, these approaches can be regarded as an attempt to integrate 
a balanced share of subjectivist and objectivist elements into one framework. Note that ‘system’ 
does not refer to the technology here, but to the strong links between various elements, with 
weaker links to elements outside the system. Since many elements are social groups, this 
approach is close to a social network approaches. Studies using system approaches have 
demonstrated that innovation is not an individual but a collective endeavour, emerging from 
interaction of multiple actors. Though the ample attention for social groups suggests a fair 
subjectivist inclination, still most of the studies lean towards the objectivist approach, neglecting 
the variety of interpretations within one social group (such as users). 
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System approach to radical innovation or ‘transition’ 
Whereas until the middle of the 1990s most innovation studies had been centred on incre-
mental innovation and lock-in, since then system approaches addressing radical innovation have 
increasingly appeared. In this approach the emergence, transformation and decay of socio-
technical systems is analyzed as co-evolution of ‘the social’ and ‘the technical’. Rip and Kemp’s 
(1998) ‘multi-level’ perspective (MLP) of innovation distinguishes between the macro level of 
the socio-technical landscape, the meso level regime, and the micro level niche. The socio-
technical regime at the meso level is an extended version of Nelson and Winter’s (1982) 
technological regime, and is defined here as the meta-coordination of a number of coexisting 
regimes, such as the technological regime, user and market regime, socio-cultural regime, and 
policy regime. Different regimes have relative autonomy on the one hand, but are interdepend-
ent on the other (Kemp et al., 2001 p.277). 
Technological niches are micro level spaces where radical novelties emerge. While initially 
unstable and weak, they act as ‘incubation rooms’, protecting novelties against mainstream 
market selection (Kemp et al., 1998; Schot, 1998). The socio-technical landscape forms an 
exogenous environment beyond the direct influence of niche and regime actors. Examples are 
macro-economic and macro-political environments and developments. 
Geels (2005) worked out the key idea that radical innovations come about through interactions 
between processes at these three levels: (a) niche-innovations build up internal momentum, 
through learning processes, price/performance improvements, and support from powerful 
groups, (b) changes at the landscape level create pressure on the regime and (c) destabilisation 
of the regime creates windows of opportunity for niche-innovations. Various retrospective 
analyzes of the rise and fall of selected socio-technical systems have been developed, such as 
‘from sail to steam ships’, ‘from horse to car’, ‘from coal to gas’ (Correlje and Verbong, 2004; 
Geels, 2005). These MLP studies have highlighted more than previous studies the patterns in 
which established technologies are sometimes abandoned and overthrown by emerging niches. 
They have enriched the understanding of interaction of two technologies, or niche-regime (or 
regime-regime) dynamics for that matter. Raven en Verbong (2007) have worked out interaction 
of two socio-technical regimes in the Dutch energy sector, building upon notions of Pistorius and 
Utterback (1997). These studies suggest that, in addition to pure competition, two technologies 
may have a symbiotic or predator/prey relationship. Raven en Verbong distinguish a spill-over 
relation, which is a special case of symbiosis (commensalism), and also integration, when 
previously separated regimes become one. The authors find that in practice the different types 
of relationships are not exclusive and can occur simultaneously or sequentially. 
In a similar line of enquiry Geels (2005) describes fit-stretch patterns as a type of niche-regime 
dynamics. Geels found that the social framing of new niche technologies is initially very close to 
the social framing of the regime technology. Early cars, for instance, were called ‘horseless 
carriages’. Perceptions gradually changed as people gained more hands-on experience with the 
technology. From a ‘fit’ with the horse-based regime, the framing of cars progressively 
‘stretched’, and a unique frame emerged. 
 
 
Innovation systems 
In the innovation literature different types of innovation systems are discerned where each type 
focuses on a specific aspect, depending on one’s unit of analysis. In the national innovation 
systems approach, it is the country that is the unit of analysis, influencing the technology choice 
and learning processes (Freeman, 1987; Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1992). Then there is the regional 
innovation systems approach within a country, where cultural variables, such as social networks, 
are important (Saxenian, 1991). The sectoral innovation system focuses on the firms that are 
active in the innovative activities of a sector (Breschi and Malerba, 1997). These approaches 
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regard innovation as a learning process, which contains the interaction of the development of a 
technology with the system in which the technology is embedded. Most analyses of innovation 
systems are quasi-static: they explain the social structure, and the related performance of the 
innovation system. However, less emphasis is put on the dynamic processes (e.g. how technol-
ogy changes in time in the system). 
A fourth related approach, technological innovation systems, puts more focus on a specific 
technology, and on how relevant actors and institutions contribute - in one way or another, 
directly or indirectly, intentionally or not - to the emergence or production of innovation 
(Hekkert et al., 2006). TIS studies analyze a technological innovation in a sector by referring to 
systemic features, including actors, institutions, (sometimes) technologies and most importantly, 
interrelations between them (Carlsson et al., 2002). A TIS is defined as a dynamic network of 
agents interacting in a specific economic/ industrial area under a particular institutional 
infrastructure and involved in the generation, diffusion, and utilization of technology (Carlsson 
and Stankiewicz, 1991, p.93). These studies have described how an initially small scale, emerging 
technology passes through a formative stage, before reaching a market environment. A TIS may 
accelerate the development of the technology greatly. The scholars conceptualize underlying 
build-up processes in terms of system functions, or key activities. These involve: entrepreneurial 
activities, knowledge development, knowledge diffusion, guidance of the search, market 
formation, resource mobilization, and support from advocacy coalitions (Hekkert et al., 2007). 
The studies have contributed detailed analyses of how acceleration through a TIS may occur. The 
concept is less clear why some TISs are successful whereas others are not. In other words: it 
remains unresolved when or under what conditions this accelerating build-up is likely to occur. 
The reason of this deficiency may be that the concept focuses more on the niche (TIS) develop-
ment, and neglects how this niche interacts with the established regime. There is little attention 
to how users appreciate the niche product vis-à-vis other products and their mental perspective 
(framing). 
Both studies of systems in transition and studies of TIS have left a few relevant issues unre-
solved. They both typically stay away from the precise perceptions of members of social groups. 
This underexposure of this part of agency obscures the (socio-practical) alternatives that 
individuals and organizations perceive, and consequently the potential of various directions of 
innovation. Shove and Walker (2007) find MLP studies are typically distanced, even voyeuristic, 
making few claims about how individuals and organisations can [or] might ( . . . ) act to affect the 
processes in question ( . . . ) p.764). Genus and Coles (2008) have suggested, amongst other 
things, that the model undervalues the role of agency (p.1440), i.e. focuses more on interaction 
patterns of actors, whilst neglecting their intentions. They also find a tendency to focus on 
‘winning’ technologies (p.1444). Others suggested that the studies have been less explicit on the 
mechanisms or key processes that drive the patterns of change of the niche and regime (Negro, 
2007). Whereas interactions between niche and regime are claimed to be important, yet the 
interactions are not specified in term of feedback processes. As we saw earlier, the same holds 
for the TIS approach. In summary, both system approaches have put less emphasis on stake-
holder perspectives and their role in key processes of niche and regime interaction. 
In the next section we develop a framework that addresses these two issues. As suggested by 
Genus and Coles (2008), we increase the input from constructivist approaches, more precisely 
from the social construction of technology (SCOT). We present a two-layered, co-evolutionary 
framework, where the micro level incorporates subjectivist elements, by mapping the perspec-
tives of individuals and organizations and describing the innovation trough the eyes of these key 
stakeholders. Further the macro level addresses aggregated, objectified indicators, such as 
prices and total sales levels. By addressing feedback mechanisms between and within the layers, 
we try and identify the key processes that constitute the niche-regime dynamics, delivering path 
dependent and path creating inclinations of a sector at the same time. 
thesis_Dijk_v07.pdf
Chapter 2 
 28 
2.4 A FRAMEWORK WITH CO-EVOLUTION OF DEMAND AND SUPPLY 
 
In our framework we consider demand and supply as two populations of attributes that co-
evolve (Saviotti, 2005; Windrum and Birchenhall, 2005; Safarzynska and Van den Bergh, 2010). 
When we speak of demand and supply we thus mean the demand side and supply side. On the 
supply side, suppliers are creating technological variety. Of the possible options that emerge, 
some are selected on the market to the exclusion of others. On the demand side we have 
heterogeneous people of different income and lifestyles, equipped with preferences, beliefs and 
ways of thinking. 
Market price is important, but certainly not the whole story behind supply and demand. Markets 
are socially embedded (Rip and Kemp, 1998) and products are socially constructed (Bijker, 
1995). Underlying supply and demand we find socio-economic actors, with ways of interpreting, 
expectations, capabilities, habits, etc. We therefore consider demand as more than actual sales, 
as including consumer attitudes towards various options. Supply is more than actual production, 
and involves capabilities, business opportunity, and future expectations towards the various 
options. The heterogeneity in potential adopters creates a variety of demand. In our scheme, 
there is present demand and future anticipated demand. Under influence of the latter, suppliers 
make decisions (select foci) about investment in research and development. By proposing 
solutions to problems, suppliers are viewed as creating technological variety (see Figure 2.1). 
 
Co-evolution
 
EV
HEV ICE  
 
Figure 2.1: Trajectories as an outcome of co-evolution of demand and supply. Regime trajectory may co-exist 
with niche trajectory(s). A trajectory has its own level of momentum. 
 
In our scheme we distinguish a micro level where the innovation is described through the eyes 
of actors (consumers and suppliers), and a macro level where aggregate indicators of the 
innovation are considered. We suggest that this micro-macro framework is instrumental to 
highlight both actor perspectives, and address dynamics between the layers (as we clarify 
below). As noted in the previous section, these two issues, actor perspectives and feedback 
mechanisms, are what we want to highlight in comparison to the MLP and the TIS approach. 
The social context in which technology is created and used is not stable, but undergoing change 
due to the introduction of novelty and due to institutional and material adaptations that go with 
it (Rip and Kemp, 1998). Both at the supplier and at the consumer side various forms of learning 
take place. These forms of learning are interrelated, in the sense that at the very beginning 
suppliers have to inform consumers about the innovation, but then suppliers themselves 
gradually learn how to evaluate demand as an innovation diffuses. Learning entails the 
outcome
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availability of new skills and knowledge, new social connotations, changing future expectations, 
new supplier-user relationships, and changes in the regulatory framework. Consumers, by their 
different ways of interpreting, using and talking about technologies, further contribute to their 
social shaping. This is part of what some call the domestication process of product into daily life 
(Lie and Sorensen 1996). Thus, both the technological hardware and the relevant social context 
change in a complex process with strong evolutionary traits. 
The process of co-evolution is thus socially enacted, but not planned by actors. In the case of 
vehicle engines, for example, the following actors are involved: car manufacturers, engine 
component suppliers, car users, car repair shops, sales persons, journalists, university research-
ers and teachers, banks, venture capitalists, shareholders, and policy makers. It is impossible to 
include all actors in a behavioural model of innovation diffusion. For the purposes of our 
framework, we include three types of actors at the micro level: consumers of the innovation (in 
the example: buyers of new cars), suppliers of the innovation (car manufacturers) and policy 
makers (regulators of the sector and sponsors of research and green products). In our scheme 
regulation adapts over time, but is not co-evolving in the same sense as demand and supply. 
Instead, we regard policymakers, and the regulation they impose, as a force that shapes the co-
evolution of supply and demand. 
The actual behaviour of all actors translates into macro patterns, such as total sales of the 
various options, prices, technological progression of various options. These macro level 
indicators in return influence the individual agents at the actor level: it is a circular (micro-
macro) process (see Figure 2.2a). 
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Figure 2.2: (a) Innovation as a circular process involving two layers, where (b) various feedback mechanisms 
may be identified. 
 
The studies of innovation we reviewed in sections 2.1 to 2.3 have identified various feedback 
mechanisms during the emergence of a product market or industry. Between the micro- and 
macro-level we distinguish (see Figure 2.2b): 
• Increasing returns to scale: cost per unit fall as firms take advantage of economies of scale, 
allowing them to profitably sell products at lower prices, which stimulates sales and further 
scale economies (See Figure 2.2b yellow) 
• Learning about the market: growing sales lead to better knowledge about the heterogeneity 
of demand (who prospective buyers are, their willingness to pay for specific features, what 
is valued and less valued); knowledge which may be used for R&D and new product offer-
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ings, which will give rise to refined products and more targeted marketing effort; consumers 
learn which products they appreciate most that, which will stimulate its sales (See Figure 
2.2b brown) 
• Social construction of meaning: products obtain a social meaning, which will differ across 
groups; products may become more or less desirable because of this. The dynamics may 
stimulate sales (in case of positive stories and connotation) or discourage them (in case of 
negative stories and meanings) (See Figure 2.2b pink) 
• Network effects: increases in usage lead to direct increases in value (as in the case of the 
telephone) (See Figure 2.2b purple); increased usage of the product may also spawn the 
production of complementary goods such as fuelling stations and assets such as skills which 
increase the value of the original product; in the case of competing technologies the one 
with the greatest installed base and compatibility with existing systems has an advantage 
over the other.  
Alongside these micro-macro processes, there are also micro-micro feedback loops: 
• Learning-by-doing: production experiences leads to improved skills and helps to discover 
cost-efficiencies in production, allowing manufacturers to reduce prices and increase sales 
and production (see Figure 2.2b green). 
• Imitation of use: potential adopters have a tendency to imitate peers (taste formation) (see 
Figure 2.2b blue) (at the supply side, producers may also imitate successful features of 
competitor products). 
The velocity of the loops differs. Some loops are more rapid, such as falling prices in the course 
of a few years, or the improvement of technological quality of new options. Other loops are slow 
or discontinuously changing, such as those involving social factors. 
In our framework, actor groups have a mental perspective or frame. A frame is the way in which 
the innovation is described or interpreted by an actor. The framing metaphor can be understood 
as a window or spectacles (worn by the actor group) that filters the total amount of information 
in a first impression (what it is about and what it important for them), and focuses attention on 
key elements and aspects within7. 
Using the example of an alternative engine, say electric propulsion, the user may perceive this as 
either a green engine, or just another engine, possibly an exciting new engine or something he 
finds hard to label (he or she may not give it any thought). For manufacturers, the engine may 
be perceived as a something that is of interest to their customers or to new customers, as 
something for which a clear or uncertain market is anticipated. For producers the profitability of 
an engine (the business case) is likely to be an essential component of the frame. Policy makers 
on the other hand may see the engine as a solution for air pollution problems or as something 
that is interesting from an employment point of view (new jobs). 
Frames are devices for interpretation by accentuating certain attributes of the car (engine): 
maximum speed, power or fuel use, etc. It is well established that goods and service hold 
symbolic as well as functional value (Douglas and Isherwood, 1979). So, besides functional 
attributes, there is an attribute of social connotation, symbolic meaning. The populations of 
(prospective) users and firms are heterogeneous: users and firms are very different in terms of 
individual characteristics (such as preferences and technological capabilities). The frames are 
consciously or unconsciously applied by firms, consumers and policy makers when they deal 
with various opportunities and problems of vehicles. 
                                                                        
7 Since our definition of frame is limited to the mental perspective of an actor group, it slightly differs from 
Bijker’s (1995) technological frame, which includes the actions and interactions of the actors of the group. 
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With this novel framework we analyse both the emergence of (hybrid-)electric engines and P+R 
in a changing social context as a dynamic process of co-evolution of demand and supply, 
mediated by feedback loops. 
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3 Methodology 
 
We apply a number of research methods to investigate and appreciate the framework presented 
in section 2.4. The most prominent ones applied can be put under four headings: actor frame 
analysis, explanatory case study, integrated scenarios, and integrated modelling. Below we 
concisely describe what the method is, and how we applied it. The final section addresses the 
rationale for combining methods in one study. 
 
 
3.1 ACTOR FRAME ANALYSIS  
 
In support and as input to the explanatory case study, we analyze frames of actor groups (in 
chapter 4, 5 and 7). As denoted in chapter 2, a frame is the evaluative structure in which the 
innovation is described or interpreted by actors. More precise, it is the manifestation of 
(relevant) beliefs, perception and appreciation around the innovation. Since Immanuel Kant 
published his ‘Critique to Pure Reason’ by 1781, social scientists have been stressing the limited 
cognitive capacities of man. Due to the diversity and versatility of reality, humans perceive only 
some aspects or elements of an observed part of reality at once. Originating from philosophy, 
social psychological research has devoted extensive attention to the notion of attitudes, which 
can be regarded as ‘simplifiers’ used for the evaluation of objects and situations: they prevent 
one to appraise things over and over again (Fazio, 1989). In the same line of enquiry, the framing 
metaphor should be understood as a window or pair of spectacles that filters the total amount 
of information in the impression, and focuses attention on key elements and aspects within. 
Thus, framing involves processes of inclusion and exclusion as well as emphasis. In general, this is 
not a conscious process, but something that happens unconsciously in the course of communica-
tive processes. Entman (1993) summarizes the essence of framing processes as follows: Framing 
involves selection and salience. To frame is to select some aspects of perceived reality and make 
them more salient in the communicating text. We follow this definition here. 
In social issues frames are everywhere. All stakeholders have their own perspective. In fact, an 
actor ‘wears’ a whole range of spectacles, for various situations or objects. Policymakers also 
make sense of reality through framing, both of the variety of problems they are confronted with, 
as well as various possible solutions strategies. Schön and Rein (Schon and Rein, 1994, p.26) 
provide a useful definition of policy framing as the process through which: 
Things are selected for attention and named in such a way as to fit the frame constructed for the 
situation. They select for attention a few salient features and relations from what would 
otherwise be an overwhelmingly complex reality. They give these elements a coherent organiza-
tion, and they describe what is wrong with the present situation in such a way as to set the 
direction for its future transformation . . . It is typical of diagnostic-prescriptive stories such as 
these that they execute the normative leap in such a way as to make it seem graceful, compel-
ling, even obvious. 
A frame is thus a perspective from which an amorphous, ill-defined, problematic situation can be 
made sense of and acted upon. For the sake of our study the question raises how to analyze 
actor frames in practical cases. Though frame analysis has a long history in political sciences 
(Rein and Schon, 1977; Schon and Rein, 1994) and communication sciences (Iyengar, 1991; 
Reese et al., 2001), currently no fully fledged, standard methodology exists to analyse frames 
(König, 2008). In this thesis we apply two distinct methods to analyze actor frames. 
The first method (applied in chapter 4) is discourse analysis to track attributes in frames. It 
examines what attributes are used to describe the innovation, and how these attributes are 
appreciated. The frame concept underlying this method is referred to as attribute framing 
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(Hallahan, 1999). It highlights how some characteristics of objects are accentuated, whereas 
others are neglected, thus (consciously or unconsciously) biasing processing of information in 
terms of focal attributes. For example, take a simple data-stick. The frame of a data-stick may 
have a structure of various attributes (or categories): the memory size (512kB), the color (white), 
the physical size (small /thin), the (non-) existence of a hook nail, to hang it around a necklace 
(included), the price ($15,-), the production cost ($10,-), the level of sales (1 million a year), etc. 
By implicitly attaching weights to various attributes, different groups of actors interpret the 
same product differently: they attach different meaning and value to it. The set of weights that 
an actor group applies in evaluating adoption or investment we call the frame or category 
structure. In addition, a consumer may appreciate each attribute to higher or lower extent. He or 
she may find a storage capacity of 512kB too low, be fond of the white color and the small 
shape, and find the hook nail irrelevant. An electronics supplier may focus on the price, 
production cost and expected sales levels, and draw his conclusions on his business opportunity. 
In other words, a frame has two parts: a category-structure (which may include a hierarchy 
between the categories), and category or attribute appraisal (see Figure 3.1). 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Stories carry the cognitive frame-structure and appraisal of innovations by market actors. These 
frames are the manifestation of knowledge and belief systems. 
 
In chapter four we trace attribute framing from stories in both contemporary newspapers, as 
well historic ones. Accordingly, this method allows studying frames longitudinally. 
The second way to study frames (applied in chapter 5 and 7) is a survey to analyze belief systems 
of actors. This social-psychological approach regards knowledge and belief systems as the 
underlying basis of the actor frame. In other words: knowledge and beliefs become manifest in 
the frame. 
In order to assess belief-systems of users, producers, or policymakers who consider adopting, 
developing or regulating an innovation, the empirical survey approach developed by Montalvo 
(Montalvo, 2002; 2006) is employed (see Figure 3.2). 
This approach is based on a simple behavioural theory designed to understand human social 
behaviour on the basis of the underlying intentions, attitudes, subjective norms and behavioural 
control. Though Montalvo’s approach was designed to study behaviour rather than frames, we 
suppose both are anticipated by belief systems. For our study we developed a questionnaire 
that could identify the various beliefs (and their salience) of car firms and city governments with 
respect to car engines and P+R respectively. By including elements of the established technology 
or practice in the survey, we determine the (dis)favour with the innovation as opposed to 
conventional options. 
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The measurement of belief systems is difficult (Malim and Birch, 1998), since they are not 
directly observable. On the one hand there is little doubt that holding a particular belief is linked 
to a particular sort of practices or behaviour. On the other hand this relation is far from clear: 
specific behaviour may contradict a general attitude. To counter this drawback, we should track 
belief systems for specific behaviours (a choice, an action), in which actors are in a ‘reasonable’ 
state-of-mind. 
Montalvo's model suggests that the innovative activities executed in an organisation are 
reflected in its relevant decision-makers' willingness to innovate, which in turn is determined by 
three domains in their belief-system: their (1) attitude towards innovation, (2) their perceived 
social pressures to innovate and (3) their perceived control over the innovation process. 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Schematic illustration of Montalvo’s behavioural model (2002) 
 
The attitude towards innovation is an indicator of the degree to which relevant decision-makers 
like or dislike (i.e. form positive or negative associations with) the expected direct outcomes of 
their engagement in innovative activities. Typically these outcomes refer to expected economic 
benefits and losses for the innovative entrepreneur and, in the case of an engagement in cleaner 
technology, also the positive effect of the latter on the environment. Therefore, as the main 
determinants of the entrepreneurs’ perceived attitude toward engaging in the new technology 
or practice, the model distinguishes between: 
• perceived Economic Risk/ Opportunity (ER) 
• perceived Environmental Risk (EV) 
In contrast to attitude, perceived social pressure refers to the positive or negative normative 
connotations associated with an engagement in the technology. In particular, the model 
distinguishes: 
• the Regulatory Pressure (RP), referring to the perceived stringency of environmental 
regulations and standards, 
• the Market Pressure (MP), arising from the perceived attitude of consumers and competi-
tors concerning the technology, and 
• the perceived Community Pressure (CP) from stakeholder groups in the community 
constituting the social environment of the innovating firm. 
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The third category of determinants refers to the entrepreneurial decision-maker's perceived 
control of the innovation process. This part of the belief system essentially comprises: 
• the perceived Technical Capabilities (TC) allowing a company to use technological 
opportunities offered by the market 
• the company's perceived capability to engage in Organizational Learning (OL) 
• perceived capabilities to form Strategic Alliances (AL) with customers or suppliers 
• perceived capabilities to use Collaboration Networks (NW) with research institutions in 
order to outsource the acquisition of knowledge needed for the innovation process. 
These nine items are potentially salient underlying beliefs to the willingness to develop the 
innovation. For our study we developed a survey questionnaire to identity the various beliefs of 
car firms with respects to low emission engines (chapter 5), as well as one for city governments 
with respect to P+R (chapter 7). By correlating the actual engagement with stated beliefs, using 
statistical techniques, we gather insight on the salience of various beliefs8. 
 
 
3.2 EXPLANATORY CASE STUDIES 
 
Explanatory case studies are suitable for applying pre-defined frameworks on a new case, testing 
causalities and explanatory value (Yin, 1994). They can tell rich stories in terms of dynamics and 
interacting processes. They address the ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions. Since our study seeks 
understanding in recent innovation dynamics of car mobility, this is thus a valuable method. 
Explanatory case studies differ from exploratory studies, since in the latter type fieldwork and 
data collection may be undertaken prior to definition of the research questions and hypotheses. 
Case studies can be designed in various ways, most significantly it may be single instead of 
multiple, and holistic or embedded. This thesis uses a multiple and embedded case studies 
method. Multiple, since we address two cases. Two case studies have advantage over one, since 
comparisons and contrasts can be made, which may lead to refinement of the framework. The 
method is also embedded, since the analysis uses various levels and units of analysis. The 
embedded case study approach allows for a multiplicity of methods that may be applied at the 
various levels or sub-units. 
For our two cases, the emergence of hybrid-electric vehicles and the emergence of Park-and-
Ride (P+R), chapter six and eight provide rich descriptions of how and why these innovations 
were developed and adopted, using the notions and processes of the framework. We do this 
level by level: first we describe innovation in terms of technological progress and diffusion of 
sales or use (i.e. at an aggregate level). We address price trends, trends in social connotation and 
regulation in place or put in place. These are aggregate patterns and here we leave out the role 
of individual actors. As a second step we examine the role of stakeholders (firms, consumers, 
and regulators) in the evolution of the innovation. We address actor perspectives, attitudes and 
behaviors. Finally, we examine interactions and feedbacks between the two layers. 
By means of our two cases, we critically appraise the two-layered framework with co-evolution 
of demand and supply. The two cases have their own distinct dynamics, one with a strong 
technological component, the other with a stronger social-behavioral and (local) policy 
component. We study these developments longitudinally, in a time-span of about fifteen years, 
                                                                        
8 It was practically not possible to include the various alternative innovation options (such as for car engines 
gasoline and diesel technology, hybrid-electric and natural gas). Therefore we work under the (rather strong) 
assumption that beliefs and willingness of the innovation we investigate can be studied independent of 
beliefs and opportunities around alternatives. For P+R nevertheless, a range of alternative transport 
(parking) policy options were included, providing opportunity to compare innovation options more directly. 
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in order to be more sensitive to the intrinsic patterns of change (compared to ‘one-shot’ or 
‘cross sectional’ case studies). 
 
 
3.3 INTEGRATED SCENARIOS 
 
In chapter 9 we develop integrated future scenarios for the diffusion of cleaner car engines, 
supported by a simulation model. Integrated scenarios are structured descriptions of possible 
futures (Rothman, 2006). They are not images of the future, but movies of the future: a 
sequence of events that could lead to a certain final image (Rotmans, 2001a). More precise they 
are denoted as descriptions of journeys to possible futures that reflect different assumptions 
about how current trends will unfold, how critical uncertainties will play out, and what new 
factors will come into play (UNEP, 2002). They should be plausible but simplified descriptions. 
Scenarios are not developed to predict the future. Scenario analysis is rather a tool that is used 
to deal with uncertainties, making various assumptions about trends of main drivers explicit. 
Thinking about what may happen in the future provides a means to share our understanding 
about particular sectors, and our concerns to it. Potential future problems may come into focus. 
Analysing ‘what if . . . ?’ questions may help to identify choices and make decisions, for example 
regarding policy interventions. Scenarios are usually developed in sets, where each scenario 
explores the implications of different assumptions of key drivers or mechanisms. 
Scenarios have been developed in broadly two ways. They can be made by a small group of 
scientific experts (expert scenario analysis) or involve a large group of stakeholders (participative 
scenario analysis). In both cases, the development process may be supported by a formal model. 
If that is the case, the results are likely quantitative scenarios. If not, scenarios are typically 
narratives (qualitative). Qualitative and quantitative representations should be seen as 
complementary (Rothman 2006). Qualitative scenarios can explore relationships and trends for 
which few or no numerical data are available. They can easily incorporate human motivations, 
values and behavior. Alternatively, quantitative scenarios can provide (an impression of) greater 
rigor, precision, and consistency. Their assumptions are explicit and their conclusions can be 
traced back to the assumptions. The effects of changed assumptions can easily be checked, 
pointing to important uncertainties. 
Combining qualitative and quantitative input can make a scenario more consistent and robust 
(Notten, 2005). A quantitative scenario might be enriched with the use of qualitative informa-
tion. Likewise, a qualitative scenario might be tested for plausibility through the quantification of 
information, if possible. 
Our scenarios analysis in Chapter 9 involves a qualitative and a quantitative element. The 
development of the two scenarios is supported by a formal model. There were no stakeholders 
directly involved in the process. Since we focus on the role of social construction of connotation 
in the progress of technological trajectories there, we examine two assumptions on the strength 
of this mechanism. As a result we present two scenarios for new car sales diffusion: one scenario 
in which the sales of (hybrid-) electric vehicles increase significantly and one in which the share 
of diesel engines is able to remain dominant. The scenarios are more than descriptions of the 
output of the model, since they are enriched with ‘educated’ guesses. They are narrative 
scenarios, constituting the dynamics suggested in the two model runs. 
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3.4 INTEGRATED MODELING 
 
The notion ‘model’ has many meanings. It is both used for photo models like Claudia Schiffer, for 
miniaturized objects, for conceptual frameworks, as well as for mathematical models and 
computer simulations of complex systems. Within the natural and the economic sciences, 
models usually refer to mathematical formalizations of (parts of) real world systems (Jager, 
2000). This is how we will use the term in this thesis. An example is the mathematic formulation 
of the relation between economic growth and emissions. Formal models are worthwhile in 
scientific research, since their outcomes can be compared to observations in the real world. This 
makes models testable, in the sense that outcomes of two different formal descriptions can be 
judged on which is better in describing a real world process. 
In general, integrated (simulation) models try and describe quantitatively as much as possible 
the cause-effect relationship of a phenomenon, and the cross-linkages between different 
contextual processes, including feedbacks (Martens, 2006). Feedback processes can amplify or 
dampen key-indicators in the system, therefore being the most significant mechanisms in a 
system. An example of a simple (positive) feedback is: if more people adopt an innovation, unit 
cost and prices will decrease, which will trigger more people to adopt. Even a simplified but 
integrated model can provide useful insight in the principle dynamics of complex issues or 
sectors. They are used to structure information, and help to become sensitive for significant 
interactions. Causal relations are explicitly specified and results can be analytically traced. 
However, any attempt to fully represent a complex issue with its numerous linkages and inter-
linkages with other issues is doomed to fail. They are never intended as ‘truth machines’, 
perfectly replicating real life systems and predicting the future. Integrated models complement 
rather than replace approaches of detailed models and case studies that cover only some parts 
of complex phenomena. 
Integrated models have sought to integrate non-human dynamics (e.g. in ecological, or technical 
systems) with social dynamics (Valkering, 2009). One of the first examples is the global change 
model TARGETS (Rotmans and Vries, 1997). The model combines the global dynamics in 
different sectors (energy, water, food etc.) with various management perspectives or styles. The 
authors apply a systems dynamics approach, which is well-suited for incorporating quantitative, 
equation-based relations between indicators. However, this approach is less suitable for 
incorporating the social and psychological richness of actors. Several scholars (Janssen and Vries, 
1998; Moss et al., 2001; Van der Veen and Rotmans, 2001) have proposed to extend the 
integrated framework with Agent-Based Modelling (ABM). ABM can be considered as an 
umbrella term for various agent-based modelling approaches (Agent-based modelling, Agent-
based social simulation, Multi-agent-based simulation, Multi-agent simulation (see Hare and 
Deadman, 2004), in which social entities are represented as computer agents acting upon their 
social and natural environments. The main merit of this type of models is that they simulate how 
assumptions at a micro-level (e.g. how an agent behaves, how they interact) emerge to macro 
phenomena over time, due to interactions of an heterogeneous set of agents. The agent-based 
method is useful for combining data from subjectivist methods (i.e. from studies on actor 
frames) with those of objectivistic studies (e.g. learning- and scale mechanisms). 
In chapter 9 we develop a simulation model which formalises our conceptual framework for the 
case of car engine innovation. The two-layered, agent-based approach allows a micro-
underpinning of macro patterns, incorporating feedback loops from macro to micro. We 
examine the diffusion and development of refined internal combustion engine vehicles and the 
diffusion and development of (hybrid) electric vehicles. We formalize actor frames and attitude 
formation, based on empirics of chapter 6. We discuss the dynamic process as constituting co-
evolution of demand and supply of products, especially how improvement in functionality 
interacts with formation of social connotation of an innovation. 
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3.5 THE USE OF MULTIPLE METHODS 
 
Combining various methods in one study is not new. In a few scientific fields a practice of 
combining methods has emerged. Most notable is the field of Integrated Assessment. Integra-
tive studies have branched off from environmental studies in search for integration of non-
human dynamics (e.g. in ecological or technical systems) with social dynamics. Two groups of 
methods are distinguished: analytical methods and participatory methods (Van Asselt, 2000). 
Rotmans (2001b) addresses the notion of integration in these studies, (implicitly) touching upon 
the combination of subjective knowledge elements (referred to as ‘the value-laden information 
provided by societal actors’) and objectified knowledge elements (referred to as ‘scientific 
facts’). In his view, the latter should be provided by scientists, whereas the first should be 
provided by societal stakeholders. Subsequently, the actor perspectives and findings from 
analytic methods should come together in an active dialogue (Rotmans, 2001, p.22), which may 
or may not lead to shared and or integrated perspectives. Hence, he views integration as a 
dialogue or participatory process. Methodological approaches on combining methods are, 
however, relatively immature. Mingers and Brocklesby (1997) provide clues to the delicate 
question on how to select a set of methods. They map out twelve aspects of the phenomenon 
that need to be addressed by the methods applied. Roe (1998) argues that the various methods 
need to be orthogonal (i.e. very different) in order to be used in the triangulation procedure. 
Triangulation (of results) has been proposed in this context as a notion to seek validation of data 
and results by combining a range of methods, sources or analysts. One principal tenet of 
triangulation is that the object of analysis should remain the same for all instruments of analysis 
(Roe, 1998). De Ridder et al. (2007) suggest a chronology for application of various methods in 
an integrative study. He suggests that participatory tools are more appropriate in the first phase 
of the study, the problem analysis, to elucidate views of the various stakeholders, explicate 
knowledge and values within the problem, and ideas about solutions to alleviate the problem. In 
subsequent phases (i.e. identification and analysis of various options), when the focus has 
crystallized, analytic tools are more appropriate. The paper is not explicit on how results from 
different tools should be combined. Grosskurth (2008) acknowledges that no general panacea 
can be developed for this. He argues to balance an equal share of analytical input form desk 
studies and subjective participatory input in an integrative study, and he refers to two exemplary 
studies: VISIONS (Van Asselt et al., 2005), and Quest (Tansey et al., 2002). 
Combining methods has a few advantages. The simultaneous use of various methods can 
improve the quality and adequacy of a study considerably (Rotmans 2001), and conclusions are 
usually more convincing if they are based on several different sources of information (Yin 1994). 
It enables the analysis and interpretation of impacts of a wide range of issues, policy options and 
strategies. Combining different methods can compensate for one-sidedness. In complex issues, 
one method easily results in only partial explanation of a phenomenon, as in the blind men and 
the elephant tale (as observed in Kemp and Pontoglio (2008). 
Combining methods has difficulties too. Combination of outcomes and knowledge elements is 
difficult to validate scientifically. There is no unifying theory that indicates how this analytical 
process of integration should happen, despite that the term triangulation is increasingly used. 
Difficulties of triangulation typically include that it is time consuming and requires a variety of 
skills of the researcher. A more fundamental difficulty is to ensure that the different methods 
applied will not have a similar bias. In other words, the various methods need to be orthogonal 
(i.e. very different) in order to be used in the triangulation procedure (Roe 1998). Ironically, 
precisely this requirement makes integration or comparison of the results of different methods 
difficult. Another fundamental issue is that various methods may stem from different paradigms, 
and therefore possibly incommensurable. Mingers and Brocklesby (1997) suggest such problems 
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are not insurmountable9. Nevertheless, the authors do not address the important question how 
sensitive the meta-analysis is to the set of methods selected. 
Considering these advantages and limitations, combination of various methods is not always a 
good idea. It is a labour intensive process that should only be undertaken if it is really necessary 
for the subject or problem at hand. Grosskurth (2008) suggests that multi-methodology is 
appropriate in cases were the research subject or problem is characterized by complexity, 
ambiguity, subjectivity, and normativity (p.26). For our cases on sustainability issues in car 
mobility these characteristics seem to apply. As we noted earlier mobility issues are multi-
faceted, since they include social, economic, ecological as well as technological aspects. Policy 
concerns are typically interconnected and cross several policy fields. Societal stakeholders have 
conflicting perceptions of the problem, whereas gains and burdens of transport activities are 
distributed unevenly over various societal groups. 
                                                                        
9 They find that the work of Giddens (1984) and Bhaskar (1994) present an ontological perspective that can 
subsume the objective-subjective dichotomy. 
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4 Technological framing by car consumers 
 
In this chapter we analyze technological frames of car consumers towards car engines. We map 
the frames by studying the stories that are told about the engines. The central question is: how 
do consumers frame different types of engines (diesel, hybrid-electric, full-electric), and how 
have frames shifted between 1990 and 2005? Section 2 describes how we analyze frames from 
stories through a method for discourse analysis. In section 3 we present data on car engine 
market stories from national newspapers in the Netherlands. Section 4 discusses patterns in the 
data and section five answers our central questions and draws conclusions. 
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Consumers use stories to understand new products, to determine their value to them (Feick and 
Price, 1987) . Through interpersonal communication or media reports people spread market-
place information, and this influences evaluations and choices (Arndt, 1967). Stories carry the 
framing and appraisal of innovations by market actors. As such, stories are important to 
understand the evolution and success of product markets (Rosa and Spanjol, 2005). From a 
cognitive science perspective, market stories help to generate the ‘knowledge structures’ that 
enable market actors to reconcile current experiences and behaviours with pre-existing beliefs. 
By doing so, stories shape future behaviours (ibid. pg. 199). 
Although several studies have analyzed user perspectives on automobiles in general (Heath and 
Scott, 1998; Steg et al., 2001), hardly any examined perceptions of car engines specifically. Most 
notably is one study reporting that a majority of HEV owners saw their vehicle projecting images 
that were linked to larger values as social awareness, responsibility and concern for others 
(Heffner et al., 2005), and another study finding that 31 percent of HEV buyers said they 
purchased an HEV because the vehicle ‘makes a statement about me’ (CNW, 2006). Steg et al. 
(Steg et al., 2001) find that for car buyers symbolic value plays a significant role next to 
functional characteristics, but the question how people frame their vehicles’ propulsion 
technology remains unresolved. Another study analyzed the relative importance of fuel 
economy, next to other consumer car preferences (Mytelka, 2008). The author argues that the 
oil price shocks of the 1970s seem to have marked the early 1980s preference structure with its 
emphasis on fuel economy, whereas five years later, fuel economy was of least important to 
consumers, whereas price and reliability had become the prime concern. 
Business consultants from Maritz-research studied (stated) changes of consumer habits due to 
rising fuel prices (in France, Germany and the UK, in 2006, with responses of 1240 new vehicle 
owners). On the statement ‘I think about buying, or have bought, a vehicle with a more 
economical engine’, 57% agrees mildly or strongly, while only 23% disagrees mildly or strongly. 
Based on these figures they conclude that a major share of European drivers is changing their 
car purchase considerations, due to rising fuel prices. How familiar are people with new 
propulsion systems? In the same research Maritz found 20% is very familiar with hybrid-electric 
petrol engines, 34% somewhat familiar, 39% has heard of the technology, and 8% is not at all 
familiar. Full electric vehicles are somewhat less well-known: 9% very familiar, 35% somewhat 
familiar, 48% has heard of the technology, and 8% is not at all familiar. Of all alternative engine 
technologies, hybrids are best known. 
Though insightful, these studies have not clarified how consumers multifariously frame different 
types of engines (diesel, hybrid-electric, full-electric), and how those frames have shifted 
between 1990 and 2005. This is what we focus on here. 
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4.2 METHOD FOR DISCOURSE ANALYSIS 
 
Frames become manifest in stories. As stated in chapter 3, currently no coherent methodology 
exists for frame analysis. Rather, frame analyses are a number of related, even though some-
times partially incompatible methods for the analysis of discourses (Scheufele, 1999). Since car 
engines are objects, we acknowledge that attribute framing is a useful method for analyzing 
frames in this chapter. This method tracks the accentuation of some characteristics of objects, 
and the neglect of others. Accordingly, it highlights the (conscious or unconscious) bias of 
information procession in terms of focal attributes (see chapter 3). 
Rosa and Spanjol (2005) discuss ways to analyze market narratives or stories. Although they do 
not explicitly link the concept of stories with frames, they do provide a number of applicable 
aspects of these stories told by market actors. Main aspects they touch upon are: 
• complexity of the story – this is the number of attributes that (market) actors use to 
describe competing product models. 
• ordinality in the story – this is the extent to which market actors use ‘ordered categories’ 
(where a category is ordered when it can be presented on a rated scale, more or less pre-
cise). 
• Subjective-evaluative centrality of the story – this is the proportion of attributes that is 
subjectively evaluated (in contrast to valence-neutral observations). 
Whereas complexity is driven partly by the product’s technical features, ordinality and precision 
are variable properties of cognitive object attributes in (shared) knowledge structures of market 
actors (Scott et al., 1979). Market actors are defined as: 
. . . buyers, sellers, and others who interact in market arenas (Rosa and Spanjol 2005, pg. 199). 
Narratives of market actors are not restricted to consumers’ word of mouth: … but include 
stories ‘circulated by producers and cultural intermediaries such as the media and advertisers’. 
This suggests that in any product market, market actors can include consumers, producers, 
retailers and intermediaries, media, government agencies, and other organizations. Moreover, 
stories that actors tell in social settings are not independent but rather interdependent (Weick, 
1995). Market actors tell stories to one another, directly or indirectly, and they collectively shape 
one another’s thinking (ibid.). 
Rosa and Spanjol expect differences in stories between new emergent product markets and 
mature markets, where innovation is only incremental. In accordance with Bijker’s notion of 
interpretative flexibility (before closure), they state: 
In the case of new products, there is a general lack of experience among market actors, and the 
initial goals or benefits that new products can or should fulfil are unclear. In turn, the lack of 
experience requires sense making and evaluation of all product attributes and features, which 
contributes to conflicting market stories because of the diverse needs and approaches of the 
people who experience the products and share stories (ibid. pg. 200). 
Similar to the notion of decreasing interpretative flexibility in the process of closure, they make 
the following propositions: 
• Market conversations in the early stages of market development are likely to include more 
product attributes (i.e. higher complexity). 
• Ordinality is likely to increase when a market develops. 
• Evaluative centrality in market stories increases as a product market develops. 
In addition to an analysis of the structure of the stories around the innovation, we contend that 
these notions allow identification of the appraisal of (attributes of) an innovation. Rosa and 
Spanjol acknowledge that market stories contain both objective descriptions next to subjective 
evaluative statements: appraisal. When statements around an attribute contain a subjective 
evaluation, an analysis can apply different scales. For each attribute an investigator can 
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determine whether the innovation is described as large improvement, improvement, compara-
ble, decline or large decline with respect to the existing technology, product or practice. When 
an objective-descriptive statement of an attribute is made, the appraisal can not be identified. 
(See Appendix A for more details on this methodology.) 
As an example of the way we analyze a newspaper article (story), see for example this story on 
an HEV in 2005: 
Triggered by high oil prices, the Toyota Prius, a fuel-efficient hybrid sells like hot cakes in the United States. 
Not the tank-like Hummer but the modest Prius is the status symbol. ( . . . )  
Both cars are popular in the U.S., but last year the Prius was the winner. For the Prius, Car of the Year in 
2004, there is a waiting list. ( . . . )  
The Prius runs almost 1 liter per 30 km by combining petrol with electricity and is affordable: from 16 
thousand euro. Compare that to the Hummer. They run at best 1 per 10 km and the cheapest version costs 40 
thousand euro. That Arnold Schwarzenegger has eight ones is fun, but is no longer a guarantee for success. ( . 
. . )  
Apparently, the desire for the status symbol was so great that the average waiting period of two months was 
insurmountable. Toyota has announced that the monthly production this year will rise from 10 thousand to 
15 thousand vehicles, but still there will be a waiting list, predicts the company.  
Hollywood plays a roll in the success. In his latest film Be Cool John Travolta drives around in a Prius. “No, it is 
not fast, but if you are important, they wait on you”, Travolta notes, and casts a loving look at the Prius. ( . .. )  
Moreover, motorists have nothing but good things to say about their Prius. The magazine Consumer Reports 
writes that at present they are the most satisfied car owners. ( . . . ) 
 
(Source: De Volkskrant (April 20th 2005, © PCM Uitgevers), under the title: Toyota's flagship displaces the 
tough Hummer: Environment-conscious Americans to choose the hybrid car Prius, especially now John 
Travolta drives it in his new film.) 
 
We recognize six attributes in this account, see table 4.1. For example the author refers to the 
fuel efficiency of the engine, evaluating it simply as ‘fuel efficient’, without using ordered 
categories. Table 4.1 lists the other five attributes. We label non- (or less) functional adjectives 
or adverbs before (or behind or around) 'engine'; e.g. sportive, modern, revolutionairy, 
powerful, super or boring - engine, as social connotation or symbolic-affective attribute. See 
Appendix B for a complete list of the attributes we recognized in the set of accounts in all the 
years, as well as how we defined them. 
 
Table 4.1: Attributes of an HEV story 
Phrases used Attribute Evaluation 
fuel-efficient Fuel efficiency Neutral (0) 
hybrid, combining petrol 
with electricity 
Engine structure Not evaluated (-) 
modest, status symbol (2x), 
winner, nothing but good 
things to say 
Social connotation Large improvement (+2) 
1 liter per 30 km Fuel use Improvement (+1) 
affordable: from 16 
thousand euro 
Price Neutral (0) 
not fast Performance Decline (-1) 
 
When, subsequently, the analyses of all stories (of an engine) in one year are accumulated, we 
acquire insight in the yearly averages of discourse on an engine. Such an analysis, for example in 
the discourse on the hybrid-electric engine in 1996, reveals that engine structure is the most 
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frequent mentioned attribute10: in seven of seven accounts. Environmental impact is second, 
with six out of seven. Further, the analysis showed that none of the accounts was based on 
actual user or producer hands-on experience of the storyteller. In 50% of the cases that an 
attribute was mentioned, it was subjectively evaluated. Overall appraisal of the innovation was 
+16. (We refer to Appendix A (method) and C (HEV 1996) for more details on this.) 
We studied market stories of one mature car engine (diesel, incremental innovation) and two 
emerging markets (electric and hybrid-electric engines). In the first half of the 1990s an 
innovated version of an ICE, the direct injected diesel engine, came to market in the Nether-
lands. In those same years, cars with electrical engines were introduced by Fiat (1992) and 
Peugeot-Citroen (1995). By 2000, hybrid-electric vehicles came to market in the Netherlands, 
first introduced by Toyota. 
We chose to analyze articles in large national Dutch newspapers: Telegraaf, Volkskrant, NRC, 
Trouw, AD, and Het Parool. Together they count for nearly two million copies a day, in a country 
of around 16 million people. The subscribers of these papers are from all corners of the political 
spectrum, and all levels of social-economic status. It makes sense to study market stories in 
newspapers, since: 
The interdependence of market stories is evident when individual consumer’ sense making has 
sufficient volume and momentum to be carried over into popular press. For example, it is 
common for commercial publications to echo consumers’ viewpoints at large. In turn, the in-print 
affirmation of consumers’ viewpoints can amplify the influence of these particular market stories 
(Rosa and Spanjol 2005; pg. 199). 
We chose four moments in time (see Table 4.2): 
• beginning of the 90s (the first accounts of the innovations) 
• halfway the 90s (we chose the year 1996, in which new regulation in California took 
effect) 
• the year 2000 
• the year 2005 
We found roughly 500 articles in the four periods. After closer examination, it showed that 
around 180 contained stories on the new engines (while others just mentioned them). 
 
Table 4.2: Number of (stories in) newspaper articles on car engines. Data before 1996 does not include 
articles of the Telegraaf. 
  
 
 1990 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Direct injected diesel  1 2 0 5   10    29     39 
Electric car  6 5     20     7      3 
Hybrid-electric car  0 0 1 6    7    22     41 
Total 7 2     37    58     83 
 
We now turn to the results of the analysis of the complete set of around 180 articles that 
appeared in the newspapers in the four periods (thus not a sample). 
                                                                        
10 We contend that the number of times that an attribute is mentioned is an indication of the importance of 
an attribute for the market. 
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4.3 RESULTS 
 
Our analysis of the stories delivered the following results of the frames of the diesel engine, 
hybrid-electric engine and electric engine respectively. 
 
Direct Injected (DI) diesel engine (1990-93, 1996, 2000 and 2005) 
 
Table 4.3: key indicators from yearly discourses on direct injected diesel engines 
DI Diesel # accounts Complexity 
(+average) 
ordinality appraisal Subject.-
evaluated
% user 
experience11 
1990-93 First 7 11 (2.7) 82 % +7 63% 29% 
1996 10 16 (8.2) 88 % +28 49% 60% 
2000 29 19 (6.5) 89 % +75 66 % 86% 
2005 39 19 (6.7) 89 % +46 41 % 67 % 
 
For DI-diesel we found various remarkable things: 
• Complexity: the total number of attributes used to describe a DI diesel engine was 11 in 
1990-93, 16 in 1996, and 19 by 2000 and 2005 (see Table 4.3). The number increases in 
time: a diesel engine stayed a complex product, but due to technological innovation even 
wooed increasing attention (= increasing number of stories) and focus on characteristics. 
Examples of new attributes are tax and drivability. 
• The average number of attributes used in one account initially increased from 2.7 in 
1990/93, to 8.2 in 1996, then decreasing to 6.5 in 2000, and 6.7 by 2005 (see table 4.3). It 
seems as if in the beginning of the 1990s this innovation was not of much interest to tell 
long stories about. Stories were very short. Only when more improved versions (with DI 
technology) had come to the market (by 1996), they were described in more detail, with 
often reports on test drives. The decrease (of the average number of attributes) after 1996 
is a slight confirmation of Rosa and Spanjol’s proposition of decreasing complexity in the 
course of market development. 
• The most mentioned attributes in 1990-93 are engine volume and fuel efficiency/use12 
(though both only 43%), all others are even lower. By 1996 engine volume and fuel effi-
ciency are both mentioned in 100% of the accounts, and engine capacity and acceleration 
were 90 and 80% respectively (see Figure 4.1). By 2000 engine volume is 86%, and engine 
capacity and torque are both 83%. By 2005 engine capacity is mentioned most (97%), while 
engine volume is still very important (87%). Acceleration is third with 77%. We conclude that 
engine volume and engine capacity are two attributes that have become a stable part of the 
frame of DI diesel, appearing in at least 83% of accounts since 1996. 
 
                                                                        
11 This is the % of accounts that are based on user experience (test drives etc.) or production experience 
(after market launch). 
12 In the remainder of the analysis fuel efficiency and fuel use are united as one attribute. 
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Figure 4.1: Technological frames for direct injected diesels and for hybrid-electric engines in 1996, 2000 and 
2005: the spider diagrams indicate the attention for attributes in those years, whereas the outer values 
indicate the appraisal score of that feature. For example, in 2005 engine capacity is mentioned in 97% of the 
accounts and on balance this attribute was evaluated as +4, which means there were two account in which it 
was seen an improvement (+1) and in one as a large improvement (+2); in the other accounts the attribute 
was not evaluated. 
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• Environmental impact was mentioned in 20% of the accounts in 1996, 3% in 2000, and 10 % 
in 2005. It therefore was a very minor attribute. Environmental concerns are apparently 
little associated with discussing new diesel engines. 
• Looking to the type of accounts, by 1996 accounts have a higher proportion of ‘experiences’ 
with the innovation (60% compared to 29% in 1990), all from the user (see Table 4.3). By 
1990 there were mainly ‘announcements’ of research or products. By 2000, 86% of ac-
counts were based on user or producer experiences, and by 2005 67%. Hence it stayed high. 
• If ‘total appraisal’ of the DI diesel engine is quantified, it shows a jump form +7 in 1990-93 
to +28 in 1996, and +75 in 2000 (see Table 4.3). Certainly this value is not very accurate, but 
it does indicate that the DI diesel engine was appraised very positively by market actors 
around 1996 and especially 200013. (There are various articles headed ‘super diesel’.) In 
2005 it stayed high. 
• Ordinality of the DI diesel is high: it slightly increases from 82% in 1990/93 to 88% in 1996, 
to 89% in 2000, to 89% in 2005. Rosa and Spanjol’s proposition that ordinality increases 
when a market develops is slightly confirmed here. The increase is modest, just as the in-
cremental innovation. 
• The percentage of subjectively-evaluated attributes fluctuates from 63% in 1990-93, to 49% 
in 1996, to 66% in 2000, to 41 % in 2005. With Rosa and Spanjol we would expect this per-
centage to increase over time, due to an increase of assessments of the product. This 
proposition is clearly not confirmed here. 
 
HEV (1992/93, 1996, 2000, and 2005 
 
Table 4.4: key indicators from yearly discourses on hybrid-electric vehicles 
HEV # 
accounts 
Complexity 
(+ average) 
ordinal-
ity 
appraisal Subject.-
evaluated 
% user 
experience 
1992-93 First 7 14 (4.0) 93% +10 57% 0 % 
1996 7 19 (6.0) 79% +16 50% 0 % 
2000 22 33 (6.5) 88% +16 75% 41 % 
2005 41 28 (3.9) 89% +80 66% 15% 
 
For HEV we found: 
• Complexity: the total number of attributes used to describe a HEV was 14 in 1992-93, 19 in 
1996, 33 by 2000 and 28 by 2005 (see Table 4.4). 2000 is the year of market launch. A HEV 
was and is a very complex product. The increase up to 2000 seems due to an increasing 
focus on a very complex product. 
• The average number of attributes per account increased from 4.0 in 1992/93, to 6.0 in 
1996, to 6.5 in 2000. By 2005 it had decreased to 3.9 per account. Like with complexity, the 
increase (up to 2000) seems due to an increasing focus on a very complex product. Since 
this is prior to market launch, the shared knowledge around HEV was still fairly low, so 
accounts could not built onto existing knowledge. By 2005 we see a sharp decrease of the 
average number of indicators in an account. I believe this is due to a growth in the shared 
knowledge of the product. This partly confirms Rosa and Spanjol’s proposition of a decreas-
ing complexity during market development. 
                                                                        
13 This statement generalizes over all accounts, which therefore loses the conflict of stories. In section 4.4 
we will discuss conflicting stories or frames. 
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• The most mentioned attribute in 1992-93 is engine structure (100%): all accounts mention 
the combination of the electric engine with the ICE, to indicate what a HEV is. Environ-
mental impact and fuel efficiency are 43%, all others are lower. By 1996 engine structure is 
still 100%, followed by environmental impact (86%), see Figure 1. Engine weight and maxi-
mum speed, and fuel efficiency were less prominent (each 43%). By 2000 engine structure 
was still highest with 77%, followed by fuel efficiency (59%), price (55%), and environmental 
impact (55%). By 2005, engine structure was still highest (88%), followed by fuel efficiency 
(63%), and environmental impact (37%). Price dropped sharply to 15%. In conclusion: in the 
mid-nineties engine structure and environmental impact were main attributes, while around 
2005 this had become engine structure and fuel efficiency. This may well have to do with 
increasing fuel prices in the early 2000s, and also with a consumer tendency to focus on 
individual benefits, instead of common goods (such as air quality). 
• Looking to the type of accounts, in 1990 and 1996 accounts are not based on user or 
production experiences. Only by 2000, when the Toyota Prius is launched (in autumn) ‘ex-
periences’ are observed, already in 41% of the accounts, all from the user. Increase of this 
number is expected after 2000. By 2005 this number had decreased however to 15% (even 
in absolute terms: 6 accounts in contrast to 9 in 2005). This seems to be the case because 
very few hybrid models have been launched after 2000 in general, and especially in 2005. 
By contrast, other types of accounts increased, such as ‘sector observations and/or future 
expectations’ (34%), and policy announcement or discussion (22%). In conclusion, hybrid 
engines receive increasingly attention, though this is less related to actual increase of prod-
uct models and user experience. 
• If ‘total appraisal’ of the HEV is quantified, it shows a steady increase from +10 in 1992-93 
to +16 in 1996, +16 in 2000, to +80 by 2005 (see Table 4.4). Certainly this value is not very 
accurate, but it does indicate that the appraisal of HEV were slightly positive by 2000, and 
very high by 2005. We should be cautious with conclusions however, since the level of ac-
tual experiences with the innovation is fairly low by 2005. To become more conclusive, we 
examined the appraisal of the (8 accounts of) user and producer experiences in 2005. We 
found an appraisal of +20. (Relative to DI Diesel this is low, since that scored +46 by 2005, 
with 67% user accounts.) Further we observe two conflicting stories: user experiences are 
fairly positive about HEV (+21), while the two producer accounts are indifferent or slightly 
negative about it (-1). 
• Ordinality fluctuates from 93% in 1992-93 to 79% in 1996, to 88% in 2000, to 89% by 2005 
(see Table 4.4). It is fair to say it is roughly 80 – 90%. This is comparable to DI Diesel. 
• The percentage of ‘subjectively-evaluated’ attributes varied from 57% in 1992-93, to 50% in 
1996, to 75% in 2000, to 66% in 2005. With Rosa and Spanjol we would expect this percent-
age to increase over time, due to an increase of assessment of the product. With regard to 
the drop after 2000, the proposition is not confirmed here. 
 
Electrical vehicle: 1990/91, 1996, 2000, and 2005 
 
Table 4.5: key indicators from yearly discourses on electric vehicles 
EV # 
accounts 
Complexity 
(+ average) 
ordinality appraisal Subject.-
evaluated 
% user 
experience 
1990-
91 
First 7 18 (5.4) 78 % -3 63% 14% 
1996 20 22 (4.5) 86 % -31 52% 35% 
2000 7 19 (5.9) 89% -12 73% 71% 
2005 2 13 (8) 77% -5 56% 50% 
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For EV we found the following remarkable things: 
• Complexity, i.e. the total number of attributes used to describe an EV, was 18 in 1990, 22 in 
1996, 19 by 2000, and 13 by 2005 (see Table 4.5). Apparently an electric car engine was and 
stayed a complex product for several years, with many aspect and elements to refer to. 
Only by 2005 it was framed slightly simpler, which may result from the low number of ac-
counts (only two). It is difficult to test Rosa and Spanjol’s proposition of a decreasing level of 
complexity, since the market for EVs didn’t develop. 
• Three most mentioned attributes are in 1990: range (71%), environmental impact (71%), 
and maximum speed (57%). Whereas in 1996 these are range (75%), price (55%), and engine 
structure (50%), the first two being negatively evaluated. Environmental impact dropped in 
the course of time, to 35% of the accounts by 1996, while being appraised positively. By 
2000 there is only one attribute mentioned in more than 50% of the accounts: range (71%). 
This attribute is evaluated very negatively. By 2005 three attributes are used in all (of the 
two) accounts: range, refuel-time, and way of refuelling. None of them is evaluated posi-
tively. 
• A number of attributes had disappeared by 1996 (compared to 1990), four new attributes 
came in use (refuel locations, production cost, dirty weather speed, size, operation cost). 
These relate to the use of the product. They were all four appraised with a decline or a large 
decline in satisfaction compared to contemporary cars. 
• Looking to the type of accounts, by 1996 accounts have a higher proportion of ‘experiences’ 
with the innovation (35% compared to 14% in 1990), both from the user and the producer 
side. By 1990 there were mainly ‘announcements’ of products or user experiments. By 
2000, 71% of accounts were based on user or producer experiences. By 2005 reports of 
experiences was one of two. 
• If ‘total appraisal’ of EV is quantified, it shows a drop from minus 3 in 1990 to minus 31 in 
1996, minus 12 in 2000, and minus 5 in 2005. Certainly this value is not very accurate, but it 
does indicate roughly what the appraisal of the innovation is. In 1996 and 2000 there is 
clearly a general feeling that the innovation has more disadvantages than advantages. The 
same holds for 2005. 
• Ordinality slightly increases from 78 % in 1990 to 86 % in 1996, to 89% in 2000, and then 
dropping to 77% in 2005, see Table 4.5. It is fair to say it is roughly 80-90%. Rosa and Span-
jol’s proposition that ordinality increases when a market develops is difficult to test here, 
since a market for EV did not really develop. 
• The percentage of subjectively-evaluated attributes varies from 63% in 1990, to 52% in 
1996, to 73% in 2000, and 56% in 2005. With Rosa and Spanjol we would expect this per-
centage to increase over time, due to an increase of assessments of the product. The de-
crease between 1990 and 1996 is surprising, since some user experiments are done in this 
period. Maybe the percentage of 1990 is relatively high, because of high expectations 
around EV, possibly wishful thinking. This brings market actors to positive appraisals, which 
are not based on actual experiences. 
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4.4 DISCUSSION 
 
Little attention for new engines 
The six national newspapers in the Netherlands published 180 stories on car engine innovations 
in the four periods we studied. Regarding the total number of newspaper issues during those 
periods, the attention for new car engines is not so high. Total yearly issues for the newspapers 
exceed 310. Given the 40 to 80 engine innovation stories, we find one account in every 20 to 30 
days in each newspaper. So, new car engines get not so much attention, probably on the 
assumption that large parts of the general public are likely not really interested in the precise 
technology below the bonnet. 
 
Growing attention for new engines 
We found that attention for new engine technology is growing after 1996: from about 40 stories 
a year in 1996 to about 60 by 2000 to more than 80 a year by 2005 (see Table 4.2). 
 
Most attention for unconventional engines 
We observed that there is relatively more attention in newspapers for unconventional innova-
tions than for incremental innovations. In 1996 twenty articles (or sections) were explicitly on 
the electric vehicle, while only ten were on the direct injected diesel. Still, only the latter was 
successful as a product market with regard to sales levels and investments of firms. Similarly, the 
largest share of articles in 2005 was on HEV, while new diesel engines were far more sold that 
year. Apparently, newspaper has a favor for what is most new. 
 
Hypes around unconventional engines 
Attention for one of the unconventional engines, the electric engine, fluctuates strongly: from 6 
in 1990 to 20 in 1996, to 7 in 2000, to 3 in 2005. This suggests a hype-disappointment cycle. 
Gartner consultancy (see Geels 2005) has described this as a typical cyclical pattern of some new 
technologies, consisting of a phase of self-reinforcing boost of expectations, followed by peak of 
the hype, and finally a sharp trough of disillusionment. After the backlash the enthusiasm may 
recover. Electric engines have gained renewed attention after 2005, mostly due to a new 
generation of batteries, but this is outside the boundaries of this analysis. 
For the hybrid-electric engine we do not find such a cyclical pattern. Attention for these engines 
shows a steady growth from 7 in 1996 to 22 in 2000 to 41 in 2005. 
 
An engine is complex 
The newspaper articles reflect that an engine is a complex product! In each period of a year, at 
least more than ten attributes are used to describe the innovation. The first newspaper account 
about a test drive of the Toyota Prius applied fourteen attributes to describe the engine-related 
aspects of the vehicle, and over the whole year attributes used to portray an HEV added up to 
thirty three. It is unlikely that laymen can handle this complexity. Probably many will loose 
interest in the precise engine, unless one is a ‘car-enthusiast’. This relates to the first conclusion. 
 
Hybrid frames shift more than diesel 
For direct injected diesel engines, we found that engine capacity and volume are two attributes 
that have become a stable part of the frame of DI diesel, appearing in at least 83% of accounts 
since 1996. Other persistent prominent attributes are acceleration, torque, maximum speed, 
engine structure and fuel efficiency. We conclude that between 1996 and 2005 the shift in diesel 
framing was only slight (both in structure and in appraisal), see also in Figure 4.2 (which is a 
reprint of part of Figure 4.1). 
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Figure 4.2: Technological frames for direct injected diesels in 2000 and 2005: the spider diagram indicates the 
attention for attributes; the outer values indicate the appraisal score of that feature. 
 
The drop in appraisal for fuel efficiency is the only notable change. It fell from +14 in 2000 to -1 
in 2005. This may be because users got accustomed to the relatively high fuel efficiency of the DI 
diesel engine, and found it normal by 2005. 
For HEV on the other hand, there has been quite a shift in the frames between 2000 and 2005, 
which is shown in Figure 4.3 (which is a reprint of part of Figure 4.1). 
 
  
 
Figure 4.3: Technological frames for HEV in 2000 and 2005: the spider diagram indicates the attention for 
attributes; the outer values indicate the appraisal score of that feature. 
 
Most remarkable is the decrease in emphasis of environmental impact: from 86% (1996) to 55% 
(2000) to 37% (2005), simultaneously to an increase on fuel efficiency: 43% (1996) to 59% (2000) 
to 63% (2005). This may well have to do with increasing fuel prices in the early 2000s, and also 
with a consumer tendency to focus on individual benefits, instead of common goods (such as air 
quality). Further, price of the engine is evaluated negatively by 2005 (-3), though in 2000 this 
was much worse (-14). This is probably due to fiscal support for HEV and/or high gasoline prices. 
All in all framing of HEV changed quite substantially, and took place mainly prior to the diffusion 
process: in 2005 the percentage of HEV in new car sales was only 0.5%. Apparently the frame 
was fairly flexible by that time; more than the more mature diesel market. These observations 
confirm Bijkers’ (1995) notion of increasing obduracy in the process of closure. Diesel technology 
is an established technology (more than 100 years old), and indeed we find that frames of diesel 
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engines are fairly stable. This is probably since consensus emerged among different relevant 
social groups about the dominant meaning of the artefact. Hybrid-electric and electric technolo-
gies on the other hand are new for the market, and therefore their framing is still fairly fluid. 
Another difference of HEV with diesel in this respect is that it has less prominent attributes: 
where diesel had three attributes higher than 80%, and another three around 60%, HEV has only 
one higher than 60%, and another two 55% or lower. 
 
Little environmental concern in diesel frame 
Engine capacity and volume are two attributes that have become a stable part of the frame of DI 
diesel, appearing in at least 83% of accounts since 1996. Further, environmental impact was 
mentioned in 20% of the accounts in 1996, 3% in 2000, and 10 % in 2005. It therefore was a very 
minor attribute. Environmental concerns are apparently little associated with discussing new 
diesel engines throughout the whole period. 
 
Social connotation plays a role 
We found that social connotation is not the most important attribute in technological frames of 
car engines, but that it does play a role. Steg et al. (2001) have studies the relative importance of 
social symbolic attributes of cars (not car engines) next to functional attributes. This had been 
hardly tested and validated by empirical research before. Through a social-psychological method 
they find that both functional and symbolic-affective attributes are significant in the attractive-
ness of the car. They do not specify which one of the two is most important. Through our 
discourse analysis we found that for car engines prices and functional performance attributes 
are most important, but that social meaning does play a role too. We mapped the development 
of social connotation of the improved diesel engine. In a significant share of the accounts social 
connotative attributes are attached to the engine (45% in 2000, 28% in 2005), which is stable 
and positive, varying from ‘super-diesel’, to ‘delicious’ and ‘brand-new’. Highest appraisal 
occurred around 2000; by 2005 the enthusiasm had slightly tempered. 
The development of social connotation of electric and especially hybrid-electric vehicles shows 
some remarkable dynamics. In the mid-1990s we find that attention for EVs was fairly high: 20 
accounts, which is double the amount of direct injected diesels in that year. Social connotation 
was however underdeveloped: only in 15% of the accounts we could recognize it, in quite 
neutral statements. Most accounts were summing up technical characteristics. Around 2000 
attention for EVs had collapsed, and social connotation had not developed. Meanwhile, 
attention for HEVs had grown considerably, up to 22 accounts by 2000. Social connotative 
attributes already appeared in one third of the accounts. They were mostly positive (with 
adjectives such as ‘high-tech’, ‘environmental friendly’, ‘modern’), some were neutral, and one 
was negative. By 2005 attention had mounted up to 41 accounts, even more than direct injected 
diesels in that year. Reference to social connotation appeared in about a third of the accounts, 
and its mainly positive appraisal had caught up with direct injected diesel. Since our findings are 
based on all stories in national newspapers, they are difficult to compare to a survey of 
American HEV consumers, which finds that 31 percent of HEV buyers said they purchased an 
HEV because the vehicle ‘makes a statement about me’ (Heffner et al., 2007). It slightly suggests 
that social connotation is more important for American than for Dutch buyers. 
In our study twenty-two percent of the accounts of HEV in 2005 were directly part of a policy 
discussion, and either announcing tax (or parking) discounts for hybrids, or pleading for it. This 
indicates the dominant social climate of praise for hybrids, and how it was easily adopted in 
political pleas. Apart from influencing consumers, it thus also pushed political support for tax 
discounts on HEVs in many countries. 
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Phases in shifting frames 
Two phases can be distinguished in the technological framing during market development of an 
innovation (product): before market launch and after. Before launch we observe a low level of 
hands-on user (or producer) experience in the stories, only experiments. We found typically 
positive attitudes and expectations, enthusiasm for what is seen as progress, and some 
marketing language. After product launch hands-on user (and producer) experience increase, 
and from that moment on appraisals start to relate to the actual (adoption, sales) behavior. We 
observe the appraisal of an unsuccessful product, EV, sharply decreasing after launch (from -3 in 
1990 to -31 in 1996, see Table 4.5), which will be surprising for an observer without practical 
experience with the technology. Appraisal of a successful product, such as direct injected diesel, 
increased after launch (from +7 in 1992 to +28 in 1996). The product market subsequently 
further unfolded. The trend for HEV is right in the middle of these two more extreme scenarios: 
it was +10 by 1992, +17 by 1996 and +16 by 2000. 
The indication of two phases explicates that ‘stories’ told and heard by market actors are not the 
whole story. Hands-on experience is another. As soon as people have actual experiences with 
the product, their original stories and frames may well be overruled. Flashy catchy testimonies 
can make people enthusiastic, but actual experience will re-balance their attitudes. Most car 
drivers have fairly stable preferences and expectations regarding car driving (drivability, 
maximum speed, acceleration, range, safety, comfort level etc.). They can for instance be told 
that 120km of range is enough for most of their trips, such as with an EV, but if they experience 
this as an increased threat of ending up with no electricity half away a trip, their enthusiasm 
crumples. 
This analysis suggests that the notion of the hype-disappointment cycle (Geels 2005) can be 
further developed by incorporating the market evolution of the product. We find that the 
market launch of a product is a critical moment in the appreciation and attention for the 
product. The twist of the trend line of product expectations or appraisal, either upward or 
downward, is an important indication of the success of the new product market. 
 
How is HEV appreciated in 2005, relative to DI Diesel? 
If ‘total appraisal’ of the HEV is scored (see Appendix A), it shows fluctuation from +10 in 1992-
93 to +17 in 1996, +16 in 2000, to +80 by 2005 (see Table 4.4). Though this value is not perfectly 
accurate, it does indicate that the appraisal of HEV where fairly high by 2000, and very high by 
2005. It may seem that hybrid is appraised higher than DI diesel by 2005 (+80 versus +46), but 
the low level of user experiences of the story tellers in the hybrid accounts (15%) is affecting the 
comparison. To become more conclusive, we examined the appraisal of the (8 accounts of) user 
and producer experiences, and we found an appraisal of +20. Relative to DI Diesel this is lower, 
since that scored +35 on the sole user accounts by 2005. 
 
Conflicting (sub) frames in the technological frames 
Both for electric and hybrid-electric vehicles we found dissimilarities of stories between 
producers and consumers: the first being mostly pessimistic about the innovation, and the latter 
mostly positive. For example in 2005: user experiences are fairly positive about HEV (+21), while 
producer accounts are indifferent or slightly negative about it (-1). Car firms evaluate new 
products on the basis of their business opportunity (profitability), which usually means a mass 
production and sales basis (Lehna, 2004). For EV and HEV most producers did not perceive bright 
outlooks (or said so for strategic reasons given their economic interest in non-electric vehicles). 
Within the group of consumers there are likely various sub-frames too, relating to various 
consumer groups. Since our discourse analysis is less suited to find sub-frames, we analyzed 
actual sales (‘revealed preferences’), and performed semi-structured interviews with car 
salesmen. Customers of new vehicles can choose their preferred type (and size) of engine out of 
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a range of alternatives (usually between two to six). We analyzed the outcomes of such 
consumer choices for the 30th highest volume car types in The Netherlands, in total more than 
200.000 choices (in a year), between 2003 and 2008 (see Appendix D for more details on this 
analysis). We found three types of (engine) consumer groups. A first group, consisting of (on 
average) 30 to 35% of consumers, chose the cheapest engine. The cheapest engine tends to be 
lightest, and this results in relatively high fuel economy (for its class). A second, largest share of 
customers is willing to pay (a few thousands of euro) more for a stronger engine (with lower fuel 
economy): this is the case in 60 to 70% of the consumers. Customers have different reasons for 
this: typically to drive more convenient on the highway, or because they like sporty driving, for 
status, or to use a caravan. Few customers are willing to pay (a few thousand euro) more for a 
cleaner engine: if such an option is available it was only 5% or less; often such an option is not  
 
Table 4.6: Size and characteristics of consumer sub-frames.. 
Consumer sub-frame  Size Weights 
  Functionality14 Social 
Connotation 
Price
15 
Environmental 
Impact 
1: ‘penny-pinchers’ 35% 0.30 0.20 0.45 0.05 
2: ‘power for convenience’ 60% 0.50 0.20 0.30 0 
3: ‘green’ 5% 0.05 0.20 0.30 0.45 
 
  
 
Figure 4.3: Consumer sub-frames; Table 4.6 visualized. 
 
available16. Adding up these ‘green’ ICE consumers with hybrid-electric drivers (and LPG drivers), 
makes the estimated share of ‘green consumers’ in the whole population around 2 or 3%. We 
                                                                        
14 Functionality includes engine capacity, acceleration, maximum speed, etc. 
15 Price includes purchase price and operational cost (which relates to fuel efficiency) 
thesis_Dijk_v07.pdf
Chapter 4 
 58 
found no evidence that this group is growing: hybrid sales stabilized at 2800 in 2005, 2006 and 
2007, being about 0.5% market share; LPG did not grow either.) 
In order to get a flavour of the three sub-groups, we combine the discourse analysis with the 
revealed preferences, and sketch three subgroups or sub-frames, within the aggregated market 
frames of Figure 4.2 and 4.3. Table 4.6 shows how we sketch these three groups with their 
distinct balance of attention for functionality, social connotation, price, and environmental 
impact. Individual consumers will be inclined to one of these three sub-frames. The rationale 
here is that when the three user groups (frames) are merged, accounting their sizes, they should 
deliver the (aggregate and averaged) socio-technical frame, such as in figure 4.2 and 4.3. Clearly, 
this is not a perfectly sound method, but valuable as a first estimate for consumer sub-groups. 
 
 
4.5 CONCLUSION  
 
Consumers use stories to understand new products, to determine their value to them. Prior to 
hands-on experience from product trials and observation of other users, stories are the only way 
people learn about a product. By analyzing stories on different types of car engines over the 
course of 15 years, we found evidence how consumers frame different engines differently: 
• framing of conventional diesel engines has been fairly stable between 1996 and 2005, 
despite progressive technological innovation. Main attributes were engine capacity (num-
ber of kW), engine volume (number of liters) and torque (amount of force, in Nm). Environ-
mental impact is rarely referred to. 
• framing of hybrid-electric engines shifted much more than frames of diesel engines. 
Remarkable is the decrease in emphasis of environmental impact: from 86% (1996) to 55% 
(2000) to 37% (2005), simultaneously to an increase on fuel efficiency: 43% (1996) to 59% 
(2000) to 63% (2005). Price of the engine is evaluated negatively by 2005 (-3), though in 
2000 this was much worse (-14). 
• framing of electric vehicles has also been less stable. Only range is a persistently salient 
attribute, evaluated negatively. Others, like price and refuel time, are slightly less persistent 
and or salient. 
By 2005, overall appraisal scores of the various engines were -1 for EV, +20 for HEV, and +35 for 
DI Diesel, where only consumers with user experience are taken into account. 
We draw four final conclusions from our analysis. First, framing of the established technology 
(conventional diesel engines) is more obdurate than that of an unconventional engine. This 
corresponds with Bijker’s (1995) notion of stabilization towards a dominant frame in the course 
of market development of an artefact, or in other words: high obduracy after closure. 
Second, two phases can be distinguished in the technological framing during market develop-
ment of an innovation (product): before market launch and after. As soon as people have actual 
experiences with the product, their original stories and frames may well be overruled. This 
conclusion suggests that the notion of the hype-disappointment cycle (Geels 2005) can be 
further developed by incorporating the market evolution of the product. We find that the 
market launch of a product is a critical moment in the appreciation and attention for the 
product. 
                                                                                                                                                                               
16 Here, engines are meant that are specifically engineered for high fuel economy, without compromising on 
power. An example is the 3-liter engine from Audi/Volkswagen, which can make 100km on 3 liter petrol. 
These engines are more expensive. Not all manufacturers offer these high efficiency engines. After 2007 
more versions have appeared on the market (e.g. Volkswagen Bluemotion). 
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Third, social connotation plays a role in technological frames of car engines. This resembles the 
conclusion that Steg et al. (2001) found for the car as a whole. We found that for car engines 
social connotation is not the most important attribute, rather prices and functional performance 
attribute are more important. For car engines social meaning does play a role though. Apart 
from influencing consumers, we found that it also affects policy discussions political support of 
tax measures. 
Fourth and finally, we found some evidence for sub-frames among consumers. Supported by an 
analysis of actual sales in the Netherlands, we provided hints that three sub-groups can be 
distinguished in the total population of consumers of new cars: for the first group (in size about 
35%) price is the most salient attribute. They are satisfied with the functionality of the cheapest 
engine. The second group (about 60%) is willing to pay more for a stronger engine. Customers 
have different reasons for this: typically to drive more convenient on the highway, or because 
they like sporty driving, for status, or to use a caravan. Finally a small third group is willing to pay 
more for a cleaner engine. This group is not larger than 2 or 3%. There is little evidence that it is 
growing. 
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5 Technological framing by car firms 
 
In this chapter we analyze technological frames of car firms towards development of Ultra Low 
Emission Vehicles (ULEV). We examine the framing of firms by studying their belief systems and 
actual engagement. The central question is: Which underlying beliefs significantly drive the 
engagement in the development of ULEV technology? A second question concerns whether we 
can map out diversity between firms. We thus ‘step into the shoes’ of the car firms and analyse 
their social, business, technological and environmental considerations. In order to achieve 
enough focus, we will focus on hydrogen vehicle technology17 as an example of an ULEV. 
Scholars, industry strategists as well as policy makers acknowledge hydrogen as an important 
future energy carrier for transportation (Hekkert and Van den Hoed, 2004). 
In section 5.1 we first introduce how car firms view car engines in general. We then present 
results of our survey to identify present-day beliefs of global car firms towards development of 
hydrogen propulsion technology (section 5.2). In section 5.3 we discuss the outcomes, also in 
the light of additional semi-structured interviews. We address the relation of actor beliefs and 
actor framing, offering a conclusion at the end. 
 
 
5.1 CAR FIRMS AND CAR ENGINES 
 
A glance at the product range in today’s car showrooms shows a strong commitment of all 
mainstream vehicle manufacturers to conventional Internal Combustion (IC) gasoline and diesel 
technology. These types of engines have been built and refined for more than 100 years now 
(Cowan and Hulten 1996). After 1990, alternative ways of propelling vehicles have been 
presented by various car firms: full electric and hydrogen, as well as hybrid-electric models. In 
general, these three alternatives have received much less (research and development) attention 
than the dominant IC engine. Hybrid-electric engines have yet been incorporated in most car 
manufacturers’ research efforts now, at least to some extent. Most firms consider them 
important on the short or medium term (Teske and Chanaron 2007). From an environmental 
perspective, they should be considered neither a minor nor a major innovation, decreasing 
harmful emissions (from driving) by 10% to 20% (Lave and MacLean, 2002). Next to hybrid-
electric systems, more radical alternatives had been presented earlier on. There are full electric 
vehicles, which were (re)introduced in the 1990s and there are hydrogen vehicles, introduced 
around 2000. These latter two types of vehicles are examples of Ultra Low Emission Vehicles 
(ULEVs). They emit extremely low levels of harmful gases compared to existing diesel and 
gasoline vehicles. California’s Air Resources Board defines a ULEV as a vehicle that emits 50% less 
pollution emissions than the average for new cars released in that model year. In this chapter, 
we follow that definition, and include CO2 as a harmful gas in the examined emissions
18. 
Car firms are confronted with a range of uncertainties around car engines. What are the future 
expectations of various alternative technologies? How strict will future emission legislation be? 
How should one enhance technological capabilities around alternative technologies: collaborate 
with suppliers, build strategic alliances with competitors or perform corporate Research and 
Development (R&D)? How much money should one invest in alternative technologies? When is 
                                                                        
17 When the term ‘hydrogen engines’ is used in this chapter, two types of engines are meant: Fuel Cell 
vehicles (FCs) as well as ICE with hydrogen as fuel. For the survey in section 5.2 we have only included 
hydrogen fuel cells though. 
18 Obviously, emissions during the production of the fuel should be incorporated in the computation. 
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the market ready for product launches? Is there a ‘business case’? When are prototypes good 
enough to be launched? These are all questions without straightforward answers to firms. 
How do car firms then deal with alternative propulsion technologies? Inter-firm competition in 
the R&D on new engine technologies is intense (Molot, 2008). There is major competition over 
gasoline and diesel technology, as well as hybrid-electric and hydrogen vehicles. The high cost 
for this type of research and the search for competitive advantage sometimes push car firms 
into strategic alliances with each other, as well as with suppliers. For cleaner technologies, 
several partnerships have emerged, often partly government-sponsored (such as California’s 
Fuel Cell Partnership). Although research consortia are important in the initial stages of research 
on new and costly technologies, inter-firm competition for first-mover advantages imposes 
limits on the extent of corporate cooperation around R&D. 
In this chapter we focus on firm framing towards hydrogen engine technologies, as an example 
of an ULEV. Most of the major (top five) auto assemblers are working to produce hydrogen 
vehicles and are doing so in their home countries, generally at sites close to their head offices. 
Daimler’s Fuel Cell (FC) R&D is based in Germany; those of Ford and GM are in the USA, and 
Toyota’s base is in Japan. GM, which began cooperation with the US Department of Energy on 
alternative fuels in 1989–1990, was the first assembler to begin research on hydrogen vehicles. 
GM has invested considerable resources over a long period of time in the search for a viable Fuel 
Cell Vehicle (FCV) and has alliances with a number of companies, such as Dow Chemical. In 
recent years, some demonstration projects with fleets of consumer vehicles have been launched 
in Washington, California and Berlin, amongst others, where both GM and Daimler are 
participating. Toyota and Honda are also investing quite substantially in R&D around FCVs19 (Van 
den Hoed, 2005; Molot, 2008). 
Some companies regard hybrid technology as an important transition step on an indefinite time 
path to FCVs. Toyota expects that assemblers that master hybrids will have significant cost and 
learning advantage over competitors when commercialising FCs (Molot, 2008). 
Again, because of the significant first-mover advantage (that will accrue to the assembler that 
first produces a reliable and reasonably priced FCV), it is not surprising that assemblers 
undertake this kind of leading-edge research in-house. In describing the ‘strict partitioning’ 
between research undertaken in-house and that conducted in research partnerships, one expert 
used the term “firewall” (Avadikyan and Larrue, 2003). Disruptive technologies are, by defini-
tion, uncertain. Despite the huge amount invested in R&D to develop FCVs, a number of 
uncertainties around cost, infrastructure, hydrogen production and storage remain. 
How strong is the dedication of firms to hydrogen technology development? Are firms investing 
to make way for market introduction as soon as possible? Or are firms slightly engaging as a 
minimal insurance to not miss the boat when it departs? These latter matters have stayed 
unresolved. In the next section we describe the hydrogen technology through the eyes of car 
firms, and analyze their technological frames. 
 
 
                                                                        
19 Until 2000 Daimler/Chrysler has invested approximately $1 billion on FCVs. By 2004, an estimated $6–10 
billions has been spent by the auto industry alone to research and develop FCVs. 
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5.2 ENGAGEMENT AND BELIEFS TOWARDS HYDROGEN TECHNOLOGY 
 
This section presents responses of seven global car firms20 towards hydrogen technology, which 
were contacted in 2005. Though the absolute number of this set is not high, the seven firms do 
represent a significant share of the (around 12) major global car manufacturers. The majority of 
the respondents were at senior engineering level (see Appendix E). Therefore, we can be 
confident that respondents were sufficiently knowledgeable about the firm’s strategy on 
hydrogen. (The questionnaire is printed below in Appendix F.) 
We assume these people to have voiced the vision of their organization. Regarding the seniority 
of most respondents and the way we have asked the question (‘for your organisation’) this is 
plausible. Nevertheless, the response may be biased for two reasons. Apart from the personal 
bias (from their position or personal opinion), there may be strategic PR considerations involved 
that intend to put the firms in a more positive light. At this point it is very difficult to assess to 
what extent this has played a role for the respondents, but we will need to take this into account 
when interpreting the response. Therefore, we will discuss the results of the questionnaire 
survey in the light of two additional interviews (90 minutes, semi-structured, see Appendix E). 
The combination of the questionnaires and interviews gives sufficient confidence to draw some 
conclusions from this analysis. 
 
 
5.2.1 Engagement in developing a hydrogen vehicle 
 
The extent to which a firm is ‘engaged in development of hydrogen propulsion’ was a key 
question asked at the beginning and end of the questionnaire (scale of 1–5, ranging from ‘not at 
all, very little, little, moderately, to extensively). From the response at the beginning of the 
questionnaire we find that the mean value for the seven respondents was 4.3 (for present 
engagement) and 4.3 (for future engagement). In other words, the perceived present engage-
ment is slightly above ‘moderate’. Further we find that firms do not intend to increase their 
development efforts for the hydrogen car. 
In order to test the stability of the respondents the same question was posed again at the end of 
the questionnaire. Now we find that the engagement in hydrogen vehicle development is 2.5 
(present) and 3.2 (future) on average, much lower than the 4.3 that was found (for both) earlier. 
It is remarkable that the difference between the scores and the beginning and the end is so 
great. We suspect that responses at the end of the questionnaire are less biases by possible PR 
considerations that one may have had in mind at the start of the questionnaire, and also 
because respondents have activated their knowledge on the firms considerations in the course 
of all the questions (completing the questionnaire took about 20 minutes). Finally, with regard 
to the responses during the interviews at two car manufacturers, we were told that hydrogen 
technology was only a minor area of development for them and for most of the firms in the 
sector, and therefore we assume that the mean value of 2.5 is most accurate, suggesting that 
firms are little engaged in hydrogen vehicle development. 
The distribution of values over the respondents gives an indication on how the mean value was 
delivered; see Figure 5.1. The distribution of engagement over the car manufacturers shows that 
the largest share of firms in the dataset (i.e. four of seven) regards their engagement as ‘little’. 
One firm chooses ‘moderately’ and two choose ‘not at all’ (whereas one did not respond to this 
question at the end). 
 
                                                                        
20 These are: Daimler/Chrysler, Honda, Nissan, Renault, Peugeot, Saab and Audi. 
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Figure 5.1: Distribution of present engagement in hydrogen vehicle development over the respondents 
 
 
5.2.2 Potential drivers of engagement 
 
Following the social-psychological model of Montalvo (2002, 2006, see chapter 3), we consider 
nine potentially salient underlying beliefs to the engagement levels, grouped in three categories. 
These are: perceived Environmental Risk (EV) and Economic Risk/Opportunity (ER), both 
components of attitude toward innovation; perceived Community Pressure (CP), Market 
Pressure (MP), and Regulatory Pressure (RP), all components of perceived social pressures to 
innovate; perceived Technological Capabilities (TC), Organisational Learning (OL), strategic 
alliances (AL) and Collaboration Networks (NW), all components of perceived control over the 
innovation process. 
By each of the seven respondents, these nine items were scored in the questionnaire (scale of 
1–7)21: Table 5.1 shows the mean values. 
 
Table 5.1: The mean values of beliefs to the hydrogen vehicle 
 
item  mean 
Perceived Environmental Risk  2.9 
Perceived Economic Risk  2.4 
Perceived Market Pressure  2.4 
Perceived Community Pressure  2.6 
Perceived Regulatory Pressure  2.3 
Perceived Technological Capabilities  3.3 
Perceived Organizational Learning Cap’s  3.3 
Perceived Strategic Alliance Capabilities  4.4 
Perceived Networks of collaboration Cap’s  4.6 
 
                                                                        
21 Or more precisely: 1 = very unlikely/not at all, 2 = fairly unlikely, 3 = slightly unlikely, 4 = uncertain, 5 = 
slightly likely, 6 = fairly likely, 7 = very/extensively likely. 
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The low values for the salient beliefs that we observed in Table 5.1 are consistent with the low 
mean value of the present ‘willingness’ for the firms (3.9) that we found (see above). Here, we 
find that the ‘attitude’ towards the innovation process is slightly negative: 
• The economic consequences of developing hydrogen vehicles are perceived to ‘slightly 
likely’ bring losses (2.4). 
• The environmental risks of the current car models (i.e., Internal Combustion Engines (ICE)) is 
perceived to be slightly low (2.9). 
The pressure from the social environment to develop hydrogen vehicles is not perceived as high 
by car firms: 
• MP, CP and RP are perceived to be low: between 2.3 and 2.6. These are not likely to press 
the firms towards the development of hydrogen vehicle technology in the short run (one to 
two years). 
The perceived capacity to perform the development of hydrogen vehicles is perceived as weak: 
• TC and OL capabilities are 3.3 on average, where 3 means slightly low and 4 means 
uncertain. AL and NW are about one unit higher (4.4 and 4.6, respectively), that is, between 
uncertain and slightly easy. 
Since the variance of the scores is quite high, a sole conclusion on the mean values is somewhat 
risky. Therefore, in addition, we will examine the answers of the seven companies separately 
(where actual engagement is scored on a scale of 1-5, whereas beliefs are score on scale 1-7): 
• Firm 1 is presently little engaged in hydrogen (3) and has few plans for the next 5 to 10 
years (3). It is uncertain about the economic consequences of engagement (4). EV is per-
ceived as very low (1). Social pressures are perceived to be very low (1, 2 and 2). Its own TC 
around hydrogen is perceived as weak (2), but OL, AL or NW capabilities are uncertain or 
slightly strong (5). Conclusion: firm 1 has little ambition for hydrogen and is most optimistic 
about its NW capabilities (slightly strong). 
• Firm 2 is hardly engaged in hydrogen (1), and it has few plans for the future (3). It would 
mean big losses for the firm (7). The EV of the current models is uncertain (4). Social pres-
sures are low (2, 1 and 1). Capabilities are very weak (TC: 3; others, 1, 2 and 2). Conclusion: 
firm 2 is hardly engaged in hydrogen vehicle development for two possibly related reasons: 
its current capabilities around hydrogen vehicles are perceived to be weak and engagement 
will currently only mean great losses. 
• Firm 3 is also hardly engaged in hydrogen vehicle development (1), and has no plans for the 
future (1). It perceives the economic consequences as very negative (6, moderated losses). 
The EV of the current models is slightly small. Social pressures are small (2, 1, 1). The TC and 
OL around hydrogen are perceived to be very low (both 1). However, the capabilities to 
form AL and NW are seen as slightly and fairly high (6 and 5). Conclusion: similar to firm 2, 
firm 3 is very unwilling to engage in hydrogen vehicle development for two probably related 
reasons: its current capabilities around hydrogen are very small and engagement will cur-
rently bring moderated losses to them. Firm 3 seems to trust external knowledge sources at 
the moment. 
• Firm 4 is moderately engaged (4) and has moderate plans (4). Still, it expects moderate 
losses from the current engagement. The environmental effects are uncertain. Social pres-
sures are uncertain (3, 4, 4). TC and OL are seen as slightly strong (5), just as AL and NW (5 
and 6). Conclusion: firm 4 is fairly engaged and it believes to be (slightly) capable to engage 
in hydrogen vehicles. 
• Firm 5 is currently little engaged with hydrogen (3), but has moderate plans for the future 
(4). Economic opportunities are currently seen as very negative (7). Social pressures are 
perceived to be very low (1, 1, 1). Technological capabilities are low (2), but the capabilities 
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to build alliance and benefit from networks are slightly and fairly good (5 and 6). Conclu-
sion: firm 5 is currently little engaged in hydrogen, but is confident about its network. 
• Firm 6 is presently little engaged in hydrogen (3) and has some plans for the future (4). It is 
uncertain about all pressures (4), except for environmental risk, which is seen as slightly low 
(3). Conclusion: firm 6 is uncertain about hydrogen (or at least not outspoken about it). 
• Firm 7 did not respond to the question on engagement at the end of the questionnaire, but 
the response to that question at the beginning suggests they are moderately engaged (4). It 
sees minimal economic losses (5). The environmental risk of the current models is perceived 
to be quite low (2). Social pressures are uncertain (all 4). TC and OL are perceived to be 
uncertain; only forming alliances are perceived to be slightly easy. Conclusion: this company 
is optimistic, most likely due to confidence in alliances, and expectation of some economic 
returns. 
 
Three conclusions can be drawn from these discussions. 
• Conclusion 1: we find three subgroups in the population of firms: 
o Subgroup 1: these firms are somewhat engaged hydrogen (firms 1, 5 and 6). 
o Subgroup 2: these firms are hardly engaged (firms 2 and 3), probably due to two re-
lated reasons: their current capabilities around hydrogen vehicles are perceived to be 
weak and engagement will currently only mean great or moderate losses. 
o Subgroup 3: these firms are moderately engaged (firms 4 and 7). In one case, this is 
because of its slightly strong capabilities; the other seems to have high confidence in 
alliances. Both acknowledge current losses, but these are apparently seen as necessary 
investments. 
• Conclusion 2: the (perceived) level of technological capabilities TC and organisational 
learning capabilities (OL) seems to have a high correlation with the engagement level. The 
two non-engaging companies have weak capabilities and one of the two optimistic compa-
nies has high capabilities (for the other firm, the response value is missing). From the three 
companies of little engagement, two are uncertain about their capabilities. 
• Conclusion 3: five out of seven firms see their capabilities for AL and NW (i.e., attaining the 
required knowledge from outside) as higher than their own current TC and OL. It looks like a 
fair majority of the firms choose to rely on external technological knowledge sources for 
their potential hydrogen vehicle development. 
 
 
5.3 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
What does this analysis of belief systems clarify on technological framing by car firms? As we 
described in chapter 3, we suppose knowledge and beliefs become manifest in the frame. The 
specific hydrogen-related belief-structure of firms shapes their framing of hydrogen technology. 
This delivers a specific appraisal of the technology, which can be summarized as willingness (i.e. 
as behavioural intention). Subsequently, willingness will shape (though not determine) the firm’s 
behaviour with respect to the technology (see Figure 5.2). 
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Figure 5.2: Relation between frame, willingness and belief-structure of a specific technology. 
 
In this chapter we have correlated specific beliefs with specific engagement, namely regarding 
development of hydrogen technology by car firms. We have found differences in engagement 
levels, and we identified three subgroups. We found that these differences most strongly 
correlate to different levels of (perceived) technological and organizational capabilities. 
However, although firms diverge in the appraisal of hydrogen technology, neither from the 
questionnaires, nor from additional interviews (see Appendix E), we found evidence that frame-
structures of car firms towards hydrogen technology differ significantly, i.e. regarding the 
weights they attach to economic opportunity, environmental risk etc. All firms are part of the 
same global market, with fierce competition. All firms emphasize business opportunities, both 
immediate and future opportunities, when considering development of hydrogen technology. A 
main question for business is: do consumers expect and value cleaner engines (personal 
communication at Audi and Peugeot)? Secondary, their relative position regarding competitors 
is important. Further, social expectations and pressures for novel technologies, such as 
hydrogen, affect R&D expenditures of firms to some extent, whereas emission regulation is a 
boundary condition that needs to be met. 
The more detailed level of communication in the interviews suggested that there are two 
technological frames towards a technology, or two sub-frames: an R&D technology frame and a 
product launch technology frame. The R&D frame evaluates the development of technology for 
future product launches. Execution of R&D delivers engine prototypes, most importantly as 
concept cars, which may be shown at international motor shows, without the direct intention to 
be produced. This frame appraises the extent to which enhancing technological competences is 
important for the firm. 
Secondly, the product launch technology frame relates to the technology on the near-future 
products. This frame appraises the extent to which new technology will be incorporated in new 
products. Each new car or engine is seen as a project with revenues and cost. Revenues are from 
expected sales, and costs are from product engineering and manufacturing. Each project 
(product) should achieve a certain return on investment in order to be approved. As long as 
production investments in a new product-technology have no profitable outlook, a firm will 
usually wait with launching the product. 
None of the car firms consider launching hydrogen vehicles in the next 5 years. All firms perform 
R&D on hydrogen at least to some extent, though the amount significantly varies. Firms that 
consider themselves stronger engaged in hydrogen are those who perceive their technological 
and organisational competences as higher. 
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6 Emergence of (hybrid-) electric vehicles 
 
In this chapter we analyze the emergence of (hybrid-) electric engines on the automobile market 
after 1990. We apply the two-layered model (see section 2.4) as an explanatory framework: we 
include agency through a micro layer where the innovation is described through the eyes of the 
members of stakeholder groups. Aggregate trends of niche, regime and (relevant) landscape are 
considered in the macro layer. We hypothesize that three stakeholder groups and four feedback 
mechanisms are key in the emergence of hybrid-electric engine technology and competition 
with ICE. We explicate the role of techno-economic mechanisms alongside social and regulatory 
mechanisms for the case of automotive engines, including social meaning of an engine. The co-
evolutionary analysis is novel in the integrated conception of actor perspectives, feedback 
effects and competition between products. 
This chapter is structured as follows. In section 1 we review other studies on electric and hybrid-
electric vehicles. In sections 2 and 3 we sketch the technological evolution of the car engine after 
1990. In section 2 we focus on aggregate patterns, while in sections 3 we address the perspec-
tives of individual stakeholders (firms, consumers, and regulators). Section 4 integrates the 
previous sections into a co-evolutionary framework. Section 5 draws conclusions on our 
approach as well as on the car engine sector. 
 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Attention for hybrid-electric vehicles is booming. At a growing pace news magazines report on 
these partial electric drives. Consumers increasingly drive them, and car firms more and more 
explore them. Critics state that similar short-lived hypes appeared in the mid-1990s on electric 
vehicles and around 2000 on fuel cell vehicles, and they may be right. Still, today’s momentum is 
distinctive in one important way: hybrid-electric engines have been sold 1.5 million times 
worldwide now. How could this happen in a sector that is typically risk-aversive and a classic 
example of ‘lock-in’ to a dominant technology? 
Other researchers have studied this subject, but mostly with a narrower focus. Some focused 
only on firms, while ignoring consumers. Pilkington et al. (2002) for example explore patenting 
of electric vehicles activity as an indicator of its technological development. Oltra and Saint Jean 
(2009b) present a patent data analysis on diversity in firm strategies around various low 
emission engines. Hekkert and Van den Hoed (2004) analyze firm competition of hybrid 
technology versus fuel cells. By contrast, other researchers focused on consumers, whilst 
disregarding car firms. Haan et al. (2006) study why Swiss consumers like HEVs, and how they 
differ from ICE drivers. Gerard et al. (2006) do the same for US drivers. Few studies have an 
integrated character: incorporating consumers and firms, competition between technologies, 
and including technical, economic, social and regulatory aspects. Exceptions are Cowan and 
Hulten (1996), from the field of evolutionary economics, addressing possibilities to escape lock-
in, a move from gasoline toward electric vehicle development. They explained the domination of 
internal combustion (IC) technology in the automotive sector for more than a century now, 
fuelled by gasoline and diesel. Their analysis however ends in 1995 (excluding HEVs) and is less 
specific on firm and consumer perspectives. Another more integrated approach is Oltra and 
Saint Jean (2009a), who’s sectoral system approach delivers a multi-faceted analysis of the 
automotive sector; but is restricted to France. 
These studies have shown their value in explaining trends in consumer preferences, innovation 
at firm level (technological innovation, learning), and market and sector level (competition and 
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diffusion), however, the conceptual approaches are less specific on the role of a changing social 
context and, accordingly, stakeholder perspectives. Popularity or social connotation of products, 
especially new emerging environmental products, may change alongside technological 
innovation. A chief example is hybrid-electric vehicles entering the car market since 1997. Many 
owners see their vehicle as ‘socially responsible’, as ‘the right vehicle for society’ (Heffner et al., 
2006). Progression of such connotation will influence the further innovation and diffusion 
process of the technology, affecting both the consumer and the producer side. There are 
currently no theories in this field that incorporate this interaction of such social and technologi-
cal aspects. 
In this chapter we explicate the role of techno-economic mechanisms alongside social and 
regulatory mechanisms for the case of emergence of (hybrid-) electric engines on the automo-
bile market. We see four key mechanisms, and three key actor groups. We present the new 
technology in the context of evolution of demand and supply of car engines, which results in a 
co-evolutionary analysis. 
 
 
6.2 EVOLUTION OF ENGINE TECHNOLOGIES 
 
In this section we sketch aggregate patterns of the technological evolution of the car engine 
after 1990. We examine innovation of both the ICE and electric engines, and address both 
technical aspects and diffusion of use. 
 
6.2.1 Internal combustion engine 
 
For more than a century now, vehicle engines are dominated by internal combustion (IC) 
technology. The engines constructed by Otto, Daimler and Benz in the 1880s have been greatly 
improved since then, though they are in principle surprisingly similar to today’s engines. 
After 1990, car firms continued to refine the internal combustion engines, especially with 
respect to performance and emissions. In Germany, fuel consumption of the fleet typically 
decreased 25% from 1990 till 2003 (Daimler-Chrysler, 2003), while average horsepower of the 
engine highly increased22. Trends in the Netherlands were similar to Germany (see figure 6.1). 
Initially average fuel economy remained fairly constant there from 1990 until 1997. This was 
despite a trend of increasing average vehicle mass, and therefore only possible due to more 
efficient engines. After 1997 growth in engine fuel efficiency surpasses growth in vehicle mass, 
resulting in a decrease of average fuel use. The impressive rise in fuel efficiency was possibly 
through broader application of two new engine components in particular23: direct injection and 
variable valve systems (Holt, 2005). These innovations comprise the following: 
Fuel injection (FI) is a system for injecting fuel into an internal combustion engine. Prior to 1985, 
carburetors were the dominant device for this. Lack of injection accuracy causes a fair share of 
incomplete combustion, which forms the primary source engine emissions. Improved (i.e. 
electronic) fuel injection systems were increasingly applied (40% market share in 1988, and 
nearly 100% by 1990) and reduced incomplete combustion. Direct injection (DI) systems can be 
seen as most recent generation of FI. 
                                                                        
22 Note that these trends are influenced by the proportion of choice for smaller lighter vehicles and heavier 
vehicles. In the US for example there is such a preference for heavy vehicles that the fuel consumption did 
not decrease at all in that period. 
23 Other relevant innovations that were increasingly applied were turbo and intercooler for diesel engines, 
and multi-point injection systems for gasoline, and EGR. 
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Variable valve timing (VVT) makes it possible to change the timing of some or all of the valves of 
an internal combustion engine during engine operation. Optimizing valve timing at all engine 
loads and speeds significantly improves engine efficiency, power, and exhaust emissions. 
Gasoline mileage improvements of up to 20% can be achieved with VVT (Dresner and Barkan, 
2005). 
 
Mass Fuel economy
kg L/
100 km
 
 
Figure 6.1: Trends of average car mass and fuel consumption of the Dutch vehicle fleet from 1980 till 2005 
(source: Bovag-Rai (2005)). 
 
Production and sales levels of VVT and DI rose considerably after 1990 (see graphs in Appendix 
G). The diffusion of direct injection systems was fairly fast on the diesel market. Beise and 
Rennings (2005) show that, in Western Europe, the growth moved from 5% to 70% in only 8 
years. By 2001 is had reached almost 80%. Application on the gasoline market has been 
increasing as well after 2002 (reaching 13% in Europe in 2007). Diffusion of variable valve 
systems was also considerable, though initially mainly among larger engines (greater than 2.0 
liters). We found it has reached 40, 50 and 60% in Western Europe, USA and Germany respec-
tively. 
 
 
6.2.2 Electrical engines 
 
From the mid 1990s onwards, electrical engines (re-) emerged as alternative technology for 
propelling vehicles. First this was as pure electric vehicles (Battery Electric Vehicle, BEV); later as 
hybrid-electric vehicles (HEV). Electric battery vehicles consist of an electric engine that moves 
the wheels, a battery for energy storage, and an electronic engine controller. Up to 1996, the 
production and sales of electrical vehicles was dominated by small companies outside the car 
manufacturing industry, most notably the Danish City El. Sales were very low (only a few 
hundred per year). Around 1995 though, car manufacturers showed an increasing interest in 
marketing their electric vehicles (just prior to California’s ZEV requirements for 1996). After a 
time of showing prototypes at automobile shows, they now started to launch production 
vehicles. Most car manufacturers favored electrifying existing models as an initial, low-cost 
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strategy (Renault Clio, Peugeot 106, etc.). Around 2000 however, it was undeniable that BEVs 
were unsuccessful as a product market (see sales levels in the Netherlands in Table 6.1), mainly 
due to limited range, and a higher price relative to comparable IC vehicles. Not more than a few 
thousand were sold yearly between 1995 and 2000 worldwide. 
 
 
Table 6.1: Sales of diesel cars (units), battery electric vehicles and hybrid electric vehicles in the Netherlands 
1995-2006 (Sources: www.avere.org, www.bovag.nl, Beise and Rennings (2005)) 
 
  BEV HEV DI Diesel Non-DI Diesel 
1995   0 8500 76500 
1996 60 0 28800 61200 
1997 10 0 33250 61750 
1998 15 0 48000 52000 
1999 13 0 66000 54000 
2000 12 0 86400 33600 
2001 0 50 93600 26400 
2002 0 63 93500 16500 
2003 25 17 92650 16350 
2004 7 1062 102000 18000 
2005 0 2800 104550 18450 
2006 0 2800 116450 20550 
 
After 1997 a few car firms launched hybrid-electric versions (HEV). Hybrids have similar range as 
IC-vehicles. Toyota presented its Prius on the Japanese market in 1997, and Honda followed with 
the launch of its Insight in California in 1998. Prices were initially much higher than ICEs, but 
Toyota initially paid a premium of around 10% on each vehicle, to push down the price. It sold 
more than 15.000 HEVs annually in its first years. In 1999 Toyota’s Prius was launched in 
California and later worldwide, followed by a 2nd generation Prius in 2004. By 2002 worldwide 
cumulated HEV sales exceeded the 100.000 mark, by 2008 1.5 million. Market shares reached 
around 0.5% in the Netherlands in 2005, rising to 2% in (first half of) 2008. In the USA it was 
around 4% in USA in first half of 2008. 
The trend in the annual sales of hybrid vehicles produced by Toyota is shown in Figure 6.2. By 
2005 the overseas sales of Toyota’s hybrid vehicle, mainly in the United States, had surpassed 
those in the domestic market. 
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Figure 6.2: Annual Sales of Toyota’s Hybrid Vehicles (Source: Tanokura and Karishu, 2006). 
 
 
6.3 SHIFTS IN STAKEHOLDER PERSPECTIVES 
 
This section examines the role of stakeholders in the evolution of car engine technology after 
1990. Whereas the previous section focused on aggregate patterns, we now address the 
innovation through the eyes of three stakeholders: users, producers and policymakers, and how 
they changed after 1990. 
 
6.3.1 User perspective 
 
Since we cannot address all car users in the world, we limit ourselves to discourse analysis of the 
Dutch car market, analysis of stated preferences on the US market, and analysis of actual sales in 
the Netherlands. 
 
User frames 
Though many studies are performed on the social perception of automobiles (see Steg et al., 
2001; Heffner et al., 2007), few studies have examined perspectives on car engines specifically. It 
is not clear how people perceive the propulsion technology of their vehicle, and how they come 
to choosing the one or the other. Through the analysis of newspaper and their car magazine 
supplements (see chapter 4) we were able to determine what features obtained attention 
among potential users, and how such features were valued (as something positive or negative). 
Here we summarize the main findings for BEVs, HEVs and diesel engines successively. Our 
analysis disclosed that for BEVs in 1996 range was perceived a salient attribute (mentioned in 
75% of the accounts), as well as price (55%). Both range and prices were negatively appraised, 
which shows that markets actors were dissatisfied with both functionality and price. Environ-
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mental impact (only 35%) had dropped in frequency in comparison to 1990, though it was 
positively appraised (assessment score of +5). The social connotation score of BEV was 0 by 
1996, which means neutral. By 2000 there was only one salient attribute: range (71%). This 
attribute was evaluated negatively (assessment score -5). Hence, perceived functionality was still 
low, and attention for BEV had decreased. 
In 2000 Toyota’s hybrid-electric Prius was launched in the Netherlands. Our analysis disclosed 
that for HEVs prominent attributes up until 2000 were fuel use (59%), price (55%), and environ-
mental impact (55%). By 2005, they were fuel use (63%) and environmental impact (37%). The 
higher price as a negative factor dropped in importance to 15%. Fuel use being a positive factor 
was increasingly appraised: scoring +15 in 2000 and even + 32 in 2005. The negative score for 
price dropped: from -14 in 2000 to -3 in 2005. The score for social connotation rose from +3 in 
2000 to +9 by 2005. Our analysis of articles disclosed that hybrids were mostly associated with 
low fuel use, while remarks on performance were few. Acceleration, an aspect of performance, 
was mentioned in only 17% of the accounts and appraised as +5 in 2005. This satisfaction was 
low in comparison to diesels. 
For HEV, there has been a shift in the frames between 2000 and 2005, which is shown in Figure 
6.3 (which is a reprint of part of Figure 4.1). 
 
  
Figure 6.3: Frames for HEV in 2000 and 2005: the spider diagram indicates the attention for attributes; the 
outer values indicate the appraisal score of that feature. 
 
 
Most remarkable is the decrease in emphasis of environmental impact (from 55% to 37%), 
simultaneously to a slight increase on fuel efficiency (59% to 63%). This may well have to do with 
increasing fuel prices in the early 2000s, and also with a consumer tendency to focus on 
individual benefits, instead of common goods (such as air quality). The change in frame for HEV 
was quite substantial, and took place mainly prior to the diffusion process: in 2005 the 
percentage of HEV in new car sales was only 0.5%. Apparently the frame was fairly flexible by at 
that time. For BEV, by contrast, there was not a big change in frames (between 1996 and 2000): 
it was stable in its negative appraisal of range, price and refuel time. 
We also examined frames of the diesel engine, which were increasingly equipped with direct 
injection systems (see section 6.2). Performance attributes, such as engine capacity (‘horse-
power’), acceleration and torque, got most attention. Innovations of diesel engines were well 
appreciated, both in terms of (perceived) functionality, as in the social connotation. Overall 
performance was appraised + 9 in 2000 and +12 in 2005. Social connotation scored +11 in 2000 
and +8 in 2005. Only price was dissatisfying for most people: -2 in 2000 and -7 in 2005. 
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Between 1996 and 2005 the shift in framing was only minor (both in structure and in appraisal), 
which is shown in Figure 6.4 (which is a reprint of part of Figure 4.1). The drop in appraisal for 
fuel efficiency is the only notable change. It may be because users got accustomed to the 
relatively high fuel efficiency of the DI diesel engine, and found it normal by 2005. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.4: Frames for direct injected diesels in 2000 and 2005 
 
 
The changes in frame-attribute appraisal reflect the technological innovations that occurred on 
the one side and changes in social perceptions on the other (emphasis on fuel economy, 
attention for climate change). 
Apart from discourse analysis, one can also ask consumers about their preferences, and identify 
stated preferences. Mytelka (2008) presents a study on car preferences, not on car engines. It 
shows the relative importance of fuel economy, next to other consumer car preferences, see 
table 6.2. It shows that dependability24 has always been a prominent attribute for (US) consum-
ers. Fuel economy fluctuates in importance, most likely due to fluctuations of the oil price. (Most 
notable is the decrease in importance of fuel economy between 2004 and 2005, since the fuel 
price rose between those years.) 
 
Table 6.2: Trends in vehicle attributes (Adapted from Mytelka (2008) and Kubik (2006)) 
 
 Trends in vehicle attribute preference USA 
Attributes 1980  1987  1996  2001  2004 2005 
Fuel economy 42   4   7  10  22 12 
Dependability 31  44  34  29  26 33 
Low price 14  31  11   8  10  6 
Quality  4   8  19  22  19 20 
Safety  9  14  29  29  23 26 
 
Business consultants from Maritz-research studied change of consumer habits due to rising fuel 
prices (in France, Germany and the UK, in 2006, with responses of 1240 new vehicle owners). On 
the statement ‘I think about buying, or have bought, a vehicle with a more economical engine’, 
57% agrees mildly or strongly, while only 23% disagrees mildly or strongly. Based on these 
                                                                        
24 That is: reliability 
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figures they conclude that a major share of European drivers is changing their car purchase 
considerations, due to rising fuel prices. How familiar are people with new propulsion systems? 
In the same research Maritz found 20% is very familiar with hybrid-electric petrol engines, 34% 
somewhat familiar, 39% has heard of the technology, and 8% is not at all familiar. Full electric 
vehicle are somewhat less known: 9% very familiar, 35% somewhat familiar, 48% has heard of 
the technology, and 8% is not at all familiar. Of all new /alternative engine technologies, hybrids 
are most familiar. What engine do they consider for their next vehicle purchase? Of the 
respondents, 24% considers or strongly considers electric, 47% for LPG, 55% for petrol, 60% for 
hybrid-electric, and 72% for diesel. 
In other words: hybrid-electric vehicles are considered more than petrol engines, if we believe 
what these people say. But what do they actually buy? That is the topic of the next sub-section. 
 
User Behaviour 
Customers of new vehicles can choose their preferred type (and size) of engine, out of a range of 
alternatives (usually between two to six). In chapter 4 we analyzed the outcomes of such 
consumer choices for the 30th highest volume car types in The Netherlands, in total more than 
220.000 choices (in a year). We found three types of (engine) consumer groups. A first group, 
consisting of 30 to 35% simply chooses the cheapest engine. The cheapest engine tends to be 
lightest, and this results in relatively high fuel economy (for its class). A second, largest share of 
customers is willing to pay a few thousands Euro more for a more powerful engine (with lower 
fuel economy): this is the case in 60 to 65% of the purchases. Customers have different reasons 
for this: typically because they like sporty driving, for status, to drive more comfortable on the 
highway, or to use a caravan. Few customers are willing to pay a few thousands Euro more for a 
cleaner engine: 5% or less. Often such an option is not available25. Adding up these ‘green’ ICE 
consumers with hybrid-electric drivers (and LPG drivers), makes the estimate share of ‘green 
consumers’ in the whole population around 2 to 5%. We found no evidence that this group has 
grown between 2003 and 2007 in the Netherlands. These ‘green’ drivers make up the third 
segment, which is the smallest one. 
 
6.3.2 Policy perspective 
 
From the 1970s onwards, governments were increasingly confronted with insights in the severe 
health implications of vehicle emissions. Emission regulation at a European level was adopted 
around1985; in the USA and Japan already in the 1970s. This section examines government 
bodies regulating the car (engine) sector. For simplicity we will not address the framing of the 
emission issue here; the political discussions (what is the problem, what are alternative 
solutions? what is the ‘best’ solution?) and formation of majorities is a too complicated matter 
for the sake of this chapter. In this section we examine what the outcomes were, such as 
decided emission standards and subsidies on R&D. In section 6.4 the impact of these regulations 
on the engine market and innovation process is addressed. 
 
European policy initiatives 
The regulation adopted in Europe in 1985 provided targets for around the year 1992. In addition, 
in the course of the 90s standards were defined in a series of EU directives staging the progres-
sive introduction of increasingly stringent standards (see Figure 6.5). Emissions of NOX, HC, 
                                                                        
25 Here, engines are meant that are specifically engineered for high fuel economy, without compromising on 
power. An example is the 3-liter engine from Audi/Volkswagen, which can make 100km on 3 liter petrol. 
These engines are more expensive. Not all manufacturers offer these high efficiency engines.  
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carbon monoxide (CO), and particulate matter are regulated. Figure 6.5 shows how require-
ments for diesel cars evolved, as an example. Similar progressive standards were set for gasoline 
vehicles. 
 
 
Figure 6.5: NOx and PM emission standards for diesel cars (1992-2005) (Source: Wikipedia, 2006). 
 
 
The Euro-directives provided the industry with requirements on pollutants for 5 to 8 years 
ahead. This gave vehicle manufacturers a focus point for their engine development work. From 
the beginning of 1990s onwards, it became more and more apparent to policymakers that apart 
from polluting emissions, another type of vehicle emissions, CO2, needed limitation as well. The 
EU chose a different strategy on this: a voluntary covenant between the EU and the automotive 
industry26. In 1998, after two years of negotiation, the EU signed agreements with the car 
manufacturer association of Europe (ACEA), Japan (JAMA) and Korea (KAMA), committing them 
to reaching 140 g/km by 2008/2009, which is a 22% reduction compared to 1995. 
In order to support these emission requirements, governments at EU and national levels have 
regularly provided funds for research & development (R&D) on cleaner engines. Also, to support 
this direction at the customer side, many national governments provided subsidies on the 
purchase of low emission vehicles, for example battery electric vehicles (mostly from the middle 
of the 1990s onwards). After 2000, many EU countries also implemented energy labelling 
schemes. These intend to provide information to the customer on the fuel efficiency of vehicles 
relative to other vehicles of the same (size) class. 
 
US policy initiatives 
Regulation in the USA was adopted in the middle of the 1970s, defining maximum Corporate 
Average Fleet Economy (CAFE) numbers. The CAFE program requires car manufacturers’ fleets to 
meet specific average fuel economy levels (for a model year). The CAFE standards have been 
unchanged since 1996, requiring that the fleet averaged fuel economy of all passenger cars, sold 
by a car manufacturer in a specific year, exceeds 27.5 miles per gallon (while pickups, vans and 
SUV’s must get an average of 20.7 m.p.g.). CAFE standards do not get progressively stricter over 
the years. Actually, the highest fuel average fleet fuel economy in the US was in 1987. 
                                                                        
26 Different legal proposals concerning the reduction of CO2 from vehicles were discussed (e.g. fiscal 
measures) from the beginning of the 1990s, but no agreement could be reached between the EU member 
states. This is why they came to a voluntary approach then. 
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Apart from these law enforced regulations, a voluntary agreement in the USA became important 
in early 1998, the National Low Emissions Vehicle (NLEV) Program. It was triggered by develop-
ments in California in the early nineties (see below). Nine states and more or less all automotive 
manufacturers agreed stricter tailpipe standards in 1999, and nationally in 2001. These were 
more stringent than those in place by the EPA27. Further, the US government subsidized the US 
Advanced Battery Consortium, cooperation between GM, Ford and Chrysler, started in 1991. In 
the 10-year program the government spent 814 million, while the three firms spent 980 million 
dollar. 
 
California 
Some governments found the European and US federal (EPA) standards too weak. Initiated by 
severe health problems in the Los Angeles area, the California Air Resources Board (CARB) had 
ambition to set stricter standards. When it learned about novel electric vehicles in 199028, it set 
new standards to trigger further development and sales of electric vehicles29. It adopted the ZEV 
Mandate in 1990, requiring that by 1998 2 percent of all new cars sold in California would be 
“zero emission”. In the year 2000 all new cars sold had to be either “low emission”, “ultra low 
emission” or “zero emission”. Moreover, by 2003 75 % had to be low emission vehicles (LEV), 15 
% ultra low emission vehicles (ULEV) and 10 % zero emission vehicles (ZEV). As Kemp (2005) 
notices, the ZEV Mandate was a significant piece of legislation, since California represents about 
4% of the world market for cars and about 12% the US car market. The Mandate was relaxed 
however later on, most notably in 1996 when the 1998-2002 requirements were abolished, and 
in 1998 when ZEV credits could be earned through partial electric vehicles. By 1994, four 
additional states had adopted the California ZEV mandate (New York, Massachusetts, Vermont 
and Maine); eight more have joint the National Low Emissions Vehicle (NLEV) Program, 
approving stricter requirements than EPA. In section 6.4 the impact of these regulations on the 
engine market and innovation process is addressed. 
 
6.3.3 Firm perspective 
 
For manufacturers, a novel engine may be perceived in various ways: as something that is of 
interest to their current customers, to new customers, as a product for which there is a future 
market when further developed (but no immediate market), or as an engine for which the 
market prospects are highly unclear. For producers the profitability of an engine (the business 
case) is likely to be an essential component of the frame. This sub-section first addresses the 
framing of car firms, and then examines individual firm behaviour (strategies) on car engine 
developments after 1990. 
 
                                                                        
27 Automobile firms were eager to participate in this voluntary agreement, since it would prevent more 
states to adopt the ZEV-mandate. From the end on 1993 onwards they had been lobbying for this (see 
Burke, 2000, pg. 45). 
28 When GM presented the prototype at the January 1990 LA Auto Show, it made electric vehicle technology 
seem real and encouraged CARB to include EV’s in the mandate it adopted in September of that year. This 
result was unforeseen by GM officials, see Hoogma et al. 2002). 
29 For a more detailed analysis on how this regulation came about, see Kemp (2005). 
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Firm frames 
In order to survive between competitors, vehicle manufacturers define a certain business 
strategy, which contains a technology strategy. Most important aim of vehicle manufacturers is 
developing vehicles that are attractive to the market, which means: attractive to the customer, 
on a mass production and sales basis. The business strategy defines the current and near-future 
product mix that should make the company profitable and competitive. 
The technology strategy has two sides: an R&D technology strategy and a product launch 
technology strategy. The R&D strategy aims to develop technologies for future product 
launches. R&D delivers engine prototypes, most importantly as concept cars, which may be 
shown at international motor shows, without the direct intention to be produced. R&D budgets 
are typically 5 to 15 % of total firm turnover. 
The product launch technology strategy defines the technology on the near-future products. 
Each new car or engine is seen as a project with revenues and cost. Revenues are from expected 
sales, and costs are from product engineering and manufacturing. Each project (product) should 
achieve a certain return on investment in order to be approved. Production volume is important 
for the developing firm, in order to get beyond break-even point. As long as production 
investments in a new product-technology have no profitable outlook, a firm will wait with 
launching the product. On the other hand firms are eager to achieve first-mover advantage. This 
is the temporary monopoly advantage that will accrue to the assembler first producing a 
reasonably priced improved engine, attractive to consumers. Consumer preferences are 
therefore the most important driver of product launches; firms need to supply what potential 
users want, to generate revenues for recouping the costs made. Emission requirements are a 
boundary condition for product launches: new vehicles have to comply with the regulation. 
 
Firm behaviour 
Firms differ in their precise strength and weakness of capabilities for innovation (Prahalad and 
Hamel, 1990). In this section we examine typical behaviour of firms in the sector after 1990, 
while we also address individual firm strategies, both for ICE and for electric engines. To identify 
firm behaviour we consider patent data and new product launches30. 
Patent data and new product launches reveals that most car manufacturers were involved in 
developing or adopting variable valve timing (VVT) and new fuel injection systems (after 1990 
most notably direct injection (DI) systems). Comparing the patent figures of ICE after 1990 on 
the one hand and BEV and HEV on the other, reveals a striking difference: total patent numbers 
of BEVs and HEVs are much lower (Burke et al., 2000; Hannibal and Meyer, 2000; Pilkington et 
al., 2002; Berggren et al., 2009). In the 1990s progress and attention for IC engines was a factor 
8-10 larger. Analyses of Oltra and Saint Jean (2009) on the French automotive industry confirm 
these figures: see investment figures of PSA in Figure 6.6 as an example. The authors also hint at 
a slightly increasing diversification of technological competences of most firms after 2000. 
(Griliches, 1990) 
 
                                                                        
30 We acknowledge the limitations of patent data as indicator of technological innovation (most notably that 
not all innovations are patented, see also Griliches (1990)). This section complements patent data with 
presented concept cars and actual market launches after 1990, which overcomes some of the drawbacks.  
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Figure 6.6: PSA patent portfolio (Oltra and Saint Jean 2009), including battery-electric vehicle (EVB), 
hybrid-electric vehicle (HV), fuel cell vehicles (FVH), diesel engines (DV), and gasoline engines (ICEV). 
   
The trends in Japanese patent applications for cleaner propulsion technologies by Toyota are 
given in Figure 6.7 (Yarime, Shiroyama, and Kuroki 2008). The green arrows indicate when 
revisions and modifications were made to California’s ZEV regulation. It shows that patent 
applications of electric vehicles rose sharply in the early 1990s, triggered by ZEV, since Toyota 
relied heavily on the large US market for their exports (ibid.: 195). Quandt (1995) concludes that 
the ZEV requirement was largely responsible for the electric vehicle development programs run 
by almost every global automobile manufacturer at that time (1994). He reports that Toyota 
assigned 100 engineers in 1992 to a new division with the mission of developing a 1998-model 
BEV for the California market. Further, Cohen et al. (2009) reports that the project team of 
Toyota’s hybrid-system (starting by the end of 1994/beginning of 1995), had intensive interac-
tions with Toyota’s Electric Vehicle Development Division - communication of their team leaders 
was called ‘a catch-ball process’. The Toyota-Matsushita joint venture for battery development 
(starting in March 1995) for its hybrid system, was relatively easy since Matsushita was already a 
supplier for Toyota’s electric vehicle development (Magnusson and Berggren, 2001). In other 
words, despite ZEV’s failure to trigger BEV sales, it did have a lasting affect on technological 
capabilities of (some) firms. 
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Figure 6.7: Patent Applications by Toyota on Clean Vehicles (Yarime et al., 2008). 
 
Firms improved ICE performance after 1990, since they observed and expected most consumer 
satisfaction there. The technological refinements enabled vehicles to accelerate faster even 
though they became heavier (Fischetti, 2002). Most firms did not regard electrical propulsion as 
a profitable strategy to increase satisfaction of the majority of consumers. Some firms did 
explore the segment of green consumers with clean ICEs and electric engines, first with BEVs, 
later with HEVs. But these efforts suffocated after disappointing sales, and remained minor 
issues compared the incremental innovation of ICE engines. (Differences between firms are 
described below.) 
Research on new car engines is a costly activity, which pushed various firms in research 
consortia (Molot, 2008), especially for hybrids and fuel cells. The research collaboration of GM, 
Daimler and BMW on hybrid technology is an example. These collaborative activities are 
however currently strictly separated from the leading edge research that is undertaken in-house, 
because of the significant first mover advantages. 
R&D work is executed on two different places in the industry: at vehicle manufacturers and at 
suppliers. Pilkington and Dyerson (2006) conclude that there is a clear difference between ICE 
and BEV here. Much of the research activity in BEVs occurred within the supplier network 
(especially in Japan) rather than exclusively in the mainstream carmakers themselves. They 
explain this to the need for more radically technology shift, required by the more radical change 
of regulation in California. This shift proved too great for them to make themselves, they argue. 
In contrast, the incremental innovation in IC engines could be met by existing capabilities and 
networks of firms. Nevertheless, diesel and gasoline innovations are also driven considerably 
from research at first tier suppliers, such as Bosch, Denso, Valeo and Delphi. 
The Table 6.3 sketches individual firm strategic activities after 1990 (i.e. three firms are shown 
here, further nine in Appendix H). Descriptions are limited to main concept cars and launches. 
The examination of individual firm strategic activities shows that in the last 15 
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Table 6.3: Chronologic overview of strategic car engine activities, limited to main launches and concept cars 
of ICE, BEV and HEV. Combination of various sources: www.answers.com, wikipedia.nl, wikipedia.en, Van den 
Hoed (2004), Cowan and Hulten (1996), Hannibal and Meyer (2000),Teske and Chanaron (2007). The table is 
an overview, and does not claim to be complete. 
 
Firm ICE BEV HEV 
GM Presentation concept of VVT 
system in 1995 (dubbed Ecotec 
engine), launch in 1997 for Opel 
Corsa, with later updates (2000: 
Double Continuous Variable Cam 
Phasing, and 2003: Twinport), 
which were gradually available in 
more models. 
Gasoline DI was presented in 2002, 
but slowly adopted in three 
engines (2004: Vectra /Signum; 
2005 Opel Pontiac; 2007: Saturn 
Sky). 
DI diesel (called DTI) adopted in 
1996 (Omega, Astra in 98), 
updated as CDTI in 2003. DI spread 
soon over all diesel models. 
GM spent more than 
$1 billion developing 
the EV1 (GM’s 
estimate). Only 800 
vehicles were leased 
during a four-year 
period. In 1998 the 
last update of EV1 
was launched. After 
relaxation of ZEV 
mandate (1996) GM 
shifted research 
focus towards fuel 
cell technology 
Until 2004 skeptical about 
hybrids. In 2006 research 
collaboration was established 
with DC and BMW. 
GM announced (in 2006) 
launch of full hybrid system in 
two SUVs (Tahoe, Yukon) for 
late 2007; by late 2008 they 
were limited available (with 
25% better fuel economy, and 
$2.500 more expensive). 
 
Toyota Introduced VVT in the 1992 Corolla 
GT-versions. Followed up by VVT-I 
(1996), and VVTL-I (1998); 
gradually launched in various 
vehicles (Avensis 2000, Camry 
2001). 
The same Avensis engine also 
applied direct gasoline injection for 
the first time. 
Developed its own DI system, 
common rail, in 1995 (D-4D), 
adopted gradually to various 
models. New generation of diesel 
engine in 2003 (D-CAT). 
Launched electric 
Toyota RAV4 by 
1996. Sold only a few 
hundred annually. 
Shift of R&D focus 
away from BEV in 
1996 (relaxation of 
ZEV), towards HEV 
and fuel cells. 
Pioneered with HEV in 1997 in 
Japan, 2000 in California. Sold 
around 15.000 HEVs annually 
in first years; by 2002 total 
exceeds 100.000. Estimated 
losses on every vehicle sold up 
to 2002 or 2003 of a few 
thousand dollars. By 2008 
three models Toyota have 
been launched outside Japan 
(Prius, Highlander, Camry 
2006), and three of Lexus. 
Total sales adding to 1.5 
million. 
BMW Introduction of VVT (vanos, 1992), 
with a second generation in 1998 
(double vanos). Third generation 
(valvetronic) in 2001. 
BMW introduced GDI in 2001 (only 
some models). New generations in 
2003 and 2006. 
Common rail diesel adopted in 
1998, and became standard after 
2000. 
No EV concept cars 
presented. One 
technical paper on 
R&D on E1 made 
public (1992). 
Until 2004 skeptical about 
hybrids. In 2006 research 
collaboration was established 
with GM and D/C. No near 
future plans for full hybrid 
launches. They have 
incorporated some electronic 
assistance for increasing 
efficiency of ICE. 
 
years firms have strongly focused R&D and engineering on incrementally improving their ICE 
engines. Up to 1996 some attention was spend on BEV technology, obviously initiated by 
California ZEV mandate. In 1996, when the mandate was relaxed, most firms shifted to fuel cell 
technology, as a more promising alternative for BEV (even before BEV proved a market failure!). 
Exceptions were Toyota and Honda, shifting to both fuel cell and hybrid-electric technology. 
Toyota and Honda pioneered in launching hybrid vehicles, Ford followed (Ford Escape, 2006). 
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Teske and Chanaron (2007), studying firm strategies towards HEV (by 2006), cluster the 
manufacturers in three groups: pro’s, cautious pro’s, and most reluctant. In group 1 they see 
Toyota, Honda, Ford, and GM. In group two they regard Hyundai, Kia, PSA, Nissan, D/C and 
BMW. In group three they hold Renault, VW/Audi and Fiat. The chronology of the commerciali-
zation of hybrid vehicles by major Japanese auto companies are shown in Table 6.4 (Yarime et 
al., 2008). 
 
Table 6.4: Commercialization of Hybrid Vehicles by Japanese Auto Makers (Source: Toyota Motor Corpora-
tion, 2003; Tachimoto et al., 2005; Center for Electric Vehicles, 2006; Karishu and Tanokura, 2007). 
 
Auto Maker Vehicle Name Year Hybrid Type Hybrid System 
Prius 1997 Parallel Toyota in-house 
(THS) 
Coaster Hybrid EV 1997 Series Toyota in-house 
Crown Mild Hybrid 2001 Parallel Toyota in-house 
(THS-M) 
Estima Hybrid 2001 Parallel Toyota in-house 
(THS-C) 
Alphard Hybrid 2003 Parallel Toyota in-house 
(THS-C) 
Prius 2003 Parallel Toyota in-house 
(THS II) 
Harrier/Kluger 
Hybrid 
2005 Parallel Toyota in-house 
(THS II) 
Lexus 2006 Parallel Toyota in-house 
(THS II) 
Toyota 
Camry 2006 Parallel Toyota in-house 
(THS II) 
Tino Hybrid 2000 Parallel Nissan in-house Nissan 
Altima Hybrid 2006 Parallel Toyota (THS II) 
Insight 1999 Parallel Honda in-house 
(IMA) 
Civic Hybrid 2001 Parallel Honda in-house 
(IMA) 
Honda 
Accord Hybrid 2004 Parallel Honda in-house 
(IMA) 
Mazda Tribute Hybrid 2004 Parallel Aisin AW (HD-10) 
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6.4 CO-EVOLUTION OF DEMAND AND SUPPLY THROUGH FEEDBACK MECHANISMS  
 
This section integrates aggregate trends of demand and supply of car engines (section 6.2) with 
stakeholder perceptions and initiatives (section 6.3). Figure 6.8 below presents a timeline, with 
stakeholders (frames and behaviour) evolving at the micro level. Simultaneously, the accumula-
tion of their practices leads to two distinct innovation trajectories at the macro level: ICE 
(section 6.4.1) and (hybrid-)electric engines (section 6.4.2). As an illustration we schematize 
developments chronologically, and visualize the feedback mechanisms on the two distinct 
innovation trajectories. One type of mechanism relates to techno-economic factors (learning 
and returns to scale), another to social factors (framing and social connotation). Regulations also 
influence these mechanisms. The development of the two-layered framework denote to co-
evolution of demand and supply in a broad sense, while the trends of total sales (demand) at the 
macro level and total products offered (supply) denote to co-evolution in a more narrow sense. 
Figure 6.8 illustrates that we have identified a strong ICE regime over the whole period after 
1990: car firms supplied (practically solely) ICEs to meet demand for two large consumer groups: 
those seeking sufficient performance engines at the lowest price (segment 1), and those 
preferring more powerful engines at a slightly higher price (segment 2). We discuss the 
innovation path of the ICE regime according to various mechanisms that shape demand and 
supply below. 
 
6.4.1 ICE regime trajectory 
 
Learning-about-the-market 
Learning-about-the-market was a significant mechanism in co-evolution of demand and supply 
for ICE engines (see figure 6.8). Firms learned which engines had the best business opportunity, 
and they learned how to shape the technology best for that opportunity. After 1990 technical 
capabilities for applying VVT (for gasoline) and DI (for diesel) in consumer vehicles grew at 
various firms, after pioneering launches of Honda in 1989 (VVT) and Fiat (DI) in 1987. Since 
emission regulation became increasingly stricter, firms found VVT an attractive option for more 
expensive, high performance side of the car market. DI was mainly applied in medium sized 
diesel vehicles: Fiat Croma and Audi 100. It was attractive for firms with large sales share of 
diesel engines, such as Fiat and VW/Audi. Around 1990, five out of 21 manufacturers had VVT 
systems in production vehicles, two had DI systems. These (launching) companies now learned 
from their own vehicles how VVT and DI could be best applied in high volume products. While 
some firms waited with application on production vehicles (typically because it was not 
profitable yet and not required yet for meeting regulation), they did advance on R&D work: their 
technical capabilities on especially VVT grew. (Although for DI systems firms relied more on 
suppliers such as Bosch.) These efforts were based on expectations that, in time, VVT would be 
necessary for improving performance and emissions of IC engines. In 1992-94 the number of 
market applications doubled quickly. Firms learned that customers in this group were willing to 
pay extra for an engine (around a few thousands of euros) for increased performance. Manufac-
turers observed sales numbers that were large enough to earn back a major share of their R&D 
investments. After 1997-98 many firms believed VVT to be profitable for medium priced models. 
It was now a means to both increase performance, but also to keep emissions within limits (i.e. 
standards). Finally, around 2000, almost all manufacturers applied VVT and DI systems in one or 
more engine models. After 2000, it further spread to more models. 
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Figure 6.8: Schematization of co-evolution of demand and supply
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Learning-by-doing 
Technological learning and application of VVT and DI improved the efficiency of ICEs substan-
tially. Average specific output of vehicles (kW per liter) grew with 20 to 25% between 1990 and 
2000 (DeCicco et al., 2001). From table 6.3 and Appendix H we surmise that firms employed 
three types of learning strategies for engine technology: (1) perform own R&D, (2) collaborate in 
R&D with competitors (e.g. Fiat, GM and PSA around 2000), and (3) temporarily license-in an 
engine from a competitor, to buy time and learn to make it yourself (e.g. PSA from Mitsubishi in 
1999). A final strategy is to buy an engine sub-system from a supplier (such as Bosch, Delphi). 
 
Increasing returns to scale 
Increasing-returns-to-scale was also an important mechanism. For DI systems production levels 
grew steadily (see Appendix G), especially since various car firms shared the same component 
supplier. Common-rail, a new generation of DI around 1997, was developed at Fiat, but soon 
sold to Bosch. This was purposely to benefit from scale economies at this first tier supplier. 
Subsequently it became available for all firms. VVT systems, on the other hand, were mostly 
developed in-house at individual firms, resulting in smaller scale batches. It did result in a higher 
variety of VVT systems. This dissimilarity between VVT and DI may explain why the diffusion 
speed of DI was steeper than VVT. It reached nearly 100% in Europe by 2005; VVT by contrast 
reached about 40%, see Appendix G). 
 
Social construction of connotation 
Our discourse analysis of the Dutch market (through national newspapers) reveals the develop-
ment of social connotation of the improved diesel engine, between 1996 and 2005. Attention for 
the engine increased with its application: from 10 accounts in 1996, to 29 by 2000 and 39 in 
2005. In a large share of the accounts a social connotation is attached to the engine (45% in 
2000, 28% in 2005), which is stable and positive, varying from ‘superb’, to ‘smooth’ and 
‘pleasant’. Highest appraisal occurred around 2000; by 2005 the enthusiasm had slightly 
tempered. 
 
6.4.2 (H)EV – niche trajectory 
 
Learning-from-the-market 
Learning-from-the-market of (H)EVs only really started after 1995, when the first paying 
consumers started using the vehicles. Before 1995 BEVs were in an experimental and demon-
stration stadium. Manufacturers tested small batches of vehicles to study practical use. Most 
firms were pessimistic about the business opportunity of these vehicles on the short term. 
Some, most notably Renault and PSA, were more confident. The ZEV mandate required large 
firms to launch models in 1996. By 1997 and 1998 manufacturers learned that their gloomy 
expectations were right: BEV’s were hardly sold. Most consumers were unhappy with low 
autonomy (kilometers per battery charge), maximum speed and high battery price. 
In 1996 California relaxed the mandate, and became more enthusiastic for HEVs. This turn 
triggered most firms to shift R&D focus away from BEV, towards fuel cells. Apart from Peugeot-
Citroen, no large manufacturer launched updates of BEVs after 1999. Although most firms 
focused mainly on fuel cells, Toyota and Honda studied hybrid-electric engines equally intensive. 
Contrasting all other car firms, Toyota launched its Prius by 1997, producing 1000 cars a month, 
a number which was soon doubled. Honda followed in 1998. Most firms stayed skeptical about 
hybrids until 2005, expecting they would only be suitable for a small market niche. Meanwhile 
Toyota and Honda’s sales added up to more than half a million (by 2005). Other firms increased 
investments in hybrids after 2005; some started research collaborations. 
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Learning-by-doing 
Technical improvement of BEVs was meager. GM’s EV1 model years 1996 and 1998 show a 
range extension from 55-95 miles to 75-150 miles. Maximum speed stayed constant at 80mph. 
Toyota’s RAV4 had similar max speed, and a similar range of 80-120 miles. A 1998 Citoen 
Berlingo had slightly lower performance: a range of 96km and max speed of 95 km/h. 
For hybrids, core of the technological challenge has been on the battery packs. Most hybrids use 
conventional nickel-hydride batteries. Specific output of these batteries (kWh over kg) has not 
improved much after 2000. Engineers have advanced though on trade-offs between total 
battery power (settling zero emission range and fuel economy) on the one hand and vehicle 
driving performance (acceleration, max speed) on the other. Progression on the battery life-time 
has also been achieved31. 
Learning strategies that firms employed for electric and hybrid electric technology were similar 
as those for ICE technology. It varies from own R&D, research collaboration with competitors 
(such as GM, D/C and BMW in 2005), to licensing-in engines or components from competitors 
(Ford licenses components from Toyota). 
 
Increasing returns to scale 
Scale benefits for BEVs were limited for two reasons. Total sales levels were only a few 
thousands a year, and also those sales were spread over more than 10 firms. There were no key 
suppliers (yet) who would supply batteries or electric engine systems to most car firms (as Bosch 
did for DI systems), so each supplier had limited batches. By 1993 prices of electric vehicles were 
more than double the price of their petrol counterparts (Cowan and Hulten, 1996). In 1995 the 
prices were 40-50 percent higher than the cheapest version of the equivalent gasoline makes 
(for Peugeot and Renault32), whereas  in 1998 an electric Peugeot was 25-35% more expensive 
than its diesel or gasoline counterpart, respectively (Funk and Rabl, 1999). In 2005, the retail 
price of a Citroen Berlingo electric was still 30% above the petrol one. Since the market launch of 
most of electric vehicles (by 1995), scale benefits have thus appeared to be limited: only about 
10 to 20 percent in ten years. 
For hybrids, the majority of the increased cost of the vehicle is associated with the batteries. 
Despite growing production levels the nickel-hydride batteries have remained expensive, mostly 
due to high nickel prices, which is one of the basic materials. Scale benefits have been stronger 
though than for BEVs, since almost all HEVs are produced by two firms only. Toyota and Honda 
will surely have benefitted from their increasing scale of production of HEVs. 
 
Social construction of connotation 
The development of social connotation of electric and especially hybrid-electric vehicles shows 
an interesting dynamic. In the 1990s we found that attention for BEVs was fairly high: 20 
accounts, which is double the amount of direct injected diesels in that year. Social symbolic 
meaning was however underdeveloped: only in 15% of the accounts there was reference to it, in 
quite neutral statements. Most accounts were summing up technical characteristics. Around 
2000 attention for BEVs had collapsed, and social connotation had not developed. Meanwhile, 
attention for HEVs had grown considerably, up to 22 accounts by 2000. Social connotation 
already appeared in one third of the accounts. They were mostly positive (with adjectives such 
                                                                        
31 We disregard investments in Lithium-ion batteries here, though investments are estimated on one billion 
annually. This type of batteries promise great advancement in specific output, but are not acknowledged 
viable for automotive applications yet. 
32 These prices include a reduction of 5000 FRF in state aid and 1000 FRF in aid from EDF, the state owned 
supplier of electric energy. 
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as ‘high-tech’, ‘environmental friendly’, ‘modern’), some were neutral, and one was negative. By 
2005 attention had mounted up to 41 accounts, even more than direct injected diesels in that 
year. Social connotation appeared in about a third of the accounts, and its mainly positive 
appraisal had caught up with direct injected diesel. This indicates the dominant social climate of 
praise for hybrids. Apart from influencing consumers, this also affected policy discussions. 
Twenty-two percent of the accounts were directly part of a policy discussion, containing pleads 
for tax (or parking) discounts for hybrids, and later also announcements of actual regulation. So, 
in the growing climate of praise for hybrids, politicians started to mention hybrid vehicles as a 
solution for environmental problems. In the Netherlands, as well as in many other European 
countries, this has lead to fiscal policies that give a preferential treatment to hybrid vehicles. 
This has affected sales levels of hybrids directly (for instance in the Netherlands HEV sales tripled 
in 2008 after new regulation for lease drivers, see also De Haan et al. (2007)). The indirect 
effects on technological development are less obvious. The number of hybrid models on the 
market in Europe is still limited (about four), but firms have launched more models with more 
fuel efficient gasoline and diesel engines. The slow growth of hybrid models may be because 
technological development takes time, holding up European and American firms to launch 
hybrid models. More likely, some firms believe than even despite social praise and fiscal 
incentives for hybrids, ICEs have still the largest short term potential for fuel efficiency gains and 
profits. 
 
6.4.3 Interaction of regime and niche 
 
Electric and hybrid-electric engines did not emerge in a vacuum: they emerged alongside 
existing dominant regime of gasoline and diesel technology. Innovation, progress and learning 
on electric technology took place alongside progress and learning on ICE technology. As 
acknowledged in chapter 2, innovation is usually inert on, or ‘locked-in’, an existing path (path 
dependency). For car engines we have encountered three sources of lock-in. One source from 
the production side: it is economically not very attractive to invest much in a new, still immature 
technology. Those will not lead to more revenues in the short term. Competition on the present 
market is fierce, and it is (relatively) more attractive and necessary to invest in incremental 
innovation of the existing technology. This yields a pattern in which car manufacturers continu-
ously refine the dominant design in order to improve environmental performance of ICEs. Since 
Ward (1967) innovation scholars refer to this as the ‘sailing-ship’ effect. 
We have found a second source of lock-in at the consumer side: about ninety-five percent of 
consumers were satisfied with the way ICEs performed. They comprised two major consumer 
groups: those seeking sufficient performance engines at the lowest price, and those preferring 
more powerful engines at a slightly higher price. The remainder of about 5% (i.e. those who 
prefer clean and fuel efficient engines and who are willing to pay slightly higher purchase price 
for this) is the current niche market for hybrid technologies. For most consumers however, IC 
technology performed as they expected, at a predictable cost. They favoured innovations of ICE 
over electric engines. 
We discerned a third source of lock-in related to regulation. We found that the European Euro 1 
to 5 regulations for example have mainly led to an impressive though incremental innovation 
trajectory of ICE, decreasing certain emissions step by step (see also Oltra and Saint Jean, 
2009a). But they have not triggered radical innovations and escape from lock-in. (A similar effect 
of relatively weak environmental regulations on promoting incremental innovations, which has 
functioned to prolong the existing technological trajectory, is found in the chemical industry by 
Yarime (2007)). On the contrary we found that California’s ZEV mandate did stimulate an escape 
from lock-in of the ICE trajectory, as we found in our analysis of the firm perspective (section 
6.3.3) and is also found in other studies (Frenken et al., 2004; Van den Hoed, 2004). Until 1996 it 
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put substantial pressure on firms to perform R&D effort for alternative engines, enhancing 
technological competences on ULEV technologies (electric and fuel cells). After relaxation of the 
mandate in 1996, most firms relaxed efforts for radical innovations by putting them in a longer 
time-frame. 
 
Path creation 
Stimulated by California’s regulation, Toyota had made considerable advancement in electric 
vehicle technology (Quandt, 1995; Yarime et al., 2008). While all manufactures where relieved 
with ZEV relaxation, and lobbied for further reduction, Toyota saw a business opportunity for its 
electric engine technology, in the form of a hybrid-electric vehicle (Magnusson and Berggren 
2001). The Prius I (1997) was targeted at the ‘green’ niche in Japan, providing an extremely low 
fuel use (3.6 liter per 100 km), while compromising on acceleration and maximum speed. When 
the Japanese niche was captured successfully, the crossing of the Pacific to California was 
undertaken. The Prius II was launched there in 2000, though with a renewed trade-off of electric 
power (increasing fuel use to 5.1 liters per 100 km, but also increasing acceleration). This ‘higher 
performance’ Prius was received well in California, a state with a considerable amount of 
environmentally conscious consumers. By 2004 the (improved) Prius III was launched worldwide, 
and was received well in most countries by the green consumer segment. Total global sales 
provided Toyota with a considerable scale level, which probably made the hybrid venture 
profitable (by about 2005), though precise figures on this do not exist. Honda early followed 
Toyota in this endeavor, launching the Insight already by 1998. Other firms were reluctant, 
expecting hybrids to be worthwhile for a small niche of the market only. After 2005 firms were 
less certain on this, and increased R&D attention for hybrids. The crucial question is whether and 
when hybrids will become attractive for consumers in segment two: those who seek sufficient 
performance at the lowest price. If fuel prices continue to rise, a point may be reached soon 
where the extra purchase cost of hybrids will be recovered by lower fuel cost. Since this segment 
comprises around 35% of the market, this would mean an enormous boost to hybrid technology 
sales. Secondly, if the social connotation of hybrids continues to grow, taking over the apprecia-
tion of cleaner and more fuel efficient ICEs, the amount of consumers that are willing to pay 
more for HEVs would grow. At the same time, policymakers would then favor hybrid technology 
over cleaner ICE technology, which could lead them to introduce policies give an extra stimulus 
for HEV sales. 
Looking back to the period of 1997 to 2007, we observe that Toyota was successful in addressing 
the green consumer segment with hybrid technology, essentially triggering the creation and spur 
of the hybrid niche trajectory. Other companies have addressed this same low-emission vehicle 
segment from time to time, by launching both conventional IC technology (Golf eco-matic, 1993; 
Volkswagen Lupo 3 liter in 2000; Opel Corsa eco in 2002; Mercedes A160), and alternative 
propulsion systems (notably PSA with several electric models, Audi with Duo hybrid in 1997). 
However, firms withdrew these vehicles from the market, and reduced efforts towards this 
segment, since in each case sales were disappointing. Toyota’s Prius was rolled out vigorously to 
the worldwide green segment and also appealed to a slightly broader set of consumer (including 
those who like high-tech devices), paving a way to the wider application of hybrid technology in 
other models. 
 
 
6.5 CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter we describe and explain the emergence of electric engines in the automobile 
market after 1990. We addressed aggregate level outcomes, such as total sales and technologi-
cal progress in the sector, both for ICE and for electric engine technology. Furthermore, we 
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examined the perspectives of three key stakeholders: firms, consumers and regulators, and how 
they changed. Moreover, we worked our four feedback mechanisms which underlie the niche 
and regime dynamics. 
We have identified a strong ICE regime over the whole period after 1990: car firms supplied 
(practically solely) ICEs to meet demand for two large consumer groups: those seeking sufficient 
performance engines at the lowest price, and those preferring more powerful engines at a 
slightly higher price. Starting with the pioneering launch of the Prius I (1997), Toyota was 
successful in addressing the green consumer segment around the globe with hybrid technology, 
creating and spurring the hybrid niche trajectory. 
We can draw a few conclusions from the analysis. First, market niche trajectories need to pass a 
critical size in order to be viable. PSA was unable to reach a critical size of its electric vehicle 
activities, despite considerable investments and support from local and national governments 
(such as a large scale experiment in La Rochelle). The vehicles were broadly regarded as 
relatively expensive and impractical due to little autonomy. By contrast, first year sales of HEV 
were to the order of 10 times higher then first year sales of BEV: about 15.000 vehicles versus 
about 1.500. Hybrids were appreciated for high fuel economy, similarly practical as ICs and 
benefitted from the positive social connotation. Somewhere in between these two values may 
be the critical size for a one-year-old (green) market niche on the automobile market (under 
current fuel prices, subsidy regime etc.). 
Second, environmental regulators have hoped for the radical (green) innovation of car engines, 
but their regulation has mostly stimulated incremental innovation of ICEs, enforcing the lock-in. 
California’s ZEV mandate is an exception, indirectly stimulating R&D on ULEVs. 
Third, social pressure from civil society (via social connotation) influences the momentum of 
technology trajectories in a few ways, though mostly indirectly. Business and technology 
strategies of car firms are focused on consumers of new cars, not so much on citizens in general, 
and therefore R&D budgets are only slightly influenced by social pressures. The degree of 
inclusion of consumers of new cars in the social connotations, their receptiveness for social 
pressures, is a more important factor: directly via their influence on actual sales, and indirectly 
by shaping R&D budgets. Further, the influence of social pressure is indirect via a second route, 
through policy discussions leading to regulation, which will subsequently influence technological 
development. For hybrids the main regulatory instrument has been fiscal incentives for 
consumers, which have stimulated sales levels directly. The impact on technological develop-
ment is less obvious though. The number of hybrid vehicles on the European market is still 
limited. 
All in all, this chapter adds to our understanding of historic and contemporary innovation paths 
of car propulsion technology. The mechanisms we identified hint at the large complexities 
involved in the interaction of emerging niches with established regimes, which makes the 
predicting of the future paths impossible. The analysis has shown that the positive social 
connotation of the new technology, (H)EV, has counterbalanced techno-economic path 
dependencies, affecting both consumers, producers and, not the least, policymakers. For electric 
and hybrid-electric engines the latter group seems to be essential in order to gain further 
momentum in the future. 
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7 Policy framing of Park-and-Ride 
 
In this chapter we analyse framing of Park and Ride within urban transport policies. In recent 
years Park and Ride (P+R) facilities are increasingly introduced by local authorities as an 
alternative for or addition to parking supply in the city centre. In this chapter we present results 
of a questionnaire survey among 45 cities in Europe, based on a social-psychological method 
described in chapter 3. 
This chapter is structured in four sections. It starts with an overview of trends in urban parking 
policies in the last three decades. In section 2 we present our findings on present engagement 
levels of P+R, whereas in section 3 we map out diversity in framing of P+R throughout European 
cities by revealing current beliefs about P+R. Finally, we track the salient beliefs in framing of 
P+R. In section 4 we discuss our findings, whereas section 5 concludes. 
 
 
7.1 TRENDS IN PARKING POLICY 
 
In recent years Park and Ride (P+R) facilities are increasingly developed by authorities as an 
alternative for or addition to parking supply in the city centre. P+R is a service provided to 
motorists to park at the periphery of an urban area, where public transport operate to and from 
the city centre. Medium and large cities around Europe suffer from an increasing flow of cars 
every day, entailing severe traffic congestion (OECD, 2007). Local governments have been 
challenged to respond to growing road use and parking demand, but policies have been rather 
ambiguous on this point. On the one hand they have aimed at accommodating the growing 
number of cars, by increasing parking supply and road capacity; on the other hand cities have 
discouraged urban car use, improved public transport, and developed P+R facilities. 
The typical evolution of urban parking policy can be portrayed in seven phases (TCT, 2005): 
1. No parking measures. This phase is sustainable until the level of parked cars has a negative 
impact on the attraction and quality of the area. 
2. Parking regulation and control. This means that in some streets parking will become 
prohibited. 
3. Time restrictions (free of charge). This results in more efficient use of available space from 
increased turnover of cars. 
4. Paid parking. Parking tariffs become used as a key to control the use of parking spaces. 
5. Resident parking schemes. An overflow of parkers to neighbouring areas (often residential) 
will require resident parking schemes. 
6. P+R facilities. These are developed as an alternative for or addition to parking supply in the 
city centre. 
7. Mobility management. It comprises various activities to tune the combination of private 
and public transport in order to provide an acceptable mobility-chain for travellers. 
This typical evolution parking policy is the outcome of an ongoing debate at local level on how to 
respond to growing parking demand. We find two ultimate response strategies for local 
governments: 
• car–accommodating strategy or ‘predict-and-provide’ (Vigar, 2001): aiming to increase 
capacity of parking in the city centre (e.g. by parking garages), and creating sufficient road 
capacity to enable cars to those parking spaces in or near the centre. 
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o car–limiting strategy33: aiming to seriously limit car-parking in the city centre (by high 
prices of parking, and few parking garages in the city centre), and in parallel creating 
facilities to leave the car at or out of the ring of the centre, with the necessary public 
transport facilities (bus, train, tram, metro, bike) to reach the centre. The places to 
leave the car and transfer to public transport are (usually) called Park and Ride (P+R) 
facilities. 
 
The rationale behind urban parking policy is not at all evident34. In larger cities, typically rival 
policy frames appear: a frame where parking policy is a tool to attract customers and strive for 
parking accommodation, or alternatively, it is viewed as one of the few engineering tools to 
restrain traffic and congestion, in order to enhance quality of life in the urban area. In practice, 
parking policy tends to reflect a compromise between these frames, delivered through the twin 
instruments of regulations which limit who can park and for how long and pricing structures 
which may seek to favour parking ‘acts’ of different duration according to the perceived 
economic priority and need for equitable treatment that the regulatory authorities afford to 
different classes of motorist. 
A third motivation, generally less forcefully articulated, is the raising of revenue for local 
authorities from charging for parking on the highway or through investment in off-street parking 
capacity. In most European countries, local authorities have high financial dependence on 
nationally-raised taxes allocated by the central governments, which retain a strong influence 
over how allocated funds are ultimately spent. In the context of this financial regime parking 
revenues offer the rare alternative of a significant revenue stream which can be allocated to 
transport or non-transport budgets against locally-determined motivations and justifications. 
Scientific studies on Park and Ride are relatively scarce (see Bos, 2004 for review). They tend to 
focus on quantitative data around the factors influencing the use of P+R sites (cf. Bos and Molin, 
2006) or on effects of P+R schemes on urban car use (cf. Parkhurst, 2000). To our knowledge no 
scholars have studied and compared how and why a large collection of European cities 
construes Park-and Ride. 
 
 
7.2 CURRENT ADOPTION LEVELS OF P+R  
 
We investigated current adoption levels of Park-and-Ride facilities in Europe. We asked local 
authority officers to mark their level of engagement in P+R (where: 1 = not at all, 2 = very little, 3 
= little, 4 = moderate, and 5 = extensively). Figure 7.1 presents their responses (as marks) on a 
map of Europe. We find that P+R is adopted fairly unevenly across Europe. Eleven cities (or 25% 
of our response group) are extensively engaged (marked as 5 in red on the map). Another 
quarter has little or very little employed P+R (marked as yellow and blue, 3 to 1). Most cities 
(45%) are moderately engaged (marked as orange 4). Two cities have no P+R development at all. 
Geographically, we find that cities in Northern-western Europe (especially UK and Germany) 
have higher adoption levels than cities in southern and eastern Europe. Stienstra (2004) also 
                                                                        
33 This is also called ‘steering approach’, as opposed to the previous ‘car demand-following’ approach. 
34 Since Adam Smith economists have regarded land invested in transport capacity as only indirectly 
contributing to welfare and to be reduced to an efficient minimum. Whilst extensively debated for road 
infrastructure, the often inefficient use of land for free or low cost parking and the wider external costs of 
providing parking at below market rate are less often recognised, with Shoup’s work being the most 
important exception (e.g. Shoup 2005). 
thesis_Dijk_v07.pdf
Chapter 7 
 96 
found that parking policies in general are more advances in North-western Europe, diffusing to 
the east and south. 
 
 
Figure 7.1: Diffusion of P+R in Europe (where level of engagement in P+R: 1 = not at all, 2 = very little, 3 = 
little, 4 = moderate, and 5 = extensively) 
 
Figure 7.1 raises the question why cities across Europe differ in their implementation of P+R. 
Why do local authority officers vary in their appreciation of P+R? In the following section we 
analyse framing of Park and Ride within urban transport policies in greater detail. 
 
 
7.3 REPORTED BELIEFS REGARDING P+R 
 
We provided statements and questions to the local transport policymakers in the 45 cities (see 
the questionnaire in Appendix F). The statements involve the most important elements of P+R 
and parking policies in general, based on the analysis in section 7.1 and four semi-structured 
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interviews with relevant local civil servants (see Appendix E). We can be confident that 
respondents were sufficiently knowledgeable about their city’s parking policies and P+R 
initiatives for two reasons. First, the city organizations helped in finding an appropriate person 
to complete the questionnaire after our request for information ‘concerning barriers and drivers 
to the adoption of Park & Ride facilities in your city’ in the cover letter of the questionnaire. 
Second, from the respondents who indicated their position we find that a majority works at 
senior level in the traffic and transport department (team leader, head of a group). 
We assume that respondents to have voiced the vision of their organization. In various 
statements in the questionnaire we use the phrase ‘in our city’, and there is no reason to 
presume that these transport professionals would not be able to indicate the field of influence 
around P+R in their city, especially since many are at senior level.  Nevertheless, the respon-
dent’s assessment of various pressures on the city government will be slightly coloured by the 
personal opinion on P+R or position in the organization. In our analysis we neglect these 
personal biases, and assume that the respondent perfectly voiced the view of the city govern-
ment and the considerations behind current policies. We realize that this is a fairly strong 
assumption. 
 
Current urban parking policies 
We evaluate five urban parking policy measures. We look at the following ones: 
• Decreasing the number of vehicles in city centre (as a policy aim) 
• Increasing the prices to park in the city-centre 
• Expanding parking capacity in the city centre 
• Expanding capacity of the roads to the centre 
• Developing P+R facilities 
Figure 7.2 to 7.7 present the distribution of response frequencies of the 45 cities to these 
statements. We found that cities aim to curtail car use: for virtually all cities ‘decreasing car use 
in the city centre’ is a policy aim ‘to increase the quality of the city centre environment’ (Figure 
7.2). Only two cities slightly disagreed: Hamburg and Rotterdam. In these cities congestion and 
(car use contribution to) air quality are apparently no critical issues. Various measures are 
applied to support the policy aim to decrease car use. Most cities apply pricing: about 84% 
(Figure 7.3). In most cities the current parking price (by 2005) is less than 2 euro’s per hour 
(Figure 7.4). Responses also show that most cities are not expanding parking in the city centre to 
solve parking problems: around 65% disagrees (Figure 7.5). On the contrary, around 20% slightly 
agrees they do use parking expansion. Further, we found that less that a quarter of the cities 
expand road capacity in order to solve congestion issues (Figure 7.6). For most cities, P+R 
facilities are one of the measures to decrease car-use in the city-centre: Notably 36 out of 45 
cities apply P+R as (at least one of the) measure(s) to decrease car use, which is 80% (Figure 7.7). 
 
Engagement level in P+R 
To what extent are these cities engaged in P+R? We evaluate: 
• present engagement levels 
• existing plans to future development 
Figure 7.8 and 7.9 present the distribution of response frequencies of the 45 cities to these 
statements. We found that most cities are moderately engaged in P+R: 45% (see Figure 7.8).  
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Eleven cities (or 25%) are extensively engaged. Another quarter has little or very little employed 
P+R. Further, most cities have moderate plans to develop P+R in the future (68%, see Figure 7.9). 
Eight cities have extensive plans: Edinburg, Florence, Rotterdam, Helsinki, Oxford, Tallinn, Gent, 
and Genève. Four cities have very little plans: Luxemburg, Dortmund, Zurich, and Copenhagen. 
 
Nine potential drivers of engagement in P+R 
In this section we describe beliefs of city governments which may drive their engagement of 
P+R. We provided statements according to the nine items of the behavioural model (that we 
described in chapter 3, section 3.1), and these are the perceived: 
• environmental relevance of P+R for the city 
• economic implications of P+R for the city 
• demand for P+R (from car drivers) 
• pressure from the community (NGO’s, stakeholder groups) 
• (national or EU) regulatory pressures 
• technological knowledge and capabilities 
• organizational capabilities 
• capabilities to form strategic alliances 
• capabilities to establish networks of collaboration 
Figure 7.10 to 7.18 presents the distribution of response frequencies to these statements. Most 
cities find that, regarding the environmental effects of car use for the city centre, that P+R is 
relevant (66%, see Figure 7.10). Notably, nine cities (20%) disagree on this: Torino, Wolverhamp-
ton, Lodz, Gent, Vienna, Zürich, Dortmund, Munich, Warschau. They do not regard P+R as a 
relevant solution for decreasing environmental impacts in their city centre. 
The economic implications of P+R for the city, such as the economics attractiveness of the city 
centre (for shops and businesses), are found uncertain by about one third of the respondents 
(Figure 7.11). The largest share of cities associates P+R with economic loss: 47%. A minority 
experiences (moderate or minimal) economic benefits: 26%. Two cities see great losses: Genève 
and Prague. 
Perceived demand for P+R, i.e. market pressure to develop P+R is polarized (Figure 7.12): 48% 
views it as high (mostly slightly high), whereas 43% as low (mostly slightly low). Thereof two 
cities see extremely low pressure (Oxford, Riga), and two cities see extremely high pressure 
(Plymouth, Edinburg). 
Community pressure to develop P+R (such as pressures from NGO’s, representatives of shops 
and businesses, environmental organizations) (Figure 7.13) is regarded to be lower than market 
pressure on average: the mean is 3.23 compared to 4 for market pressure. 58% of the cities see 
it as weak, while 26% regard it as strong (mostly slightly strong). Cities that find it quite strong 
and extremely strong are Birmingham and Edinburg respectively. 
Same as community pressure, pressure from national and EU authorities to develop P+R is 
mostly regarded as low: 57% (Figure 7.14). Only 30% believes it is slightly high. The mean is 
comparable to community pressure: 3.16. Cities that find it quite strong are Oslo, Helsinki and 
Rotterdam. 
For a large majority of the cities technological capabilities (Figure 7.15) are no concern or barrier 
to develop P+R: 72% sees them as high. Only 12% considers them low (mostly slightly low); 
Torino as single quite low. 
Similarly as for technological capabilities, a great majority (of 70%) regards organizational 
capabilities for P+R (Figure 7.16) as high (mostly slightly and quite high). Most pessimistic is 
Dortmund (extremely low), whereas most optimistic are Genève and Plymouth (extremely high). 
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About 58% believes building of strategic alliances for P+R (e.g. with private bus or rail compa-
nies) is easy (mostly slightly easy), see Figure 7.17. The number of cities that has concerns about 
this capability (13) is a bit higher than for the previous two statements. Three cities believe it’s 
quite difficult: Lodz, Belfast, and Torino. Only four cities (about 9 percent) find that building 
networks of collaboration to acquire know-how for development is difficult (Torino, London, 
Rotterdam and Bratislava), see Figure 7.18. 
 
Alternatives to P+R 
We provided statements on the perceived effectiveness of P+R and various alternatives. First we 
asked about their appreciation of P+R as a policy measure. Subsequently we asked about 
(effectiveness of) alternatives to P+R. 
1. Statement A: P+R-facilities would be a good measure of my city to decrease car-use in our 
city-centre 
2. Statement B: ‘Increasing the prices to park’ would be a good measure of my city to decrease 
car-use in our city-centre 
3. Statement C: The effectiveness of ‘limiting or decreasing places to park in the city centre’ as 
a measure to decrease car-use in our city-centre is. 
4. Statement D: I believe that other available technologies / practices are more effective than 
P+R (to increase environmental quality of the city centre) 
Figure 19 to 22 present the distribution of response frequencies to these statements. A great 
majority believes P+R to be a good measure to decrease car traffic in their city centre: 93% 
(Figure 7.19). The same holds for pricing of parking in the city centre (82%, see figure 7.20). The 
mean value here is 5.31, very close to the mean of the confidence in P+R (5.33). ‘Limiting parking 
capacity’ is less regarded as an effective measure: in total 57% (see figure 7.21). About 36% finds 
it minimal effective. The mean is 4.53. 
Is P+R the best measure to decrease car traffic? We asked whether other practices were 
regarded more effective than P+R. We found 61% of the cities agreeing with this statement, who 
thus believe that other measures are more effective than P+R (Figure 7.22). About a quarter is 
uncertain. The mean value is 4.73. Four cities (or 9%) disagree and thus believe that P+R is the 
most effective measure. 
Finally, directly following on statement D we posed an open question: Which measures are more 
effective than P+R (to increase environmental quality of the city center)? Most cited were: 
better or more public transportation (54%), promotion and facilities for bike use (31%), road 
pricing or congestion charge (31%). Finally four cities underlined the necessity of a package of 
measures (not just one solution like P+R), and the difficulty to see P+R as sole measure. 
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7.4 DISCUSSION: FRAMING OF P+R IN EUROPE 
 
In this section we analyze the salience of the various beliefs regarding P+R through a statistical 
analysis of beliefs and actual engagement in P+R. 
 
Validity of the behavioural model 
In order to confirm the validity of the behavioural model described in the methodology section, 
we analyse the validity of the hypothesis H: 
I W= W(EV+ ER + MP + CP + RP + TC + OL + NW + AL) 
  
Stating that perceived environmental effects (EV), economic implications (ER), market pressure 
(MP), community pressure (CP), regulatory pressure (RP), technological capability (TC), 
organisational learning (OL), strategic alliance formation (AL) and networks of collaboration 
(NW) consistently contribute to the firm's actual engagement (I) in the development or adoption 
of an innovation such as P+R, hypothesis H is represented by the following equation: 
I W=w0+w1EV+w2ER+w3MP+w4CP+w5RP+w6TC+w7OL+w8NW+w9AL 
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In order to test this hypothesis, actual engagement I is subjected to a (stepwise) linear regres-
sion on all variables. Through a backward procedure we examined various model combinations 
by removing insignificant variables from the model until we there were only significant ones left 
(see Appendix I). We found a good model fit (R square 0.383; adjusted R square of 0.328) for a 
model with three independent variables: market pressure, economic implication and organiza-
tional learning capabilities, see Table 7.1. The p-value for this model is below 0.01 and thus the 
null hypothesis can be rejected and, accordingly, hypothesis H is confirmed. 
 
Table 7.1: Result of stepwise (backward) regression of actual engagement in Park+Ride and the correspond-
ing beliefs regarding P+R (final step; unstandardised coefficients; significance in parentheses) 
 
Variables Actual engagement (I) 
  
Constant (b) 0.62 ± 0.71 (0.388) 
Market Pressure, MP 0.23 ± 0.094 (0.019) 
Economic implications, ER 0.23 ± 0.095 (0.020) 
Organizational Learning Capability, OL 0.25 ± 0.099 (0.017) 
R2 (adjusted) 0.383 (0.328) 
 
 
This set of three variables is found to make relevant contributions to the prediction of the 
organizations’ engagement in Park-and-Ride. Attempts to include each of six other predictors as 
a fourth variable led to negligible increases in R2, whereas the fourth variable was never 
significant (and in most case the three variables remained significant). The correlation matrices 
for the three variables all show correlations below 0.15 (see Appendix I), which indicates that 
multicollinearity is not a problem and, thus, the variables indeed measure different aspects of 
the willingness to engage. 
 
Salient beliefs 
Looking more closely at the variables, it becomes evident that the three variables have 
practically an equally important contribution (as measured by the size of the coefficient) to the 
willingness to develop P+R. The importance of Economic implications of P+R for city govern-
ments is understandable for a few reasons. City authorities care about the effects of P+R on the 
local economy, most notably on the attractiveness of the city centre for visitors of shops, 
services and businesses. The fear to put off visitors is likely part of the explanation for those 
responders perceiving negative effects, whereas those who expect positive effects find that loss 
of attractiveness in terms of parking is compensated through increased attractiveness of the 
inner-city in terms of safer and more liveable streets and squares. In many cities these potential 
effects lead to lively political debates, as Stienstra (2004) notes.  
Beside economic implications through the effect of P+R on attractiveness of the city centre, 
some responders may also have thought about the direct impact on the city’s financial budget. It 
is quite difficult to develop and operate P+R sites on a budget neutral basis. Cities therefore face 
yearly returning operational costs, in addition to investment cost of constructing the sites. Also, 
parking revenues from central locations make up a significant share of total local tax revenues, 
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and cities may fear losing those revenues through introduction of P+R. The rather tight budget 
of city governments explains why this financial factor is of salient importance to them. 
It is notable how diverse cities perceive these potential economic effects, as figure 12 shows. 
The largest share of cities P+R expects losses: 47%, while a minority experiences (moderate or 
minimal) economic benefits: 26%. 
Market pressure is a second important contributor to willingness. We interpret market pressure 
as demand for P+R from car motorists (since we asked for demand signals, see Appendix F). 
Obviously, demand from car motorists is an important factor for the city’s engagement in P+R as 
it would not make sense to construct sites if they would not be used. The other way around it 
would make a lot of sense to construct sites if motorist would really like them. Experiences in 
other cities are important in this respect, since they are taken as examples of how much car 
motorist like P+R and actually use it. Oxford’s well functioning P+R sites in the early 1990s (with 
car interception ratio of around 10%) has stimulated other British cities to experiment with P+R. 
Even though physical infrastructures and cityscapes are very different, cities learn from each 
other. 
Organizational learning is the third salient driver. This factor denotes the authorities’ capabilities 
to organize P+R. Business innovation research suggests that organizational learning is a critical 
capacity for organizations aiming to innovate (Leonard-Barton, 1992; Lynn et al., 1998). Since 
innovation is typically surrounded by uncertainty, the absorptive capacity of new knowledge is 
key. For many cities P+R is a relatively new initiative, and still in development. It is not very clear 
how the sites can be operated and managed most efficiently, and what impact on other parts of 
city government organization and financial effects are. In this stage it is therefore explicable that 
organizational learning capabilities are a significant driver to the development of P+R. 
Obviously, our analysis does not suggest that the other six potential drivers of P+R are irrelevant. 
Although they not turn out to be significant in the statistical analysis of the respondent group, 
they may well be important for specific cities. Also, the importance of drivers may vary in the 
course of the innovation process in a city (phases such as future planning and visioning, 
implementation, operation), and accordingly some factors may be only critical in a certain 
phase, which is something we would not easily disclose with our regression analysis. 
 
 
7.5 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter offered three things to the literature on Park-and-Ride. First, we reported on 
present adoption levels of P+R in Europe. The survey outcomes reveal that a quarter of the 
responding cities is extensively engaged with developing P+R, whereas another half is moder-
ately engaged. Geographically, we found that cities in Northern-western Europe have higher 
engagement levels than cities in southern and Eastern Europe. Second, we map out diversity in 
framing of P+R throughout European cities, by revealing current beliefs about P+R. We showed 
how diversified their interpretation of P+R is. Linear regression analysis suggests that economic 
implications of P+R for the city, perceived demand for P+R, and organisational learning 
capabilities are the salient drivers for city governments whether or not to engage in P+R 
development, explaining almost 40% of the variance in their engagement levels in P+R. Thirdly, 
Park-and-Ride is certainly not the only transport policy initiative in town to improve accessibility 
and liveability of the city. Most cities apply combinations of measures. We found that P+R is 
appreciated as part of such a package, but is not regarded the perfect one. Most cities regard 
P+R as a ‘plan B’. 
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8 Emergence of Park-and-Ride 
 
In this chapter we analyse the introduction of Park-and-Ride (P+R) facilities in six cities across 
the Netherlands and the UK. We apply the two-layered model (see section 2.4) as an explana-
tory framework: we include agency through a micro layer where the innovation is described 
through the eyes of the members of stakeholder groups. Aggregate trends of both niche, regime 
and (relevant) landscape are considered in the macro layer. For our case of P+R, we find two 
types of stakeholders to be most relevant: travellers and the local government. Travellers 
constitute a demand for parking, while the city government is the initiator of a city’s parking 
strategy. To a large extent it regulates the parking prices and amount of parking supply; both in 
the city centre, as well as at P+R sites in more peripheral locations. 
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 1 provides a general historic account of P+R in 
Europe, as well as an account of major scientific studies to it. Sections 2 to 7 analyze urban 
parking developments in six cities in the Netherlands and the UK. They refer to relevant city 
government policy reports, complemented with information from various semi-structured 
interviews with civil servants (see Appendix E). Section 8 compares the six cases and analyzes 
whether the introduction of P+R has stimulated transition towards low traffic city centres. 
Section 9 concludes. 
 
 
8.1 A SHORT HISTORY OF P+R IN EUROPE  
 
The concept of P+R is not very new. The early birth of the P+R concept was by 1932, when 
Bernard Mees, a Dutchman, published a book on possible ways to solve congestion problems: 
“Verkeersvraagstukken voor de grote stad”(CROW, 2004). Subsequently, it was picked up in the 
1950s in the USA, where the first P+R sites were built (MU-Consult, 2000). The United Kingdom 
followed suit and started to develop the first experimental P+R sites in various English cities in 
the 1960s: Oxford and Leicester were the first ones. Even though, as Cairns (1997) states, those 
first schemes were considered a failure. The first permanent UK schemes began in Nottingham 
(1970) and Oxford (1973), joined by a handful of other, mostly historic, towns by 1990. After 
1990, however, the possibility of financial support from central government, followed by 
national policy endorsement, encouraged many other towns to initiate schemes (Parkhurst and 
Richardson, 2002). Other (European) countries followed the example and by now P+R schemes 
can be found in a majority of European countries. 
Park and Ride facilities have emerged in many cities as one of the initiatives to mitigate the 
impacts of urban mobility to the city population. Motorists who park their vehicle at the edge of 
a city (centre) and continue their journey by means of public transport, will in principle lower 
road and parking intensity in the city centre. Some studies have confirmed that P+R-facilities can 
promote the use of public transport, relieve urban traffic congestion and reduce the level of car-
borne exhaust in city centres (Pickett et al 1999). Other studies hinted at possible counter 
effects of P+R. Decreasing congestion in city centres could stimulate car drivers again to use 
their car in the city, since accessibility will have increased (Noel, 1988). P+R could then make 
driving more attractive. Another study found that Park & Ride can generate extra car trips, divert 
motorists from other business centres and abstract patronage from other public transport 
services (Atkins 1998). This would then contribute to car use around the city centre. Also, cars 
drivers travelling via P+R facilities to the city centre may make some extra miles to reach the P+R 
facility. The precise weight of these negative externalities is still debated (and will differ from 
place to place), just as the net direct benefits of P+R on car traffic in the urban area as a whole. It 
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is uncontested however that well-used P+R sites directly reduce car movements in the central 
city centre. 
Studies on Park and Ride tend to focus on quantitative data around the factors influencing users 
of P+R sites (cf. Bos et al., 2004) or on the effects of P+R schemes on urban car use (cf. Park-
hurst, 2000). Rarer are studies which examine the construction and use of P+R sites over a 
period of several years in the context of evolving city transport policies, and parking strategies in 
particular. We thus aim to complement existing studies by including the various (evolving) 
stakeholder perspectives on P+R. In addition to infrastructure, substantial ‘orgware’ and 
‘socioware’ are involved in such passenger transport interchange systems such as P+R: delivery 
agencies working together to provide land, car parking arrangements, public transport services, 
publicity and funding for all these. Travellers opting for P+R must embrace a significant symbolic-
cultural change which reframes the car as a means to access public transport, rather than a 
door-to-door personal transport system, resulting in a revision to what can be regarded as the 
dominant socio-technical configuration of road transport. In other words, our analysis comple-
ments existing studies by addressing the emergence of P+R in a broader social context. 
The following section turns to consider the rationale and experience of six cities in the Nether-
lands and the UK on P+R (see maps of the cities in Figure 8.1). We describe the relevant 
stakeholder perspectives (micro level) and policies, occupation levels and prices (macro level). 
As each of the cities was developing its P+R policy according to its own schedule in time, in each 
we focus on the phase in which the significant part of P+R capacity was being developed and 
delivered. We are less concerned with periods of policy stasis or incremental change. 
 
 
8.2 P+R IN AMSTERDAM 
 
Introduction 
Amsterdam is the capital and largest city of the Netherlands. At January 1st, 2006, Amsterdam 
had 743,027 inhabitants, while more than 1 million inhabitants lived in the urban area of 
Amsterdam. The city has been built on and around canals, mainly during the 17th century and 
this means that most of the city centre is formed by small streets where circulation of cars is 
difficult and where parking is just at the edge of canal banks. Since then, Amsterdam has 
gradually expanded into what is now known as Amsterdam Metropolitan Area, comprising 
Sloterdijk, Amsterdam Arena, Amstel station and the “Zuidas”. The city is located in the western 
part of the Netherlands and is close to other cities like Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht. The 
region comprising these cities is called “Randstad” and it is home to more than 6 millions 
inhabitants. 
The city is accessible by various highways, which nevertheless are usually subject to traffic jams 
and queues on a daily basis and especially during peak hours. This high traffic congestion is 
mainly due to the high number of commuters travelling towards Amsterdam each day for 
business purposes. 
Many of the economic activities are present within the city centre, but during the past few 
decades more and more businesses have opened in the Amsterdam Metropolitan Area, such as 
West-poort, Zuid-Oost and Zuid-as. Amsterdam has nine train stations and the major one is the 
Central Station with about 280,000 travellers each day. Amsterdam has a good tram and 
underground public transport system that gives the opportunity to many people to easily reach 
most of the city centre. Finally more than 600,000 privately owned bikes make the traffic 
situation in Amsterdam a lot livelier. 
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City government perspective 
Throughout the 1990s Amsterdam’s city government aimed at preserving accessibility of the 
city, while increasing liveability (dIVV, 2001b). It launched a new policy plan in 1994: the VIP-plan  
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(i.e. “Verkeers en Inrichtingplan” or Transport and Spatial Plan). In this plan the authorities 
framed two issues as most salient problems: the high level of on-street parking, and the 
congestion on city corridors. Associated to this, they proposed two main policy solutions: a) 
reducing levels of on-street parking places by offering underground parking space (and raising 
street parking prices); b) decreasing congestion in the city centre by using traffic management 
system, and providing a low-priced parking alternative at the border of the city centre: a P+R 
‘transferium’. In the latter facility motorists would transfer to train or metro. The government 
combined the transferium with the new development of business area Zuid-oost and a football 
stadium, and furthermore subsidy from the national government had become available for P+R 
initiatives. These factors helped in turning attitudes in the city council towards this plan 
positively. 
After 1996 the policy frame reaffirmed in the “Nota Verkeer en Parkeren (Memorandum on 
transport and parking policies)” in 1999 and “Nota Parkeren is manoeuvreren” (Parking is 
manoeuvring) in 2001. Both policy documents focused on creating underground / private 
parking facilities so that the loss of on-street parking should be equal to the parking places 
available in underground/private parking facilities. Furthermore these documents focused on 
extending and increasing parking taxes (“fiscalisering”). Attitudes towards this measure were 
positive (‘we can conclude that that pricing is a powerful strategy to attain mobility goals’ (dIVV, 
2001b) ). This was partly because it was financially self-supportive. A gradual, moderate increase 
of parking prices in the city centre was explicitly chosen to avoid unwanted effects on the local 
economy or social acceptance (in case of high increase), and too little effect on decrease of 
unnecessary car use (in case of low increase). The tariff for a parking license was proportional to 
these on-street parking tariffs (ibid, p.21). By 1999 a concrete goal was set to decrease car use in 
the city centre by 25% by 2005, in comparison to 1991 (SAC, 1999). 
There are signs of a reframing of the policy perspective to P+R between 1999 and 2001. In 1999 
Park-and-Ride initiatives were of ‘a matter of importance’ (SAC, 1999, section 4.3). They were 
mentioned in the reports, but generally treated as an additional initiative to parking polices, and 
not embedded in an overall plan to restructure the parking system in and around the city. After 
1999, however, they were increasingly mentioned as ‘an indispensable element of the accessibil-
ity of the city’ (dIVV, 2001, p. 26). Since the first P+R site in Amsterdam, ArenA, was seen as 
relatively successful, attitudes towards opening more sites tuned positive. 
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Figure 8.1: Geographical overview of the P+R sites in the six cities by 2005. (Copyright © 1995 - 2010 ESRI 
Data & Maps, Europe)
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There are signs of a second reframing of the policy perspective by 2005, with respect to air 
quality. Until 2005, policy reports mention that P+R sites are not solely meant to reduce 
congestion problems but also to improve the environmental and air conditions in and around 
the city (ibid, p. 24). However, nothing of this is reflected in transport policy aims or considera-
tions. Only by January 2005 had this changed, when new European norms on air quality 
(especially ‘small particles’) forced city governments to seriously take emissions into account. Air 
quality indications are now becoming part of the policy discussion and influence initiatives. In 
the beginning of 2006 an air quality action plan was presented, which gave renewed importance 
to P+R. 
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Figure 8.2: Parking tariffs in Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Utrecht (1995-2005). Tariffs in Rotterdam are 
averages (since they vary between streets and times of the day). 
 
 
Traveller perspective 
According to research from a branch organisation, a large share of people travelling in the 
Netherlands had the car framed as the only option for their journey by the beginning of the 90s 
(around 50%). Another quarter did consider both the use of the car and the public transport (this 
is the ‘choosing traveller’, the ‘keuzereiziger’), though for many of those the car was the 
preferred option (OV9292, 2003). There are no indications that Amsterdam deviated much from 
this. This means that around 75% of the travellers preferred to drive ‘as-far-as-they-could’ 
towards their destination, and accepted the parking price. 
The same study hints at a change of perspective of quite some travellers between 1991 and 
2002. The amount of ‘keuzereizigers’ increased, from 26% in 1991 to 45% in 2002 (OV9292, 
2003). Thus, for 45% of the people public transport at least became an option for their trip, in 
addition to the 20% who uses public transportation any way. 
Commuters also changed their behaviour more clearly due to policy initiatives. Initially (i.e. up to 
1997) the extended introduction of parking taxes repelled parking in the city centre (dIVV, 
2001b), and the total number of car kilometre in the city centre decreased between 1995 and 
1997 (with 9 percent points). Commuters fled to other areas, longing for parking at a lower price 
or free. After further extension of the areas with tariffs however, parking in the city centre 
increased again (after 1998). Apparently visitors accepted the parking taxes, got used to it, and 
started to drive-as far-as they-could again, and paid for their parking (dIVV, 2001bb). 
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Some motorists opted for P+R. A survey found an overall satisfaction score of the Arena facility 
was 7.5 in 1997 and 7.6 in 199935. In the light of all travellers to Amsterdam, only a small 
minority chose for P+R use: of about 0.2% (by 2005). Around 70% drove the whole trip by car, 
whereas about 30% used public transportation. 
 
Policies 
From 1993 to 1998 the city government extended the areas where parking was charged. It rose 
sharply from 8000 to 110.000 places in that period. Free parking was now limited to outer areas 
of Amsterdam. Further, parking tariffs in the city centre moderately increased between 1995 
and 2005, during eight of the ten years (see Figure 8.2). Parking supply in the city centre was 
roughly held stable between 1993 and 2004, at about 28,500 spaces within the inner ring (SAC, 
2008). In 2001 an ‘Integral Dynamic Parking Indication System’ was launched, easing the search 
for free parking places. All in all, regime restricting policies were moderately strong. 
Policies to promote the P+R niche were moderate in Amsterdam. In addition to the transferium 
Arena in 1996, the government opened two new P+R facilities in 2001: Olympisch stadion plein 
and Sloterdijk. By 2001 there were 1000 spots available (500 at Arena, and 250 each at others). 
A forth site, Zeeburg, opened in 2005. All of these linked to train, metro and (later) bikes, 
whereas no bus-based sites were introduced. The frequency and reliability of the public 
transport service from the sites was seen as attractive (although not very attractive), while 
facilities at or near the sites for users (shops, cafés, making waiting more attractive) scored 
poorly. No special collaborative efforts were applied to stimulate the use of P+R over the decade 
(such as collaboration with companies or shops). 
In the 1995 to 2005 period the city slightly improved the metro, tram and bus systems, most 
notably with extensions of tram lines (e.g. Gein to West). In the metro system ring line number 
50 was added. Detailed accounts of these public transport innovations are beyond the scope of 
this research. 
 
Occupation levels 
The average parking pressure in 2004 was 80% (which was fairly stable after 1998). The total 
number of car-km travelled in the city centre decreased between 1995 and 1997 (by 9 percent 
points), due to the introduction of the new parking tariffs. After further extension of the areas 
with parking charges, parking acts in the city centre increased again (after 1998). In 2001 the city 
government estimated however that without parking taxes car use within the city ring would 
have been 13% higher than at that moment (dIVV, 2001b). The goal to reduce car use in the city 
centre by 25% was reached by 2005. The share of visitors using public transportation grew to 
30%. The number of P+R users is shown in Figure 8.3. Motorists opting for P+R grew from 80 in 
1996 to 240 in 2000, to 450 in 2005. About one third of these users was heading for a local 
destination (dIVV, 2001aa); two third continued their journey to the city centre by train or 
metro. Thus, only about 0.2% of car travellers were intercepted from a trip to the city centre, 
about 300 car trips each day (by 2005). In other words, the restricting central parking regime 
pushed most people into public transportation (for the whole trip), and few into P+R use. 
 
                                                                        
35 This is fairly high, but we acknowledge that assessing the opinion of actual users gives a biased view on the 
opinion of car travellers in general: it does not measure all the dissatisfaction of non-users, or drivers that 
tried once but did not return. 
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Figure 8.3: Daily use of the P+R sites in Amsterdam (dIVV, 2001aa) 
 
 
8.3 P+R IN ROTTERDAM 
 
Introduction 
Rotterdam is, in terms of population, the second largest municipality in the Netherlands, with 
596,407 inhabitants (2005). In contrast to Amsterdam, Rotterdam has a modern and spacious 
road network, most of it put in place after severe damage during the Second World War. The 
port of Rotterdam is the largest in Europe and one of the busiest in the world, creating a zone of 
intense economic activity extending from the city centre to the North Sea coast. These activities 
comprise and attract high levels of traffic movements, both of goods and people. 
 
City government perspective 
City government’s transport policy after 1995 consisted of plans to improve both accessibility 
and liveability of the city, making way for economic growth (Gemeente-Rotterdam, 1993). In an 
update of the plan in 2002 these aims were reaffirmed, while containing a new ambition for 
‘mobility networks’: a pattern of well connected hubs, offering travellers a range of choices 
among modalities: car, metro, tram, bus, train and bike. Throughout the whole period, parking 
supply was not critical, and there was a common understanding that Rotterdam had provided 
sufficient numbers of parking places throughout the city, both on street and in garage, delivering 
relative low ‘seeker kilometres’. 
In the 1980s Rotterdam’s city government had developed two types of P+R sites: those with a 
local function and those with a regional function. The first type was built solely as parking lots 
near public transport stations (especially metro stations) for local users. The second type 
contains (larger) sites attuned to car drivers from the region that visit the city centre (also linked 
to metro and train stations). In the beginning of the 1990s the authority re-stressed the role and 
operation of P+R sites in their transport policy (Gemeente-Rotterdam, 1993). The sites would be 
upgraded to provide a more attractive opportunity for commuters. 
Around 2000, striking reframing occurred in the government reports related to the attitude 
towards (road) traffic growth. As on national at policymakers in Rotterdam shifted from an aim 
to decrease car traffic growth, to an acceptance of the growth. The central idea became 
‘mobility is o.k.’, and ‘let the citizen choose’ (Gemeente-Rotterdam, 2003). In other words 
Rotterdam allowed growth of parking places in the city, within the limit of what was called ‘the 
environmental liveability of local neighbourhoods’. This approach continued between 2000 and 
2005. 
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Traveller perspective 
Rotterdam resembles the national trends of a majority of people travelling to or from the city 
have the car framed as the preferred option for their journey (OV9292, 2003). In Rotterdam 
motorists face a spacious principle road network and ample parking spaces in the city centre. 
Accordingly, car driver will less likely be attracted to P+R. On the other hand, from those who do 
use the P+R sites, 80 to 90% are satisfied or very satisfied with the P+R site with respect to safety 
and comfort, as an evaluation at the Alexander site shows36. 
Car commuters were affected by parking restrictions though. Confronted with extended 
introduction parking fees, many commuters initially chose a new parking location, at places 
where parking fees were still non-existent or low. This created a shift of parking pressure to an 
adjacent neighbourhood. After some time (and some complaints), the city government 
introduced fees in the adjacent neighbourhood, and the same reaction would recur. However, 
after a few years, people accepted the high tariffs in larger city centre area, and started to park 
again closer to their destination. 
 
Policies 
After 1995 a few additional garages were built, bringing the total to sixteen by 2005. The area 
where parking was charged extended after 1995, phase by phase, from the centre further to 
adjacent neighbourhoods. The level of the fee that was introduced in a street was proportional 
to the parking pressure in that street. As Figure 8.2 shows, parking tariffs were fairly stable 
between 1995 and 2005. The city government collected the revenues in a parking fund, to be 
used for improvement of parking facilities. In 1994 a parking indication system was launched 
(0.9 million euros, for 75% drawn draw from the fund). In 2005 a major update of the system 
was made operational. The system guides car travellers to nearest parking lots in the city centre 
(reducing ‘seeker’ kilometres). 
All in all, regime restricting policies were weak in Rotterdam. 
After 1995 a number of (larger) P+R sites were more explicitly indicated at the ring road and 
attuned to car drivers from the region that visit the city centre: Alexander (A20), Kralingse Zoom 
(A16), Slinge (A15), Hoogvliet (A16) and Spijkenisse. These are connected to the underground 
and therefore provide fast and reliable rides to the city centre; more reliable than bus connec-
tions, which are often troubled by road congestion. 
Most of these P+R schemes were free to use, except for the one in Schiedam Centrum. In 
Alexander it is free provided that the commuters pay for the public transport ticket (since 2004 
this arrangement is made). All in all, policies to promote the P+R niche were moderately strong 
in Rotterdam. 
 
Occupation levels 
The net effect of the practices of road users resulted in a mild increase in road traffic between 
1995 and 2005, although the area inside the inner city cordon was an exception, where demand 
in 2005 was back at the 1995 level (Gemeente-Rotterdam, 2005). Parking pressure decreased on 
average because of the introduction of parking fees, and overall sufficient parking supply. The 
total number of users of public transportation (i.e. bus, tram and metro) in Rotterdam decreased 
from 172 million in 1995 to 160 million in 2005 (source RET). 
                                                                        
36 As in the case of Amsterdam, we acknowledge that studying actual users gives a biased view on the car 
traveler in general, since it does not measure all the dissatisfaction of non-users, or drivers that tried once 
but did not return. 
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The occupancy rates of the P+R sites Alexander, Kralingse Zoom, Slinge and Hoogvliet were 73%, 
110%37, 60%, and 78% respectively (in 2006). This accounts for more than 2500 vehicles daily on 
average for the six regional sites in total (Gemeente-Rotterdam, 2007). Figure 8.4 shows the 
fluctuation between 1998 and 2003 for the six sites. The facilities were used by various groups: 
commuters, shoppers and tourists, of which commuters were the largest share. Local users, 
which were not a target group, made up 5 to 15% (Mingardo, 2008). Another untargeted group 
are outbound travellers. Alexander is a special case in this respect: 60% of the parkers work in 
Amsterdam, Utrecht or The Hague. On other sites this is however not the case. 
Mingardo (2008) studied the way P+R users previously travelled. He found that at most sites 
33% of the current users previously travelled by public transport or by bike. This means that one 
third of the current users does not decrease car use to the city centre. All in all we see that total 
daily car reduction in the city centre does not equal the 2500 P+R users as shown in figure 8.3, 
but is around 1500 cars (versus around 300 in Amsterdam)38. 
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Figure 8.4: Trend of P+R users in Rotterdam 
 
 
8.4 P+R IN UTRECHT 
 
Introduction 
Utrecht is, in terms of population, the fourth largest city in the Netherlands. It is situated in the 
centre of a national web of infrastructure. Every day almost 100.000 cars enter the town, while 
45.000 cars drive out (Gemeente-Utrecht, 2003b). The central train station transfers more 
passengers than Schiphol airport. The number of inhabitant has grown in the last decade, due to 
development of new area westward, from 234.000 in 2000 up to 275.000 in 2005. Traffic 
                                                                        
37 This means the parking lot was full, with additional cars outside the marked spots. 
38 The total number of daily car parkers in the city centre is estimated 50 to 100 thousand, while P+R 
intercepts around 1500 car travellers to the city centre, which is about 2%. 
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movements have grown accordingly, and will continue to grow, according to the National 
Traffic-and Transport Plan 2001-2020. 
 
City government perspective 
Managing parking in the city is challenging. The city government records that ‘Utrecht has a 
parking problem, meaning that demand for parking spots is higher than supply’ (Gemeente-
Utrecht, 2003a, p.7). The prime objectives for the city’s transport policy are maintaining or 
increasing accessibility and liveability. These should however respect the freedom of the car 
driver: [we aim to] meet the demand for car mobility of our citizens: ‘car mobility is okay’ 
(Gemeente-Utrecht, 2003b, p.10). After 2003 there is a slight refining, towards intensification of 
steering parking policy (ibid). Practically this meant the (proposed) use of price differentiation in 
influencing parking demand in different areas. 
An increase of the number of parking places, also in the center, is regarded as one of the 
solutions for congestion problems (ibid, pg 17). At the least, current car accessibility should be 
maintained. Being able to park near the destination, either house, shop or work, is a high good’ 
(pg. 23). A system of various P+R sites around the city is studied in this period, and is seen as a 
solution for the farther future. It is not seen as a solution for the citizens of Utrecht, but for 
others: ‘commuters and visitors of the inner-city are collected as much as possible at the city 
edge and transported to the centre by means of a smooth public transport connection’ (pg.20). 
 
Traveller perspective 
Motorists to Utrecht were not attracted to the P+R facility: only a few dozen chose to park their 
car there. There were various reasons why car drivers favoured parking in the centre. One is that 
there were still areas near the town centre where one could park for free. Another part is that 
finding a parking spot in the city centre was made easier, through an automatic indication 
system. 
Commuters did change their behaviour slightly due to policy initiatives. The extended introduc-
tion of parking taxes urged commuters to park in adjacent areas, where parking was still free. 
They seemed to be happy walking 10 minutes when they could park for free. Due to further 
extension of the areas with charges, this became more and more difficult, though in Utrecht 
there are still areas with free parking in walking distance of the city centre. 
 
Policies 
Firstly, from 1996 onwards the city centre was made less attractive for car-use. By re-directing 
the drive directions, the centre became unsuitable to drive through. You could reach almost any 
street by car, but only via many de-tours. This was learned from Groningen. Secondly, from 2000 
onwards PRIS was operational: an automatic indication system, guiding car drivers to parking 
lots with free spaces. Further, in 2003 the government launched a plan of building seven new 
garages just outside the inner-city (canals), but well within the ring road (Gemeente-Utrecht, 
2003b). These garages added to the 12 existing garages in 2003, which provided 2400 places in 
total (in the first shell outside the inner-city there are another 6000). Developing garages takes 
time, usually a few years. The government expected the first three garages to be ready by 2004, 
2005 and 2006 respectively, increasing the number of parking space with around 1000 places. 
(These garages were partly intended to remove (236) resident street parking to resident garages, 
but by 2003 it was not fully clear how these street places would be removed.) All in all an 
increase of at least 750 parking places within the ring road would be accomplished. 
Alongside building new garages, areas of paid parking were extended between 1995 and 2005. It 
started with the quarters near the inner-city, especially the east side: buiten-wittevrouwenveld, 
and wittevrouwenveld. The government usually waits with applying this measure in an area till 
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the parking pressure has risen above a certain level. Therefore not all areas in the first shell 
around the inner-city have paid parking yet. 
Parking tariffs in the city centre were mildly increased, see Figure 8.2: between 2001 and 2005 
the rise was around 13%, to 2 euro 56 for an hour. This was just in between the price in 
Amsterdam (3 euro 40) and Rotterdam (1 euro 68). All in all, regime restricting policies in 
Utrecht were weak. 
Together with the developments in the city centre, policymakers studied options to promote 
parking outside the city centre. In 1998 a P+R experiment started at Galgenwaard, called 
‘Shopping-Express’. On moments of shopping peak hours (only Thursday night and Saturday) the 
parking lot of the football stadium was used, and a bus shuttle drove up and down the city 
centre for a low price. In 2000, when the national government offered a subsidy, P+R Westraven 
was built at the south ring. It included 750 places, and was connected by (existing) quick-tram. 
Following disappointing use of this site, some years without action followed. Discussions and 
studies on the future of P+R emerged. More recently, local government policy has departed 
from the principles of using P+R to intercept traffic by stimulating use of the car park by firms 
located in the neighbourhood of the site, instead of preserving its use for transport to the city 
centre. As a result, it is not surprising that the facility did not decrease car use in the city centre. 
All in all, policies to promote the P+R niche were weak in Utrecht. 
In 1996 a free bus lane became operational. It was like a ‘tram on tires’. This was a great 
improvement for the quality of bus trips in the city, and supported bus use. The original plan of a 
tram in the city was rejected. Detailed accounts of this and other innovations in public transport 
are beyond the scope of this research. 
 
Occupation levels 
From 2000 till 2005 P+R Westraven was extremely little used: a few dozen of cars a day (apart 
from exceptions of large expositions in the Jaarbeurs, or shopping peak hours). It did not attract 
commuters during the working week. It did not decrease car pressure in the city centre. 
 
 
8.5 P+R IN OXFORD 
 
Introduction 
Oxford is a medium-sized (135,000) historic city located in central England in a geographical 
context constrained by river flood plains and heritage preservation designations, notably an 
encircling greenbelt. Significant industrial development mainly related to the motor industry 
occurred in the 20th Century which resulted in large increases in jobs and population in a few 
decades and, combined with housing provision constraints, led to growing in-commuting. 
 
City council perspective 
Oxford City Council adopted bus-based P+R at the beginning of the 1970s as part of ‘balanced’ or 
‘integrated’ transport strategy. At a time of growing public concern about the acceptability and 
affordability of urban highway construction to provide for free-flow traffic the council accepted 
the need for car traffic restraint for the first time. 
It expected P+R to contribute to curbing the rising local environmental consequences of car use, 
traffic congestion, and declining conditions for pedestrians. Therefore, it developed bus P+R, 
with new shuttle bus services, as a relatively cheap and pragmatic policy to adopt. 
Oxford’s P+R scheme was the only one to survive from the 1970s, and was itself not without 
critics on grounds of low patronage and financial viability. Over the subsequent 30 years the 
scheme would, however, be expanded to 5 sites offering a total of approximately 5,000 spaces. 
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Traveller perspective 
By 1993, a motorist approaching Oxford was offered 3,000 P+R spaces in four sites around 
Oxford. Frequent (10-30 minute headway) bus services were provided to each, with very basic 
car park facilities and buses in order to maintain financial viability. However, the alternative 
option for the motorist without reserved parking was paying parking costs much higher than in 
similar-sized towns, and uncertainty about how long it would take to find a free spot. In this 
context the basic facilities were judged as acceptable by users, and around 10% of inbound 
motorists opted for P+R use by the early 1990s (Parkhurst and Stokes, 1994). A decade later, 
with the P+R scheme expanded in capacity, further restrictions and higher charges introduced in 
the city centre, and higher quality facilities offered, P+R was carrying about 10% of all trips 
(although conventional public buses remained for more important in terms of total demand). 
 
 
Figure 8.5: Key traffic trends in Oxford 
 
Policies 
A key factor of the Oxford policy was to link strong regime restricting (push) elements and with 
pull elements by increasing off-street parking charges (Figure 8.5), particularly for long stays and 
using the revenues to support P+R operations. Another effective push policy was that Oxford 
City Council required property developers to contribute to funds for P+R capacity rather than 
providing private off-street capacity in individual developments. A further potentially powerful 
policy was to limit the provision of public parking in the city centre (Parkhurst, 1993). However, 
this policy was only moderately restraining on traffic levels as a growing share of city centre 
motorists were either passing through the centre or had access to private, off-street parking. 
Also, an increased share of shorter stays, due to higher charges in public parking spaces, limited 
the reductions in overall traffic levels. 
 
Occupation levels 
By 1992 the total amount of parking for the city centre including P+R had increased, although 
that available to the public in the central area had fallen. Off-street parking was reduced by 
around 10% but most of the on-street capacity was eliminated, so that an overall availability of 
more than 10,000 spaces in 1966 was reduced to less than 4,000 (Parkhurst 1993). However, 
private off-street parking capacity nearly doubled in the same period to more than 10,000 
spaces despite restrictive development control policy, apparently as a result of long-standing off-
street parking ‘rights’ being used more intensively. 
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These changes in parking provision were associated with a 20% decline in car traffic and an 
increase in bus use at the end of the 1990s (Figure 8.5). A key factor here was a re-invigorated 
traffic restraint policy which focussed on restricting through traffic in several central streets. P+R 
use was in fact stable in this latter period whilst central parking charges actually fell in real-
terms. 
 
 
8.6 P+R IN YORK 
 
Introduction 
York is also a historic city of around 135,000 inhabitants which like Oxford saw significant 
transport-industry related growth, but in this case in the 19th Century, linked to railway 
operations and rail vehicle manufacturing, and confectionary. However unlike Oxford, which is 
embedded in the southeast economic core, York has a relatively rural location, as a central place 
serving a large hinterland. 
 
City council perspective 
York is regarded as one of the most successful examples of wide-area ‘retrofit’ pedestrianisation 
in the UK. Whilst congestion remains a relevant issue, the city council has managed the worst 
effects of car use on the city centre economy relatively effectively. Combined with the rural 
origins of many of the frequent users of the city centre and planned strategic growth, the 
highest priority for P+R policy has been to contribute to economic objectives, with a medium 
contribution to reducing congestion and a small contribution to improving air quality(YCC, 
2006b). 
Following the implementation of a partial reorganisation of English local government in certain 
areas, York City Council was established as a unitary authority with control over the territory 
immediately beyond the perimeter of urban area. This reduced the number of local authorities 
involved in the delivery of short-range P+R from 2 to 1. 
In this context York City Council has pursued one of the most aggressive P+R policies in the UK, 
delivering 5 sites in less than 15 years (1991-2005), with a one-third expansion in capacity in the 
final five years of this period, to a total of around 3,500 spaces. Whilst operating costs were 
covered from user fares in recent years, significant capital costs for new sites were designated: 
P+R expansion was in fact the largest item in the Council’s transport capital spend from 2001/02 
to 2005/06: £8.5 billion of a total £28 billion. Local planners have envisioned a particular 
innovation for P+R sites by operating them as rural bus termination points, with passengers 
transferring for the final journey leg, to increase the efficiency of rural bus operations, although 
this is yet to be implemented. 
 
Traveller perspective 
By 2003/4 P+R patronage in York had grown to around 2 million return trips per year and 
towards the end of the decade was approaching 3 million. The ample supply of P+R sites made it 
an attractive option for car travellers. For citizens aged over 60 parking and shuttle bus were 
even provided free, due to the introduction nationally of free bus travel for this age group. 
 
Policies 
Parking supply policy places a cap on off-street public car parking in the city centre at 2002 levels 
(5,100 spaces)(YCC, 2006b). As in Oxford a parking regime based on length of stay restrictions 
and tariffs which favour short and medium stays has been effective in reducing demand for 
commuter parking. Some parking capacity has also been transferred from city centre to 
periphery, although overall capacity has grown significantly. 
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P+R policies have sought to make the P+R sites and shuttle services high-quality and financially 
attractive. The buses operate up to a ten-minute frequency and travel is relatively low cost, with 
discounts for frequent users and free travel for children accompanying adults. 
 
Occupation levels 
During the five years from 2000 when P+R capacity increased by a third, there was a modal shift 
away from private cars for accessing the city centre of approaching 10% overall, but 30% in the 
morning peak. These changes are associated with a 3% reduction in car traffic at peak times, but 
a similar level of traffic growth over the typical days, as travellers respond to the parking regime. 
Demand for city centre parking fell overall by 30% 2000-2005(YCC, 2006a). Hence, a 10% 
reduction in council-controlled off-street parking supply to a total of 3,500 spaces as a result of 
redevelopment has not resulted in scarcity of demand but parking revenues fell. Reductions in 
parking revenue for the authority have continued (10% or £3 million in the period 2006/7-
2008/9)(YCC, 2009). 
 
 
8.7 P+R IN BRISTOL 
 
Introduction 
Along with Nottingham, Bristol was one of the pioneers of bus P+R as a solution for medium-size 
cities in England. The Bristol urban area has a population of 520,000. Rail-based P+R is typically 
more suited to this scale of city as rail services, requiring segregated corridors, generally achieve 
higher priority. In the case of Bristol, though, suburban rail services are limited, with both train 
schedules and station car parking management being oriented towards serving regional and 
national movements. Bristol is the largest city in southwest England, characterised by hilly 
terrain and a city centre which like Rotterdam suffered wartime destruction and was redevel-
oped with shopping precincts and an extensive road system including urban motorways in the 
post-war period. A combination of physical, economic and institutional factors has resulted in 
Bristol arguably becoming the most car dependent of the ten largest urban areas in Britain, with 
the lowest traffic speeds outside London and a public transport modal share of less than 15%. 
From 1974 to 1996 planning and transport for the whole Greater Bristol area was the responsi-
bility of the subregional Avon County Council (Avon). From 1996, following local government 
reorganisation, Avon was divided into four single-tier ‘unitary’ authorities. Most of the urban 
area was designated as Bristol City, although around a quarter of the city’s population in the 
northern suburbs was allocated for electoral and demographic reasons to a different unitary 
(South Gloucestershire). 
 
City council perspective 
Over three decades Avon and then Bristol City Council (BCC) led unsuccessful attempts to re-
introduce light rail and adopt city centre road pricing, projects which had the highest priority. 
P+R was introduced as part of a package of shorter-term measures including intermittent bus 
priorities on the highways. Avon introduced the first permanent site (Bath Road) in 1993 on the 
southeast side of the city (1,300 spaces). A second was planned under Avon and opened in 1997 
beyond the city boundary to the southwest at Long Ashton (1,500 spaces). BCC provided a third, 
Portway, in 2002 to the northwest. The bus service to the last of the sites is also targeted as a 
‘walk to bus’ service to those residential areas it passes through. 
The primary objective of policy was reducing peak-hour congestion, although secondary 
accessibility, road safety and air quality benefits were also intended (WoEP, 2006). To date 
attempts to establish a site to the northeast of the city to serve one of the busiest radial 
approaches to the city centre have not been successful due to site identification issues, with the 
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most suitable site options being beyond the BCC boundary, and controlled by South Gloucester-
shire Council, which has had a different vision of P+R form and function. The reorganisation left 
BCC with no formal powers to influence transport-related matters beyond boundaries unsuit-
able for strategic transport management. It does, however, form joint policy through voluntary 
cooperation within the ‘West of England Partnership’; a structure which also offers BCC limited 
influence on neighbouring authorities. 
 
Traveller perspective 
Demand for P+R has generally emerged since sites have been provided. The majority of this 
demand is from travellers who perceive their alternative travel option to be drive-by-car to the 
city centre. However, approaching half of users at the Bath Road site and a third at the Long 
Ashton site were found from surveys in the 1990s to have transferred from public transport, and 
to see those services as their alternative options. Around a half of users to the Bath Road site 
were also travelling from origins within 10 km (BCC, 1996; BCC/NSC, 1997). The site is located 
adjacent to dense suburbs and on the corridor between Bristol and the neighbouring city of 
Bath, just 10 km to the southeast. Such modal shifts and short-range trips to P+R are understand 
in a context of high rail fares, peak-hour crowding on trains and also non-P+R bus fares which 
are higher than P+R fares. 
 
Policies 
P+R provision has been linked to a parking policy to transfer long-stay parking from the city 
centre to P+R (BCC, 2001) using deterrent tariff structures for public parking and development 
control measures for private parking. In practice, however, the policy has faced two key 
constraints. First, BCC only controls around half of the public off-street parking. Second, the city 
centre faces significant economic competition from a large out-of-centre shopping mall (Cribbs 
Causeway), located on the edge of the Bristol urban area with 7,000 free, unrestricted parking 
spaces. Its presence is acknowledged as having a significant competitive impact on parking policy 
(WoEP 2006): concern about economic competition resulted in BCC supporting plans to develop 
a new shopping centre, Cabot Square, in the city centre, which opened in 2008 with 2,600 
additional charged parking spaces, representing a 25% increase in city centre supply. Following 
the economic downturn the car park has significant excess capacity, which is being aggressively 
marketed by the private sector operator. 
 
Occupation levels 
The policy intention to transfer long-stay parking to the periphery of the city has had some 
success, although a large minority of users would have otherwise used public transport and total 
parking capacity in the city centre has risen, whilst the share controlled by BCC has fallen. The 
local policy target for traffic flow to Bristol city centre is for ‘zero growth’. A 10% reduction 
inflow in fact developed over the four years to 2007-8, although this was partially reversed in 
2008-9 (WoEP, 2008). The changes at least in part reflect the reconstruction and then opening of 
Cabot Square, involving road and parking closures. 
 
 
8.8 CO-EVOLUTION OF DEMAND AND SUPPLY FOR PARKING 
 
In this section we first compare the implementation of P+R in the six cities. Then we turn to 
consider the extent to which the introduction of P+R affected the dominant regime of urban car 
use, addressing how supply and demand for urban parking co-evolve. 
Table 8.1 summarises the way in which push and pull policies were deployed in the six cities 
examined and the impact we found on city centre traffic. 
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Table 8.1: Outcomes of deployment of parking policies in the six cities 
 
City Regime restricting 
Policies (push) 
Niche promoting 
Policies (pull) 
Combined 
pressure on city 
traffic 
Amsterdam Strong Moderate Medium-High 
Bristol Weak Moderate Medium-Low 
Oxford Strong Moderate Medium-High 
Rotterdam Weak Strong Medium 
Utrecht Weak Weak Low 
York Moderate Strong Medium-High 
 
Since none of the cities combined strong regime restricting (push) policies with strong niche 
promoting (pull) policies, we suggest that none of the cities had maximized the potential to 
transfer parking to P+R. Nevertheless, Amsterdam, Oxford and York were the cities in which the 
strongest pressure was applied on city centre traffic. In the case of the first two, particularly 
strong penalties on city centre parking were the key features, and in the case of York, a 
particularly attractive P+R offer. Rotterdam emerged as an intermediate case, where limited 
disincentives for city centre parking to some extent counteracted the strength of the public 
transport offer. Finally, in the case of Bristol and Utrecht, the policy rhetoric was insufficiently 
translated into delivery, with weak push and pull signals, except perhaps for a moderate niche 
promoting policies in Bristol. 
The comparison explains well the outcome of the P+R (push and pull) policies to the pressure on 
city centre traffic, but reaching general conclusions on traffic reduction is more problematic. 
After all the relation of P+R use to actual reductions in traffic is not a straightforward relation-
ship, but depends partly on factors such as the economic activity context and effectiveness of 
other traffic management measures, such as restrictions on through traffic and promotion of 
public transport in general. Hence, the cities with the greatest reduction in traffic – Amsterdam 
and Oxford – achieved this more through increasing modal shift from car to conventional public 
transport rather than P+R use. York was notable in that P+R does seem to have been a specific 
factor resulting in traffic reduction in the peak period, but this was accompanied with traffic 
growth overall as car owners took advantage of available short-stay car-parking in the inter-
peak. 
Hence, we find that P+R at least had an important symbolic role to the development of traffic 
restraint frames, building consensus around the idea that alternatives for car dependent 
travellers are being provided. It was often presented as a tool of ‘integrated’ transport planning 
in that it facilitates combination of different modes. Nevertheless, in each of the six cities P+R 
was developed parallel to upgrades of parking supply for the city centre. To different extents in 
the six case-studies then, we find echoes of Kauffman’s (2000) conclusion that: promoting the 
use of public transport by improving it, whilst simultaneously constructing new car parks for 
commuters in the city centre, is mutually incompatible. 
Examination of our six case-studies did not indicate a particularly strong ‘national character’ to 
the interpretation and adoption of P+R as a niche traffic management innovation, even if there 
were clear superficial differences, such as the exclusive use of bus transport in the UK and the 
reliance on rail in the Netherlands. 
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Co-evolution 
Despite the city specific contexts, there is a pattern we come across in most of the six cities: 
from no parking measures, through parking regulation and control, to various activities of tuning 
the combination of private and public transport. With our two-layered model of chapter 2, we 
stylize the subsequent steps in the underlying process, see Figure 8.6. 
 
 
Figure 8.6: Stylized process underlying urban car parking innovation 
 
All of the six city authorities started to regulate and control parking supply at some point in time, 
involving a ban on parking in some central streets, whereas in surrounding streets paid parking 
and residential parking schemes were gradually introduced. Typically, parking intensity 
(demand) shifted to areas just outside the paid parking zones, and people walked further to 
their end-destinations. Triggered by complaints about these practices, often from residential 
areas, city authorities extended parking restrictions and paid parking zones, and developed P+R 
facilities as a niche solution (supply). In most cities, the initial P+R usage did not accumulate 
significantly by itself: most car motorist ignored the P+R site(s) and accepted the higher fees for 
parking in or near the centre. This condition put city councils at a crossroads. Some authorities 
saw this as proof that P+R was not a good solution for transport issues, and should not get too 
much attention (especially since they could be detrimental to the revenues from parking). 
Correspondingly, there was little support for strong regime restricting policies and P+R 
promotion in those cities. Car travellers accepted the (moderate) parking fees grudgingly and 
continued to park in the city centre, leaving the P+R niche with insignificant modal share 
(Utrecht, Bristol, Rotterdam). Other cities authorities seized the presence of P+R sites as an 
opportunity to make regime restriction and niche promotion policies increasingly stronger, 
arguing that the facilities provided an affordable alternative to car drivers. Here, car drivers 
became more reluctant to parking in the city centre, and a significant share shifted to public 
transportation and or P+R (Oxford, Amsterdam, York). 
The highlighted process (see Figure 8.6) is a pathway of innovation of urban car parking, which is 
an outcome of interactions of the city councils’ regulation, infrastructures (supply) and the daily 
practices of travellers (demand), in which we found three types of traveller groups (see section 
8.2). It is a sequence of introducing a new policy with partially unforeseen outcomes, followed 
by another new policy introduction. More than a sole outcome, the pathway also forms the 
landscape or context which constrains and enables future practices and reactions. 
This co-evolutionary process is essentially a socially enacted process of actors with different 
perspectives and interests. Our approach has been less successful in highlighting the social and 
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political dynamics around the city authority. More than being a single decision maker, the local 
authority is composed of departments (economy, transport, environment etc.) as well as the city 
council, who are lobbied by stakeholders and sensitive to their own constituencies and 
professional groups. In our analysis we have left out such dynamics, and just addressed the 
policies and regulation that passed the city council. In future research this part of our framework 
needs to be elaborated. Also, actor learning mechanisms should be further elaborated. For both 
these issues, we see the two-layered framework as a good starting point. 
 
 
8.9 CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter we have considered the introduction of P+R facilities of six cities as an emerging 
niche alongside the dominant regime in urban parking, which has been ‘parking in the city 
centre’ for decades. 
We found that each of the cities had a distinctive policy frame and mode of implementation. In 
none of cities more than a modest share of urban travellers and commuter was attracted by 
P+R. Analysis of the impact of P+R on the urban parking regime showed that three cities (two 
British, one Dutch) had implemented P+R with push (regime restriction) and pull (niche 
promoting) factors of sufficient potency to result in partial transformation away from the 
dominant parking regime. This shows that possibilities of local authorities to shape the practices 
of car drivers are small. 
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Chapter 9 
 
SCENARIOS OF CO-EVOLUTIONARY 
TRAJECTORIES 
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9 Scenarios of co-evolutionary trajectories 
 
In this chapter we explore future scenarios of car engine technology with support of a simulation 
model. Whereas chapter four to eight provided historic-analytic approaches to our two cases, 
we now turn to the question: what could happen? We develop plausible but simplified 
descriptions of two possible trajectories. These descriptions involve both technological and 
economic aspects as well as the formation of social connotation. To consider the complex and 
uncertain dynamics between the latter and the former phenomena, we benefit from a 
simulation model analysis. Therefore we formalize the two-layered innovation framework (see 
section 2.4), and make it ‘tailored’ to the case of car engine innovation. We deliver a model, 
simulating the co-evolution of demand and supply, giving rise to various possible trajectories. 
We formalize stakeholder perspectives, based on the empirics of chapter 4, 5 and 6. The main 
duty of the model is to support the analysis of the role of social connotation in innovation 
dynamics. 
This chapter has four sections. In section 1 we review the diffusion modelling literature, covering 
the early epidemic modelling approach of Bass, up to the recent co-evolutionary approach. In 
section 2 we describe the simulation model. In section 3, the model is applied, both in retro-
spect, and to explore the future, and draws lessons on the role of social connotation. Section 5 
presents scenarios for the diffusion of cleaner car engines. Section 5 draws conclusions and 
discusses the novelties of our analysis and challenges for future research. 
 
 9.1  FROM EPIDEMIC MODELLING TOWARDS A CO-EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH 
 
Much has been written about innovation diffusion. The focus is on aggregate patterns. Rogers 
(1983) mentions five characteristics of an innovation, as perceived by potential adopters, which 
help to explain their difference in rate of adoption: (1) relative advantage, (2) compatibility, (3) 
complexity, (4) triability, and (5) observability. He offers a taxonomy of adopters based on when 
they adopt but does not offer a dynamic model of innovation diffusion in terms of endogenous 
and exogenous mechanisms. 
For explaining dynamic patterns we have three types of models. The first, well-known, and 
widely applied model is the epidemic model pioneered by Bass (1969). It builds on the premise 
that what limits the speed of usage is the lack of information available about the new technol-
ogy, how to use it and what it does. Information diffusion is governed by social contacts and 
marketing. Epidemic models have been widely applied in curve-fitting exercises (Bass 1986; 
Mahajan et al. 1990). Supply factors and changes in the environment are usually neglected, or 
incorporated in a crude way39. Mahajan et al. (1990) identify nine crude assumptions, three of 
which are: 
• Total market potential of a new product (= final number of adopters) stays constant in time. 
• Diffusion of an innovation is independent of all other innovations. 
• The nature of an innovation does not change over time 
Although Mahajan et al. and others (for example Lee et al. 2006) mention studies that overcome 
several assumptions, the models remain one sided in explaining the driving forces of innovation 
diffusion processes (still spread of information). Other relevant feedback effects, such as 
progressive improvement of the product (affecting adopter attitudes), remain neglected. 
                                                                        
39 Nevertheless, starting from Metcalfe (1981), models of diffusion have been proposed incorporating the 
production capacity growth rate, such as for instance by Bruno Amable (1992), Batten (1987), and Leoncini 
(2001). 
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The second type of model is rational choice models, or threshold models (David, 1969; Kemp, 
1998). In this type of model economic micro theory is applied based on the assumption of 
rational behaviour: any actor is expected to adopt an innovation the moment it becomes 
economic to do so. Supply aspects such as the techno-economic characteristics of an innovation 
can be incorporated in this type of model (as is being done in Ireland and Stoneman 1982). 
Learning and social and institutional aspects are typically poorly integrated. The model is mostly 
applied to the diffusion of production technologies, often using firm size as critical variate (David 
1969; Davies 1979). Bigger companies are expected to adopt earlier because of economies of 
scale advantages or available capabilities. Bonus (1973) applies a threshold analysis to the 
diffusion of household durables (cameras, TV sets, automobiles), using income as the critical 
stimulus. 
There has emerged a third type of diffusion models in which technological change is endoge-
nized, called evolutionary or ‘non-equilibrium’ models (in the tradition of Nelson and Winter, 
1982). Evolutionary approaches have sought to improve rational choice models by including 
learning of agents whilst maintaining an economic focus (Silverberg, 1991). The creation of 
technology and its adoption are seen as mutual dependent. Supply depends on demand and vice 
versa. Suppliers learn form users and benefit from scale economies, which allow them to sell the 
improved product at a lower price. Silverberg notes that this black spot of many diffusion 
studies, decoupling diffusion from further development, dates back to Schumpeter’s linear 
model of progression from invention to innovation to diffusion. He states that realistic concepts 
should include feedback from diffusion of an innovation towards the profitability, relative 
competitiveness and market shares of the potential developers. The same holds for feedback 
from diffusion to price changes and towards perceived utility for potential adopters, we argue. 
In their application evolutionary models have been focussing on firms and industries and to 
process innovations related to production efficiency. Windrum & Birchenhall (2005) however, 
move ahead by presenting a multi-agent framework that explicitly models consumers and firms. 
In their model the nature and direction of technological innovation is determined by the 
interaction of heterogeneous consumer preferences and heterogeneous firm knowledge bases 
at the micro level. Since the two populations exercise a strong selective force on each other, we 
can speak of a co-evolutionary model. The authors investigate the possibility of technological 
succession by introducing a ‘technological shock’, which is a discrete step towards offering a new 
feature to the existing set of (service) characteristics. The merit of their approach is the 
identification of technology as set of characteristics, which makes it a variable, multi-faceted, 
mediating device between evolving consumers and firms. The approach does not include social 
meaning of a technology and imitation of adoption. 
Although existing diffusion models have shown their value in simulating innovation at firm level 
(technological innovation, learning), market and sector level (competition and diffusion, 
structural change), and the macro level (growth, long waves and international trade), the models 
are as yet less applied to consumer products in a changing social context. Popularity or social 
connotation of products, especially new emerging environmental products, may change 
alongside technological innovation. A chief example is hybrid-electric vehicles entering the car 
market since 2000. Owners see their vehicle as ‘socially responsible’, as ‘the right vehicle for 
society’ (Heffner, Turrentine et al., 2006). Progression of such connotation will influence the 
further innovation and diffusion process of the technology, affecting both the consumer and the 
producer side. There are currently no models available that incorporate this interaction of such 
social and technological aspects. 
In this chapter we aim to extend the co-evolutionary approach to innovation diffusion in a 
changing social context. To this end, state-of-the-art evolutionary modelling is combined with 
the literature of social construction of technology (SCOT; Bijker 1995). This results in an agent-
based model to analyse the interaction between consumer demand and industry supply as a co-
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evolutionary process. We formalize agents’ perspectives and behaviour and implement their 
subjection to feedback mechanisms from micro-to-micro, as well as macro-to-micro, as 
conceptualized in chapter 2 and described in chapter 6. More precise, we formalize the frame-
structure that an actor group applies as the set of weights that an actor group applies in 
evaluating adoption, or investment and launch. An adopter’s frame includes attributes of 
functionality, but also of social connotation. The attribution of meaning influences decisions of 
peer consumers, something that is well-established in marketing but has been neglected in 
innovation diffusion analysis. The interplay of demand and supply through various feedback 
loops give rise to trajectories. A model analysis of these paths of innovation is instrumental to 
understand the role of social connotation in innovation dynamics. 
 
 
9.2 A FORMAL MODEL OF CAR ENGINE INNOVATION 
 
In this section we describe the simulation model concisely. For a more detailed description 
(including equations and parameters) we refer to Appendix J. 
 
9.Ϯ.1 Model overview 
 
The model assumes a limited number of possible innovation trajectories: one related to internal 
combustion engine (ICE), and one to electric/ hybrid-electric ((H)EV) technology. We have two 
populations of agents: a large group of potential consumers (1000), and a small group of 
potential suppliers (10 firms). A prospective consumer considers buying a vehicle. It may adopt a 
vehicle type, or postpone its decision. After adopting a vehicle type, an agent is out of market for 
15 time steps (re-purchase period). Then it is receptive again to buy a new vehicle type. Suppliers 
sell vehicles, invest in R&D, and assess their business opportunity in the two technologies. 
Agents are conceptualized by three components: (1) a frame-structure, (2) an evaluation of 
options, and (3) a decision (e.g. adoption by users; investing in R&D or launching products by 
developers). The two agent groups, users and suppliers, are heterogeneous, and individual agent 
characteristics are considered (such as preferences and technological capabilities). 
In accordance to the conceptual framework the model has two layers. The micro level contains 
the characteristics and decisions of agents. The macro level contains aggregate variables, such as 
total adoption levels, total investment levels, prices, and social connotations, see Figure 2.1 and 
2.2 in chapter 2. 
Regulators are considered exogenous in the model, for simplicity. We assume an exogenous 
regulatory system in place that requires gradual reduction of emissions. We assume that these 
requirements can be met with both technologies. 
 
9.Ϯ.2 User frame and supplier frame 
 
The user frame accentuates certain attributes of the car (engine). Each attribute goes with a 
certain ‘weight’ or emphasis. The following attributes are taken into account, see Figure 9.1: 
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1) Price (P) of the innovation or ‘cost of 
adoption’ 
2) Perceived functionality (PF): the 
direct utility a potential adopter 
perceives, in comparison to the 
current situation. The utility depends 
on techno-economic characteristics 
of the innovation and functional 
needs of the individual user  
3) Social connotation (SC) of an 
innovation, as defined by cultural 
peers. 
4) Environmental impact (EI) of an 
innovation, with regard to ecological 
and social impact.  
 Figure 9.1: Typical user frame-structure 
 
The frame consists of four weights of the 4 factors: w1 to w4. This actor frame is the basis for 
the appreciation of the innovation (i), which leads to a certain level of ‘receptiveness’ (R) in the 
following way: 
Ri = (+ w1 * PFi + w2 * SCi + w3 * EIi ) – w4 * Pi 
In other word, psychological and cultural factors of meaning and framing are combined with 
economic variables such as cost of adoption (indirect utility) and perceived functionality (direct 
utility). Especially automobiles are acknowledged to provide more than just transportation. They 
have a symbolic meaning that goes beyond functionality. Receptiveness is an extended/enriched 
type of utility. Each potential user is characterized by an individual level of receptiveness. 
 
In chapter 4 we have analyzed consumer frames of car engines in more detail. In that analysis 
we found three types of consumer groups (frames), and also found frame-structures changing in 
the course of market development. Nevertheless, in this version of model, for brevity and 
simplicity, we assume that frame-structures are static, and we have chosen an average of the 
frames we found for 2000 and 2005. Also, we have simplified the number of consumer group 
from 3 to 2 groups. The sets of weights we estimate for the two groups (see Table 9.1) are based 
on that analysis. 
 
Table 9.1: Two weights sets representing two consumer groups 
 Frame group 1 (900x) Frame group 2 (100x) 
Weight 1 0.75 0.4 
Weight 2 0.3 0.3 
Weight 3 0.1 0.5 
Weight 4 0.2 0.2 
 
A supplier’s frame on the other hand is about the business case or business opportunity of a car 
engine, which is assessed by weigh up expected benefits and expected cost of launching a new 
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vehicle. Supplying firms differ in their precise strength and weakness of capabilities for 
innovation (cf. the literature on ‘core capabilities’), which will drive their expected cost for 
launching a new product technology. Silverberg (1991) denotes the importance of production 
quantity for the developing firm, in order to get beyond break-even point. As long as production 
investments in a new product-technology have no profitable outlook, a firm will wait with 
launching the product. 
Alongside decisions on launching new products, firms also invest in research and development, 
to enhance their technological capabilities. In our model their future expectations of demand in 
the two respective technologies (reflected in their R&D investments), are driven by (1) the 
number of successful launching competitors (endogenous in the model), and also (2) the 
(current) level of positive social connotation of a technology (endogenous in the model)40. The 
two components have equal weights. 
 
9.Ϯ.3 Implementing the feedback loops 
 
The innovations evolve over time, as does the social environment (connotations). As a conse-
quence of both, agents’ attitudes towards the innovation(s) are changing. Mechanisms of 
change describe how various factors relate to each other. Five feedback-loops that have been 
identified in literature are implemented in the model. They are described one after each other 
below, and visualized in Figure 9.2. 
Aggregated 
indicators
Tech.progres≈
Cum.investm.
Price
Social 
connotation
Total 
demand
Agent level
User
1000+
15
Firm
 
Figure 9.2: Five feedback-loops: increasing returns-to-scale (yellow), learning-by-doing (green), imitation of 
use (blue), learning-from-the-market (brown), and formation of symbolic meaning (pink). 
 
Increasing returns-to-scale and learning- by-doing 
The increasing returns-to-scale mechanism consists of the following sequence: cost per unit fall 
as firms take advantage of economies of scale, allowing them to profitably sell products at lower 
prices, which stimulates sales and further scale economies. Costs also fall because of learning-
by-doing (workers getting better at what they do). In our model, learning by doing is imple-
                                                                        
40 We assume that the social connotation of the technologies affects the regulatory pressure for the two 
technologies (e.g purchase subsidies, tax benefits). Therefore the social connotation is an important driver 
for the firm R&D investments. 
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mented through decreasing variable costs over time. This accounts for the producers’ accumu-
lated experience over time, or by their cumulative output41. Increasing returns-to-scale is 
implemented through price setting of firms, who divide their fixed and variable cost over their 
(expected) production volume. When their production volume rises, price will decrease42. 
 
Learning-from-the-market 
Besides learning-by-doing, there is also learning-from-the-market. Learning-from-the-market 
refers on the one hand to user feedback helping suppliers to improve their products, and on the 
other hand to better ways of using the innovation by the consumers (Rosenberg, 1982). Increase 
of use gives developers insight in customer preferences, which are obviously heterogeneous. 
This helps to direct their investments in new product launches, serving a greater range of 
customers. Because of learning-from-the-market we are likely to see greater (perceived) product 
quality and greater product variety both of which will increase perceived functionality from 
customers. This will lead to further increase of adoption of the innovation. 
This mechanism is implemented as follows. As a first component, capabilities of (all) firms rise 
when the numbers of consumers rise (even if a firm has not launched a product in that 
technology). Firms thus learn (directly, i.e. without own R&D) from the use of products of rivals, 
which is referred to by some as emulative learning (Windrum and Birchenhall 1998). Second, 
increasing number of launching competitors (due to rising consumer sales) will drive up R&D 
investment levels of all firms, which will increase their technological capabilities. As a third and 
final component, R&D investments will increase user perceived functionality. This is modelled 
simply as follows: perceived functionality of an innovation increases with total increasing 
investment in an innovation. These model assumptions thus reflect the mechanism that user 
feedback eventually leads to better products. 
 
Formation of symbolic meaning of products 
Whereas the previous mechanism identified the increase in utilitarian functionality, this 
subsequent mechanism addresses socio-cultural values that are connected to the product. 
The symbolic meaning and appreciation of the product becomes (among others) manifest in 
stories of market actors (Rosa and Spanjol 2005). When making a speech on a car engine, agents 
use adjectives or adverbs. By telling stories to each other, social connotation spreads and thus 
affects receptiveness. Though symbolic meaning and appreciation of a product is a pluralistic 
phenomenon, ultimately the set of adjectives and adverts is net positive (adding perceived value 
to the product), or negative. It the case of a car engine, people may use terms as ‘revolutionary’, 
‘super’, ‘promising’, ‘high-tech’, ‘you want to be seen in this’, or in contrast terms as ‘bulky’, 
‘weak ‘ or ‘dull’. 
In our model the social formation of meaning involves two conflicting stories: a positive one and 
a negative one. Agents may incline to one of the two stories. This is implemented by assuming 
different trends for spread the stories: (after market launch) the number of users inclined to the 
positive connotation of a product may grow steadily in time, up to 80% of the population, while 
the negative connotation stays small. This is an example of dominance of the idea ‘you need to 
have this’. Similarly, strong growth trends can be assumed for negative stories. Each of the 
                                                                        
41 In an ideal case, the decrease of price would be linked only to specific producers (namely those that have 
launched), but this was too complex for the current model. Here, the price decrease counts for all producers. 
Since firms only differ on the level of technological competences, the company with highest technological 
capabilities (lowest investment cost) will set the market price. 
42 We assume that the market price of the innovation is the lowest price at which at least one company can 
still make a profit. Fixed cost account for investment in R&D, product engineering and production facilities. 
The variable cost counts for material and labour of one product. 
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patterns can be chosen as input to the model, to explore scenarios. (By the way, being inclined 
to a positive story does not mean that an agent in all cases adopts. It is one of five factors in the 
formation of ‘receptiveness’.) 
 
Imitation of use 
For consumer products there is a tendency of potential adopters to imitate peers (e.g. Rogers, 
1983). We treat imitation as a bandwagon effect43 within their social group (which is the group 
with whom they share the same frame). In a bandwagon process individuals do not make the 
final decision to adopt or reject, but they are receptive to social pressure (from others that have 
already adopted), that spreads through the population (Abrahamson and Rosenkopf, 1993). The 
distribution of receptiveness is heterogeneous however, so that differences in individual 
benefits to the innovation result in a higher or lower receptiveness. 
A more detailed account of the model can be found in appendix J More than existing models, 
this model should suitable to analyse the role of changing social connotation of a product within 
the co-evolution of demand and supply. 
 
 
9.3 MODELLING RESULTS 
 
In this section we present simulation results of the model described in section 2, using a simple 
numeric simulation model. We simulate the co-evolution of supply and demand for electric 
engine cars and diesel engine cars as competing products. The five feedback-loops, which 
underlie co-evolution of demand and supply, are incorporated. 
The model outputs show how two innovation trajectories may co-exist in the sector, as a result 
of diversity in preferences (i.e. framing) of different consumer groups. We have calibrated the 
model for the first half of the model run by mimicking what we know about the diffusion of 
electric and diesel engine passenger cars from 1990 until 201044. A model analysis is provided in 
Appendix K This analysis suggests that the model is valid for an order-of-magnitude analysis of 
cause and effect relationships of social connotation with technical and economic factors such as 
investments, prices, technological progression and adoption. 
We present two runs. In the first run we assume an increasing share of the consumer population 
included in a positive social connotation for (H)EVs in the longer run. At the same time, a 
negative connotation of ICE technology becomes dominant.  
In the second run we assume again a positive connotation for (H)EV, but now we assume that 
ICE innovations will also predominantly acquire a positive social connotation, see Table 9.1.  
 
Table 9.1: input values for the two model runs 
Parameter RUN 1 RUN 2 
 ICE new (H)EV ICE new (H)EV 
InfP: Positive Connotation 0.1 0.75 0.75 0.75 
InfN: Negative Connotation 0.75 0.1 0.1 0.1 
                                                                        
43 An alternative way of incorporating imitation would be to place agents in a spatial structure, where they 
imitate neighbours. 
44 We match the first half of the model and the period of 1990-2010 in the following way. Some research 
suggests that the average re-purchase time of new cars is 6.3 yearsBoyd, T. (2006). Report on Demographic 
and Consumption Behaviors of USMS Members. Londonderry NH, USMS., and in the model we choose 15 
steps as the re-purchase period. Therefore, 50 modelling steps represent about 22 years. 
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Obviously, there is much more to tell about other possible runs and lessons or propositions we 
can draw from this model. Nevertheless for the sake of this chapter we will only address the role 
of social connotation, which we can understand better through the examination of these two 
runs already. 
 
Fig. a: Social Connotation (input) 
 
Fig. b: Market shares 
 
Fig. c: Technological Progress 
 
Fig. d: Price 
 
 
Fig. e: Firms on the market 
 
Fig. f: Perc. Functionality (step 1) 
 
Fig. g: Receptiveness (step 15) 
 
Fig. h: Receptiveness (step 30) 
 
Fig. i: Receptiveness (step 60) 
 
Figure 9.3: Model output Run 1. In this run the input is: only HEV acquires a positive Social Connotation, 
whereas ICE a negative. 
 
For both runs the first half of the run is very similar. It shows new diesel engines being launched 
in the early 1990s, and electric and hybrid-electric engines in the second half of the 1990s. Also, 
the new diesel systems have diffused towards 100% with respect the non-direct-injected diesel 
engines by about 2010. Further, the diffusion of electric vehicles stagnates after initial launches 
due to perceived superiority of diesel technology at that time. In the second half of the model 
period, the model runs really diverse. 
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In Run 1 (see Figure 9.3a to i) we choose social connotation of HEV to become strongly positive 
and ICE strongly negative (Figure 9.3a). We observe that the market share of (H)EV steadily rises 
after step 50 (Figure 9.3b). In the other graphs we find explanations for this. For instance, the 
 
Fig. a: Social Connotation (input) 
 
Fig. b: Market shares 
 
Fig. c: Technological Progress 
 
Fig. d: Price 
 
Fig. e: Firms on the market 
 
Fig. f: Perc. Functionality (step 1) 
 
Fig. g: Receptiveness (step 15) 
 
Fig. h: Receptiveness (step 30) 
 
Fig. i: Receptiveness (step 60) 
 
Figure 9.4: Model output Run 2. In this run the input is: both HEV and ICE acquire a positive Social Connota-
tion. 
 
state of (H)EV technology is progressing at a steeper rate than ICE (Figure 9.3c). It overtakes ICE 
at about step 40. As a consequence, for the majority of consumers receptiveness for HEV 
overtakes receptiveness for ICE at about step 40. For the green consumer group that has 
happened earlier (about step 30). 
In Run 2 (see Figure 9.4a to i) we choose social connotation of both (H)EV and ICE to become 
predominantly positive (Figure 9.4a). Here we find the market share of (H)EV remaining marginal 
in the longer run (Figure 9.4b). The state of ICE technology remains superior to (H)EV (Figure 
9.4c). Consumer receptiveness of ICE remain higher than for (H)EV, even for the green market 
niche. 
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In both runs we find similar price trends. We find the price decreasing because of rising firm 
capabilities through R&D investments and (after launch also) economies-of-scale, which can be 
observed in practice. However, we also find that the price rises again when more suppliers 
launch vehicles on the market, whereas the market niche is not growing in terms of consumers.  
At a first glance this is strange (prices usually decease in a diffusion process, especially when 
competition rises), but a closer look suggest that it is caused by a jump in the perceived quality 
of the product, due to a series of launch investments of firms. In order words, it is not the same 
product of which the price rises, but it is a new generation of the technology. In practice we also 
found new generations of DI injection diesels engines (or plug-in hybrids for that matter), which 
have initially higher prices (together with their higher perceived functionality). Although we can 
understand why the price trend in the model may jump (at moment of much investments and 
technological progression), this price trend is somewhat problematic and needs reconsideration 
in future applications of the model. Still, for the analysis of the role of social connotation, this 
discontinuity in the price trend does not seem to be significant (for example the figure of the 
market shares shows just a slight unevenness on the moment the price jumps). 
Another issue is the relative importance of various learning mechanisms. In the current model 
firms learn in various ways (through R&D, market sales (use), from each other), but the output 
graphs show that their technological capabilities mostly grow form R&D investments, whereas 
learning from user levels is a minor effect. (That is the reason why in run 2 the Technological 
Progress graphs remain parallel, despite the wider use of ICE.) In general the relative strength of 
learning mechanisms and other feedback effects is significant for the model results, whereas 
practical information to support the choices is hardly available, and therefore it is fairly hard to 
check weather these are reasonable assumptions. 
 
Lessons learned 
We draw a few lessons on the role of social connotation in the innovation dynamics from these 
model runs: 
• Initially the role of social connotation for new technologies is rather weak, since the 
connotation is poorly defined (right after launch). They only slightly impact R&D portfolios, 
and at the demand side few consumers adhere to a connotation yet. 
• When more consumers adhere to some social connotation of the new products, a positive 
connotative will mean an increase in receptiveness for the respective consumer groups 
(even though for consumers social connotation remains less important than perceived func-
tionality). 
• More significantly, a rise in positive social connotation will trigger more R&D investments in 
the new technology and after some time trigger more product launches. (For a negative 
social connotation this is the reverse effect.) 
• At longer last, when technological capabilities for the new technology have grown to similar 
levels as those of the established technology, the social connotation provides the competi-
tive edge, and adoption levels surpass those of technology with inferior social connotation, 
driving even more technological refinements. 
 
 
9.4 SCENARIOS FOR ELECTRIC ENGINE CARS AND DIESEL CARS 
 
In this section we present plausible but simplified descriptions of two possible socio-
technological trajectories. They are narrative scenarios, based on expert knowledge, combined 
with the insights from the quantitative model simulations. We develop two scenarios, based on 
two alternative assumptions on the uncertain formation of social connotation in the future. 
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Before presenting the scenario’s we concisely describe the developments between 1990 and 
2010. 
 
 
9.ϰ.1 Recent history 
Two innovation trajectories can be distinguished for the case of cleaner vehicles after 1990: the 
conventional diesel and gasoline internal combustion engine (ICE) trajectory and a trajectory of 
electric propulsion (EP)45. Two important innovations in ICE are Direct (fuel) Injection (DI) 
systems and variable valve-timing (VVT) is another. In the EP trajectory we find innovations such 
as improved batteries (i.e. lithium-ion batteries), regenerative braking and plug-in technology. In 
the last fifteen years, DI systems diffusion has been quick. Diffusion in electric vehicle innova-
tions on the other hand has been slow. The only success so far is the hybrid-electric Prius car 
which has sold of 1.7 million units worldwide since 1997 (see Table 9.2 for a comparison on sales 
units in the Netherlands). 
 
 
Table 9.2: Yearly sales of diesel cars (units), battery electric vehicles and hybrid electric vehicles in the 
Netherlands 1995-2006 (Sources: own calculations based on Avere (2008), Bovag (2008), Beise & Rennings 
(2005)) 
 
  BEV HEV DI Diesel Old Diesel 
1995   0 8500 76500 
1996 60 0 28800 61200 
1997 10 0 33250 61750 
1998 15 0 48000 52000 
1999 13 0 66000 54000 
2000 12 0 86400 33600 
2001 0 50 93600 26400 
2002 0 63 93500 16500 
2003 25 17 92650 16350 
2004 7 1062 102000 18000 
2005 0 2800 104550 18450 
2006 0 2800 116450 20550 
 
Behind these diffusion patterns is a complex phenomenon. The fast diffusion of DI systems and 
slow diffusion of electric vehicle technologies can be described and explained with the help of 
the two-layered, co-evolutionary model. Electric propulsion requires new capabilities at the 
supply side and positive appraisal from consumers. We observed that while electric vehicles got 
improved, consumers still decided for an improved ICE vehicle. This slowed down both the 
development and diffusion of electric vehicle technology. Up until today electric vehicles have 
suffered from two unfavourable characteristics: low autonomy (kilometres per battery charge) 
and high battery costs. Alongside these techno-economic mechanisms (which have been studied 
relatively well) a social mechanism played a role and interacted. Concerns about the climate 
                                                                        
45 We discard developments in hydrogen technology here. 
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enhanced awareness of impact of technologies. Social meaning and image of new engine types 
is however not an ‘instant delivery’ phenomenon, but unfolds over time and level of use. As a 
consequence, suppliers were initially reluctant to invest (much) in alternative models and 
capabilities, until they observed changes in actual market launches of competitors, and also in 
the effects of positive connotation of EP on tax incentives (etc.) for EP. Only then more firms 
gave priority to building up EP capabilities. Up to this day, sales levels of EP have been modest. 
In this perspective the future trajectories will be the outcome of the co-evolutionary process: 
suppliers creating capabilities in electric vehicles and ICE in parallel, affected by socio-regulatory 
pressures, offering both electric vehicles and new ICEs; consumers assessing HEVs on their fuel 
economy (higher for non-highway drives), prices (higher), their image as a car (green, trendy), 
engine capacity (sufficient, not spectacular), range (similar), engine noise (absent), and in the 
future the possibility of renting batteries and changing them during a long trip. With help of the 
model runs we can give more structure to this analysis, and explore various diffusion scenarios. 
 
 
9.ϰ.2 Two scenarios 
 
Scenario 1: Social popularity triggers functionality boost 
In scenario 1 we assume an increasing share of the consumer population adhere to a positive 
social connotation for (H)EVs: up to 75% in the longer run, whereas a majority become negatives 
about ICEs. 
1-5 years – This scenario foresees only a small growth in adoption of (H)EV in the next five years, 
limited to a group of green consumers. Other than the latter consumers are hardly interested in 
buying (H)EV since they perceive price/performance levels of (H)EV as yet as inferior. Neverthe-
less, average receptiveness of consumers for (H)EV is increasing, and coming closer towards 
those of ICEs. This rise is both driven by increasing perceived functionality, but also through 
increasing positive social connotation of (H)EV owing to growing concerns about global warming 
and higher prices for fuel. These stimulate praise for fuel efficient vehicles, which benefits 
electric engines, which are efficient to drive. Moreover, electric vehicles benefit from cultural 
icons (such as Hollywood stars) buying them, giving electric propulsion a positive image 
(something we are observing at the moment). The positive social connotation provides support 
for regulatory measures (most notably national tax exemption schemes) that favour battery and 
hybrid-electric vehicles. These stimulations affect firms’ R&D portfolios, which now devote more 
resources to EP than to ICE.  
5-10 years – After five years, rising average receptiveness of (H)EVs has not led to massive 
adoption yet, because it was still inferior to that of ICE. Soon after 2015 however, ongoing 
investments in electric engine technologies bring perceived price/functionality levels at the 
same level as (H)EV. New generations of (H)EVs include Li-ion batteries and Direct Drive in wheel 
technology. A variety of models with electric engines appears on the market, some minimizing 
fuel use (plug-in hybrids), others boosting performance. Renting schemes for batteries emerge, 
making refueling of electric vehicles possible in a few minutes. Continued policy support of 
(H)EVs brings prices equal to diesels. 
Near 2020 the sector passes a bifurcation point, after which adoption of (H)EVs increases 
steadily. A second consumer group, those for whom price is the most prominent attribute, 
increasingly chooses for electric propulsion. Around 2025 their sales have increased to 25-35%. 
 
Scenario 2: ICE strikes back 
In scenario 2 we assume that the social connotation of both (H)EV and ICE becomes more 
predominantly positive.  
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1-5 years – Scenario 2 foresees a small growth in adoption of (H)EV in the next five years, similar 
to scenario 1, limited to a group green consumer, and those who benefit from support schemes 
for EP. Average receptiveness of consumers for (H)EV is growing, due to some refinements in EP 
technology. However, at the same time, diesels are increasingly equipped with particle filters 
and within 5 years also increasingly with NOx filters. Firms are successful in presenting these 
diesels as clean, proven technology, at a relative low price. Because of this, national and EU 
policymakers start treating filtered diesels as environmentally equivalent to hybrids (partly as 
defensive support for the European automotive industry). 
5-10 years – Without special support from tax authorities, hybrid engines stay somewhat more 
expensive than diesels, in equivalent vehicles. (Especially) European automotive firms expect 
higher profitability from diesel in comparison to hybrids, and focus R&D on the first. Increased 
availability of (2nd generation) biodiesel is anticipated. Receptiveness of hybrids stays lower than 
diesels for a large majority of consumers. In this scenario the growth of (H)EV stagnates and 
tends to fall back. By 2020, hybrids have stayed a niche market only, smaller than five percent. 
 
 
9.5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter we explore future scenarios of car engine technology with support of a simulation 
model. In addition to previous evolutionary models, this model is instrumental to analyse 
technological innovation in a changing social context. 
We suggest and offer how an agent-based analysis of innovation diffusion can be formalized, 
which offers a micro- underpinning of macro patterns, which incorporates feedback loops from 
macro to micro. The formal model is analytically novel by taking explicit account of actor frames. 
By attaching weights to various product attributes, different groups of consumers interpret the 
same product differently: they attach different meaning and value to it. A frame includes 
attributes of functionality, but also of social connotation and others. Mediated by various 
feedback loops, demand and supply co-evolve. Attention is being given to the (changing) techno-
economic characteristics of the innovation (as an important supply feature), competition 
between various product offerings, and to processes of taste formation (as an important 
demand feature). With the model as a supporting tool it becomes possible to explore various 
possible futures, scenarios, depending on what mechanism plays a salient role, and the strength 
thereof. 
We presented two scenarios, based on two assumptions regarding progress of social connota-
tion. For that matter, we do not suggest that formation of social connotation is the most 
essential mechanism, but that it is a relevant factor with high uncertainly. Performing our 
history-friendly simulation analysis, we found that the trend in social connotation impact the 
innovation process in the following way: 
• Initially the role of social connotation for new technologies is rather weak, since the 
connotation is poorly defined (right after launch). They only slightly impact R&D portfolios, 
and at the demand side few consumers adhere to a connotation yet. 
• When more consumers adhere to some social connotation of the new products, a positive 
connotation will mean an increase in receptiveness for the respective consumer groups 
(even though for consumers social connotation is not the most important attribute; gener-
ally less important than perceived functionality). 
• More significantly, a rise in positive social connotation will trigger more R&D investments in 
the new technology, and after some time more product launches. (For a negative social 
connotation this is the reverse effect.) 
• At longer last, when technological capabilities for the new technology have grown to similar 
levels as the established technology, the social connotation provides the competitive edge, 
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and adoption levels surpass those of technology with inferior social connotation, driving 
even more technological refinements. 
 
In this chapter the model has been applied empirically to the case of clean vehicles, where we 
examine the diffusion of improved internal combustion engine vehicles and the diffusion of 
(hybrid) electric vehicles, as part of an integrated analysis in which the diffusion of one vehicle is 
at the expense of the diffusion of the other vehicle.  
We have developed two narrative scenarios. In the first scenario the social connotation of (H)EV 
technology becomes predominantly positive, whereas ICE predominantly negative. Here we find 
a gradual increase of the state-of-the-art of electric propulsion, within 10 years surpassing the 
state-of-the-art of ICE. After the initial adoption of electric propulsion in a limited group of green 
consumers, wider adoption occurs after 2020.  
In the second scenario new ICE versions acquire a similar positive connotation as (H)EV. Here, 
the state-of-the-art of ICE remains ahead of (H)EV, and after some adoption of electric models, 
even some green consumers shift back to refined versions of ICE. 
In the scenario analysis in this paper we have grouped HEV and BEV technology, which is slightly 
problematic regarding the differences of the products, especially the different requirements of 
an infrastructure. For instance, for BEV the availability of an extensive plug-in infrastructure is 
essential, for HEV it is not, whereas for plug-in hybrids this is fairly important. Nevertheless, the 
necessary technological competences to develop BEV and HEV overlap to a large extent (and 
both deviate from ICE competences), and this was the rationale for grouping them in this 
chapter. 
The model can be applied in principle to any diffusion process both retrospectively and 
prospectively. It cannot be used for prediction (because diffusion is not a deterministic process 
and because we lack data on certain variables) but can be used for exploration on the basis of 
proxy data. Especially micro level data (time series of agents’ attitudes and frames for evalua-
tion) is rather difficult to obtain. It is also hard to determine the relative strength of the various 
feedback loops. These should probably be assessed outside the modelling analysis. Perhaps 
expert opinion can be used for this. Implementing the model with expert opinion in an open 
fashion allows for the creation of models closer real world observations. The strength of such a 
modelling approach is then that it combines the structure and scientific underpinning of 
analytical modelling with the richness of participatory methods so as to address real complex 
issues of societal change in a consistent and meaningful way. We recommend this as a topic for 
future research. 
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10 Policy options for sustainable car mobility  
 
In the previous chapters we have addressed innovation in car mobility in a co-evolutionary 
perspective. In this perspective we highlighted the dynamic interplay of demand and supply. We 
have seen that this complex process is shaped by policies and policymakers in various ways. In 
this chapter we analyze what our co-evolutionary approach learns about the role of policy in the 
innovation process in the two cases. 
As referred to in chapter 1, policymakers at local, national and international levels have been 
challenged firmly to deal with the societal impact of car mobility. Despite that some transport 
policies have been successful in the last 20 to 30 years (safety, nitrogen oxides etc.), still some 
effects have remained critical or have even grown. Congestion levels and greenhouse gas 
emissions are the main examples of this. It raises the question how policies around these two 
issues can be improved. For our two cases, P+R and (hybrid-) electric vehicles, which may 
contribute to mitigation of the two issues, this delivers two more specific questions: what does 
the co-evolutionary analysis learn about: 
1.. the extent to which policies in the past decades have supported innovation in these two 
outer-regime niches, and 
2. how innovation at these niche trajectories can be supported in the future? 
This chapter has three sections. In section 1 we review the main policy instruments considered 
in the literature on environmental policy and innovation policy, including the contribution of the 
(co-)evolutionary perspective to this field. The focus of our discussion is on the innovation 
effects of policy instruments. Then we address the two questions for each of our case studies. 
We analyze which policy instruments have been applied in the two cases in the last 15 years, 
and we asses their impacts. Then we sketch some policy options to simulate low-carbon car 
engines, and use of P+R in cities respectively. 
 
10.1 POLICY FOR GREEN INNOVATION: FROM STATIC TO EVOLUTIONARY INSTRUMENTS 
 
There are two main perspectives on environmental and innovation policy in the literature, the 
welfare perspective and an evolutionary perspective. Of these two the first one is best worked 
out. It says that policy intervention is warranted in the case of market failure, when allocation 
via markets leads to a non-optimal allocation of resources. Examples of market failures are: 
negative externalities (such as environmental pollution causing social costs from private 
activities and profits) and public good problems (when goods are non-rival in use and when 
there are difficulties of excluding others from free use). In the welfare perspective policy should 
intervene up to the point where marginal costs start to equate marginal benefits, being the 
point at which welfare is maximised. 
Environmental policy studies suggest various instruments to spur and shape innovation, and 
from a welfare perspective these are most notably: 
• Pollution taxes and emission trading. A widespread view among economists holds that this 
economic instrument is most effective to spur innovation, addressing financial incentives. 
For example, Milliman and Prince (1989) suggest that incentive-based instruments are most 
effective, finding that emission taxes and auctioned permits are better facilitators of tech-
nological change than regulation and free permits. This is called into question however by 
other theoretical studies (e.g. Fischer et al., 2003). 
• Standards and regulation. This type of instruments sets specific target outcomes, such as 
emission limits and product bans. There is ample evidence of regulations that spurred inno-
vation, but also ample evidence that it did not (Kemp, 1997). In some cases it triggered a 
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modernization of the industry, in terms of improved productivity (Ashford et al., 1985) and 
efficiency (Dieleman and Hoo, 1993). 
The conflicting results suggest that there is not one instrument best in all circumstances - the 
choice should depend on the circumstances and give due attention to the design (specific 
characteristics) of the instruments. Relevant circumstances are: technological opportunities for 
dealing with environmental problems, market entry barriers for newcomers, openness to 
change, willingness to experiment, knowledge infrastructure. Attention should also be given to 
non-cost drivers of innovation, such as societal and business expectations and political factors 
(Foxon and Kemp, 2006). Other possible instruments for promoting eco-innovation are: 
• Investment subsidies. Subsidies for green investments are a much used instrument. Various 
studies suggest that sole subsidies have only limited impact on the development of innova-
tions new to the world, since the behavioral effect of the innovator (either firms or users) 
was low. However, a combination of investment subsidies with environmental taxes may be 
effective for diffusion of a cleaner technology, provided that a substitute technology is 
available. 
• R&D programmes and subsidies. This instrument deals with subsidies for development of 
cleaner technologies. Studies suggest that this instrument does trigger research that would 
not have been performed otherwise but also generates windfall profits for some innovators 
(those who would have done the R&D anyhow). It is not clear to what extent the pro-
grammes affect established or future market products. 
• Covenants or voluntary agreements. According to Klok (1989) the effectiveness of 
covenants is typically small, since it leaves firms to rely more on autonomous technological 
change and market evolution, than on the covenant. 
In our case studies, we have addressed dynamic processes of co-evolution, where outer-regime 
niches emerged next to the regime. In this perspective it is not just a question of ‘does an 
instrument spur innovation’, but also: ‘does an instrument spur innovation to improve the 
existing regime (the lower quadrants of Figure 1.5, reprinted as 10.1) or does it spur an 
alternative trajectory’ (the top quadrants of Figure 10.1)? Such a key question has not been 
investigated systematically by research and is given only scant attention by policy makers, since 
the traditional welfare perspective operates mostly in a technology-blind manner.  
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Figure 10.1: Typology of innovation trajectories (combining notions of Abernathy & Clark (1985) and Geels 
and Kemp (2007), see also Figure 1.5. 
 
It should not come as a surprise that the common response of industry to environmental 
pressures has been the adoption of existing technologies and incremental innovation (the 
bottom-left quadrant in Figure 10.1), as opposed to alternative innovation trajectories (the top 
left and top right quadrants) (Kemp, 1997; Foxon and Kemp, 2006). When policymakers seek 
more fundamental shifts from unsustainable regimes to more sustainable ones, the traditional 
instruments are less appropriate, since the isolated application of a classical instrument hardly 
supports the outer-regime niches (or, in the case of sole R&D subsidies for the niche, will have 
little impact on the regime). Therefore, in those cases the coherency of a set of policy instru-
ments is what matters rather than the type of instrument chosen (Kemp 1997). 
In the same line of inquiry, Rip and Kemp (1998) notice that environmental innovation policies 
should not just lay down functional requirements (to products and processes), but governments 
should modulate the innovation dynamics, oriented towards the strategic interactions among 
market actors. This involves: facilitating communication, broadening the scope of inquiry, 
providing resources for research that is unlikely to yield short term results, and stimulating 
cooperative activities in a novelty seeking business environment (p.391). One such approach is 
strategic niche management, “the creation and management of protected spaces (niches) for 
promising technologies by means of experimentation with the aim of learning about the 
performance, effects, economic viability and social desirability of the technology and to use this 
knowledge to inform private and public (support and control) policies that are needed for the 
further development and rate of application of new technologies and technology systems” 
(Kemp et al., 2000)46. These insights have inspired the approach of transition management 
which is broader in scope, focuses on system changes and system innovation, and advocates 
evolving adaptive portfolios of alternative niches (e.g. Rotmans et al., 2001). More recently, the 
concept of time strategies has been put forward which focuses on the political preparation and 
                                                                        
46 See Kemp et al. (1998, 2001), Hoogma et al. (2002) and Schot and Geels (2008). 
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utilisation of time windows of opportunities in unstable phases of technological competition 
(e.g. Nill and Zundel, 2001). 
These approaches suggest that policies should be concerned not only with providing incentives 
and setting limits but also with providing orientation, stimulating mutual learning, fostering 
socio-technical alignment, making sure that a wide variety of options is explored, dealing with 
conflicting claims by technology actors and with learning about the effects of their policies. Since 
the policies concern the dynamics of variation, selection and retention, they are referred to as 
evolutionary policy. This is a second perspective on innovation policy and an alternative to the 
welfare perspective.  (Schot and Geels, 2008) 
 
Evolutionary policy 
The evolutionary perspective on policy concerns itself with shaping interactions—between firms 
and other actors in markets and policy arenas—to desirable outcomes. It builds upon evolution-
ary theories of innovation and change (Nelson and Winter, Potts, Hodgson) where the term 
evolutionary may refer to gradual change or to the evolutionary mechanism of variation, 
selection and retention (inheritance). Nill and Kemp (2009) and Van den Bergh and Kallis (2009) 
have coined the term “evolutionary policy” for an policy approach that is concerned with the 
dynamics of variation, selection and retention, which is mindful of (the sources of) lock-in, and 
sets out to learn about new paths in a forward-looking, adaptive manner. 
These novel evolutionary policy models have provided principles to support a shift to niche 
trajectories, but these principles have been quite abstract. In the next sections we analyze 
whether we can identify elements of evolutionary steering in the historic policies in our two case 
studies, and secondly, what this policy model can practically contribute to future policies in the 
two cases. This leaves us with two questions: (1) to what extent have policies in the past 
supported innovation in the two outer-regime niches, and (2) how can innovation at niche 
trajectories be supported in the future in our two cases? 
 
 
10.2 POLICY OPTIONS FOR MITIGATING (TOTAL) CO2 EMISSIONS OF CAR USE 
 
Policy analysis 
Environmental policymakers consider and have considered various instruments and technologies 
to mitigate the (total) CO2 emissions of car use. Over the last two decades technological 
solutions have received most attention, and electric vehicles, hydrogen vehicles, hybrids 
(whether or not plugged-in), clean and small diesel and gasoline vehicles have all been in the 
spotlights as possible low emission vehicles (LUVs) and ultra low emission vehicles (ULEVs). 
There has been considerable debate on which technology is most promising. This is a politicized 
debate, influenced by technological uncertainty, vested economic interests and ecological 
objectives, also between various member states in Europe (Jacob et al., 2005). 
As a first instrument of environmental innovation, emission regulation was adopted around 
1985 at a European level. The initial emission requirements for various pollutants that were set 
were gradually tightened (these are the Euro 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 standards, see chapter 6). In the last 
two decades, these have resulted in a steady reduction of exhaust gas emissions of new vehicles, 
through refinement of engine technology. The gains in eco-efficiency have, however, not been 
sufficient yet to compensate for the rapid growth of vehicle volumes, bringing about the rise of 
total greenhouse gas emissions of road transport. 
The gradual tightening of these standards over time continues to be a major stimulus for the 
development of cleaner propulsion technology. So far, however, more stringent emission 
requirements could always be met by refining conventional IC engine technology and introduc-
ing or improving exhaust after-treatment systems. Recent studies show that the potential for 
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the further improvement of existing Otto and diesel engines, catalyst technology and powertrain 
control systems is still large and will probably be sufficient to meet near future emission 
standards in the next five to eight years. This means it will not be necessary for manufacturers to 
introduce hybrid or hydrogen propulsion technology in this period from the viewpoint of 
meeting future emission standards. 
The second environmental policy instrument on the issue of CO2 is a voluntary agreement or 
covenant between the EU and the automotive industry. The two parties signed agreements for a 
reduction of the average CO2 emission of new passenger cars in 1998, from around 180 g/km to 
140 g/km by 2008/2009 (i.e. a 22% reduction compared to 1995). The main contribution to 
achieving this goal was expected to come from the widespread introduction of direct-injection 
diesel and direct-injection gasoline engines. A vision of the role of hybrid and hydrogen 
technology was not given by the partners. A recent review of the effectiveness of the covenant 
showed that between 1995 and 1999 CO2 emissions of new cars decreased by 5.6%. At the end 
of 2006, the manufacturers appeared to be behind schedule and unlikely to meet the 2008 
targets. In June 2007, the EU decided to change the voluntary agreement to a compulsory 
requirement for 2010: a CO2 emission of 130 g/km
47. We conclude that emission requirements 
and the voluntary agreement have resulted in the decrease of emissions per vehicle of about 1 
to 2 percent a year. However, development of ultra-low emission vehicle (ULEV) technology, 
which seems to be necessary to decrease total CO2 emissions, is currently not stimulated by this 
policy instrument. 
The European level direct support for ULEVs comprises mainly R&D subsidies for electric and 
hydrogen vehicles. This is the third type of policy instrument that we identify in the sector’s 
recent history. The R&D programs sometimes include demonstration projects. In the 1990s 
some funding was provided for demonstration programmes, such as ZEUS, in which eight cities 
jointly operated several hundreds of electric vehicles, as well as vehicles running on biogas and 
natural gas (Hoogma et al., 2002). A few European countries supported electric vehicles at a 
national level, mostly through demonstration experiments. Most remarkable were the French 
state electrical utility EDF ordering in total close to 2000 EVs, amongst other in the La Rochelle 
experiment. Other experimenting countries were Germany (Rugen Island), Switserland 
(Mendriso), and Norway (Think!). 
Whereas direct support for electric vehicles in the 1990s was only slightly encouraged by the 
European Union (EU), the high expectations around hydrogen technology around the year 2000 
triggered more thorough initiatives. The European level support of hydrogen technology for 
vehicles is embedded in the wider field of hydrogen and fuel cell (FC) technology, including 
transportation-, stationary- and portable applications. The EU provides basic funds for R&D, 
supporting identified European Research Areas (ERAs) in which large consortia of industry and 
R&D organizations team up their R&D investments and activities for an extended period of time 
in ‘Integrated Projects’. A High-Level Group for Hydrogen and Fuel Cell Technologies (HLG) was 
initiated in 2002 by Directorates-General Research and Energy and Transport. It established a 
basic proposal for a European hydrogen and FC roadmap in its report Hydrogen Energy and Fuel 
Cells – A vision to our future. This commitment led to the creation of the Hydrogen and Fuel Cell 
Technology Platform (HFP) in 2004 in order to reach the targets stated in the HLG report. 
Besides direct R&D on (general) hydrogen and FC technology, the European Commission 
supports vehicle demonstration projects with hydrogen and fuel cell vehicles (FCVs). Currently, 
most experiments are in urban delivery or public transport. Many vehicles are involved in such 
projects. The Clean Urban Transport for Europe (CUTE) project is a demonstration project partly 
                                                                        
47 This requirement includes a 10g/km reduction for fuel, which brings the total emission of an average 
vehicle down to 120 g/km. 
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financed by the EU, where FC buses and hydrogen infrastructure are demonstrated in nine 
European cities. A total of 27 FC prototype buses have been delivered to the cities (three buses 
to each city) and are currently being demonstrated and tested in normal operations during a 
five-year period. These projects are effective in finding out the actual acceptance of FCVs among 
operators, passengers and vehicle developers and producers. They will play an important role in 
the preparations for the market launch. 
Currently, no direct incentives on customer purchase of hydrogen vehicles exist at the European 
level. Such consumer tax exemption schemes are a fourth possible instrument in the sector. 
Such incentives for hydrogen vehicles neither exist at the national level. In most European 
countries national schemes of tax exemption (either VAT or road tax) have been implemented 
for cleaner vehicles, but threshold values for these exemptions have been broader than ULEV (in 
most countries 90 or 120 g/km), in order to include hybrid vehicles. As a result they have not 
exclusively triggered demand for electric or hydrogen vehicles, whereas their effect on hybrid 
has been modest. In most countries sales of hybrids have not exceeded 1 or 2 percent of annual 
sales. These tax exemption schemes are a fourth type of instrument of innovation policy that we 
identify in this sector. 
We find that the four instruments in our case study have mostly lead to diffusion of existing 
technologies and incremental innovation, not to transformation or shift to alternative trajecto-
ries. This confirms the proposition of Foxon and Kemp (2006). The first instrument, the stepwise 
emission standard scheme (Euro 1 to 5) sustains firms focusing on only few years ahead. They do 
not provide an incentive to go beyond the standards. In chapter 5 we found that from a business 
perspective, it is not very attractive to invest much in a new, still immature technology. Those 
efforts will very likely lead to losses in the short term. Competition on the present market is 
fierce and it is (relatively) more attractive and necessary to invest in the incremental innovation 
of the existing technology. Firms that would invest large portions of their R&D portfolio in future 
engines (for launches five to ten years ahead) draw from their engineering budgets of forthcom-
ing engines, pruning their competitiveness in the next few years, and running the risk of being 
outcompeted. In other words, firms with a longer time focus are punished by the market. This is 
an important cause of the sailing ship effect that we found in chapter 6. The emission scheme in 
place has not compensated for this market failure. 
We found that the second instrument, the voluntary covenant, was only slightly effective. This 
too is in correspondence with earlier studies (Klok 1989). The progress that was made came 
from wider application of existing technology: direct injection systems. The fourth instrument, 
tax exemption schemes at the user side have been applied at national levels. This measure 
makes sense since we found in chapter 4 that (in The Netherlands) around 35% of the consum-
ers of new cars buys the cheapest engine. Tax benefits for hybrid-electric vehicles have 
therefore stimulated their sales in various countries, though these have not exceeded market 
shares of a few percent. To what extent has this triggered car firms to develop more hybrid 
electric vehicles? This effect has not been substantial, regarding that by nine years after the 
market launch of Toyota’s Prius, only two car firms, Honda and Toyota (including Lexus), have 
hybrid models on the European market. Although the tax benefit also counted for electric 
vehicles, it has not triggered established car firms to launch electric models. There is only one 
firm offering electric vehicles in most European markets, the Norwegian Think, which is a new 
market entrant. 
The third instrument applied, R&D subsidy programmes, is especially interesting for our 
question of regime shift, since it includes direct promotion of the niche and includes some 
elements of an evolutionary steering approach. The European polices on electric and hydrogen 
vehicle technology, such as support of R&D via HFP and vehicle demonstration projects have 
enhanced the niches of electric and hydrogen vehicle technology. They contributed to improved 
versions of electric and hydrogen vehicles, and provided experiences with actual usage of these 
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vehicles in practical settings, which otherwise probably would not have been performed. 
However, these propulsion technologies have not yet reached the necessary maturity for 
broader market applications. In chapter 5 we found that the average contemporary willingness 
of car firms to develop hydrogen vehicles is between uncertain and slightly low. A large majority 
of the seven firms perceive their own technological capabilities and organizational learning 
capabilities to develop hydrogen vehicles as weak or uncertain. Therefore, this R&D instrument 
has not yet resulted in positive willingness of car firms to launch market vehicles, and it’s not 
clear whether it has made market application more likely than before. After all, the develop-
ment of electric and hydrogen technology took place alongside refinement and learning on ICE 
technology. The various technological trajectories are as moving targets and interact with each 
other, mostly in a competitive relation. The isolated character of the R&D subsidies, discon-
nected from the ICE regime, is a disadvantage of this measure. 
Some of the European R&D programmes include the establishment of a European platform or 
demonstration projects, often including provision of local infrastructure. From an evolutionary 
steering perspective these are important additions to the R&D subsidy instrument. Demonstra-
tion projects foster interaction between users, producers and infrastructure in early stage, which 
provides rich lessons learned. In the same vein, the establishment of a platform is important 
because it structures the communication between various stakeholders in the sector: firms, 
research centers, universities, regulators, NGO’s, consumer groups. It stimulates the acknowl-
edgement of each others perception of the issue and possibly the emergence of a shared 
problem perception. The platform can address the issue of niche-regime competition collabora-
tively. Of course, as with any specific technology policy there is a danger of regulatory capture. 
Policy makers have to be mindful about this. Much lobbying work is undertaken by various 
organisations to influence the perceived desirability of various technologies, including their 
potential. Ultimately, the objective is to shape expectations of policy makers. Decision makers 
must, consequently, develop an independent position and critically assess attempts to shape the 
perceived desirability of various technologies. They also must not fall prey to hype-
disillusionment cycles, resulting in too massive support of not yet ripe options and the with-
drawal of support when positive results do not quickly materialise. Policy should promote a 
portfolio of options and should create an element of continuity in support policies. As Verbong 
and others write: 
“Experiences in the 1990s and in other countries (Denmark, Germany) showed that regulatory stability and 
long term support were crucial for successful development of renewable technologies (Jacobsson and Lauber, 
2006). Policy analysts and consultants recognised these characteristics as key components for renewable 
energy policy, but these lessons were not internalised, as policy actions in the early 2000s demonstrate 
(frequent policy changes that created instability and uncertainty). Policy makers did not provide long-term 
guarantees and too rapidly abandoned innovations when setbacks occurred. They cut off protection 
measures too soon, and introduced market pressures when innovations had not yet stabilised. So, the lessons 
from the 1990s were either forgotten or not implemented (for political or financial reasons)” (Verbong et 
al., 2008, p. 570-571). 
In summary, we state that the four instruments that have been applied have not contributed 
much to regime transformation or transition. We found two elements though, sectoral 
platforms and demonstration projects, useful approaches for addressing niche-regime dynamics 
and for working toward regime shifts. 
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Policy advice 
Regarding the fairly certain future growth of vehicle numbers both in Europe and worldwide, a 
large decrease of CO2 emissions per vehicle would inevitably be required in order to reach the 
(stated aim in Europe of) reduction of total CO2 emissions (EEA, 2004). This requires substantial 
transformation of vehicle technology or even transition (lower right or upper right quadrant 
respectively in Figure 1.5). How can the niche of such ultra low emission vehicles (ULEVs) 
effectively be stimulated? 
From an evolutionary path-creation perspective, to escape lock-in the European Union should 
try and modulate the niche-regime dynamics, and shape the strategic interactions among the 
market actors. More concrete, the EU could strengthen and develop the role of the hydrogen 
platform (one niche technology) into a low-carbon car platform (relating to niches and regime 
technologies). This platform could be instrumental in determining a portfolio of various 
propulsion technologies, and be involved in monitoring the potentials of the technologies. It 
could be instrumental in disseminating lessons learned in demonstration projects through 
evaluation and monitoring reports. These reports should address technical as well so-
cial/behavioral issues, in order to exploit the socio-technical co-construction potential to the full 
(Elzen, 2004). Experience from different projects should be combined. The platform could have 
an important advisory role in the allocation of EU R&D budgets and future emission require-
ments. These regulations should be adaptive to ongoing developments, whereas the goal of 
curbing total emissions of the sector should be steady. To prevent a tunnel vision and stimulate 
learning over a wide range of issues, the platform should be a diverse group ranging from 
industry representatives, consumer organizations, policymakers, research organizations and 
NGOs. It is important that they include a variety of expertise and interests, including experts on 
transition processes. 
The platform should discuss the future of the compulsory requirement that have recently been 
introduced: the required level 130 g/km as a fleet average for 2010. It needs to assess and agree 
an average future level of g/km that would be sufficient to arrive at lower total CO2 levels of the 
car sector, probably around 65 g/km. It should discuss how this averaged level may be moved 
down stepwise. Such average levels are technically challenging, and car firms will probably 
contest that such a slide is unrealistic, as they have done in the past. Independent assessment 
therefore is needed. The platform is the right place to address the feedbacks in niche-regime 
interactions, which constitute the major complexities and reason why emissions are indeed 
difficult to mitigate. One point for discussion is the proportions in R&D portfolios of incremental 
technology versus ULEV technology. Traditional stepwise schemes (such as Euro 1 to 5) do not 
encourage firms to look more than a few years ahead. To counteract this effect additional policy 
options need to be explored: ways to put incentives to R&D expenditures more directly. For 
instance, rules on R&D expenditures could not only stimulate competence building on ULEVs, 
but could concurrently slow down the incremental innovation of the existing technology. An 
example would be to require firms to reserve at least 50% of their R&D budgets in ULEV 
technology. Fairness over the various car firms and their competition could be achieved through 
the use of a percentage of R&D expenditures. Since much technological innovation has also 
recently shifted to suppliers, these (first-tier) suppliers may need to be included in the platform 
and in such regulation. In order not to be short-sighted and bet on one technology, the 
requirement should be defined for ‘very low emission’ propulsion technology instead of a 
specific technology such as hydrogen or EVs. An alternative solution is to create a large R&D 
fund to which companies can submit proposals. 
Another option for discussion in the EU platform would be to adopt California’s ZEV mandate, 
which requires minimum sales levels of low-emission vehicles, and combine it with (existing) 
R&D subsidies. The ZEV mandate already supported R&D on ULEVs indirectly (Frenken et al., 
2004; Van den Hoed, 2004), but the coherent combination of it with R&D subsidies, demonstra-
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tion projects and emission regulation, could provide a strong stimulation for escaping lock-in 
from the ICE trajectory. 
All in all, with regard to increasing vehicle numbers in Europe (and even more worldwide), the 
stated aim to decrease of CO2 emissions of the vehicle fleet as a whole will almost certainly 
need radical measures. For such a complex issue, we can not simply conclude: develop a 
regulation that allows, for instance, only 65 g/km. To acknowledge the complexity, we stated 
that a sectoral platform is a suitable way to provide communication between the relevant 
stakeholders, and address the feedbacks in niche-regime interactions, which are a major reason 
of why emission levels are indeed difficult to mitigate. We have provided a few suggestions for 
the platform to seek ways to shift the balance of R&D budgets from incremental to more radical 
environmental innovation. It is important that the platform houses different types of expertise 
and interests. Instead of one platform, different platforms could be created for various options. 
Here the Dutch transition approach with the seven transition platforms for sustainable energy is 
of interest48. The platforms serve as vehicles for learning and action for innovative solutions 
identified by business and experts (micro co-generation, battery electric vehicles, energy 
producing greenhouses, and others). Through the platforms the interest in society (business) in 
innovative change is mobilised. Strategic issues are considered via the Coordination-body Dutch 
Energy Transition created in 2008. The Coordination-body is responsible for developing an 
overall vision for the energy supply (electricity and heat) in the Netherlands and to formulate a 
strategic agenda based on inputs of the platforms. 
The whole approach is set up as a vehicle for socio-technical change and policy change in a 
coordinated manner. The transition approach seeks to encourage industry to work on low-
carbon innovations including those that are not yet ready for the market, and to assist in the 
development of those innovations (Kemp, 2009). Generic policies are combined with technol-
ogy-specific policies. This (national) approach could be a prototype for a European platform of 
car propulsion technology. 
 
 
10.3 POLICY OPTIONS FOR MITIGATING URBAN CAR USE AND PARKING 
 
Policy analysis 
The role of policy in the second case study is at least as complex as the previous case, even 
though urban car use and parking is a local issue rather than a global one. For P+R, policymakers 
are both the regulator and (usually) the developer of the facilities, giving them a double role. 
Various policy instruments have been applied in the urban parking sector (as we saw in chapter 
8). The first instrument is parking restrictions: banning parking from certain streets, and also 
time restriction on the length of stay. This regulatory instrument is typically applied in the early 
phase of a city’s parking policy, as a first step to mitigate congestion in some streets. 
The second type of instrument is pricing strategies. This economic instrument puts a price (or 
tax) on parking in streets which are most congested, as a negative incentive. The third type of 
instrument is investment subsidies. Investment subsidies have both been applied to support the 
regime of central parking and for the P+R niche. Through investments in new (often expensive, 
underground) garages in the city centers and in parking indication systems at the ring road, the 
central parking regime was refined. In addition, local governments have invested in P+R sites. 
We found that the rationale behind parking policy instruments is not at all evident. In larger 
cities, typically rival policy frames exist: a frame where parking policy is a tool to attract 
customers, striving for greater parking accommodation and alternatively a frame of parking 
                                                                        
48 Based on Kemp (2009).  
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restriction to reduce car traffic (congestion) and to enhance quality of life in the urban area. 
Related to the first frame is another motivation, generally less publicly articulated, which is the 
raising of revenue for local authorities from charging for parking on the highway or from 
investments in off-street parking capacity. From our survey in chapter 7 with respect to P+R, we 
found most evidence for the first frame, since economic effects (e.g. effects on local shops, 
parking revenues) and market pressures (e.g. preferences from car drivers) are salient drivers for 
city governments whether or not to engage in P+R development, not environmental considera-
tions. In practice, parking policy tends to reflect a compromise between these frames, delivered 
through the twin instruments of regulations which limit who can park and for how long and 
pricing structures which may seek to favour parking acts of different duration. 
It is understandable that economic effects are important for local authorities, since they typically 
have high financial dependence on nationally-raised taxes allocated by the central governments, 
which retain a strong influence over how allocated funds are ultimately spent. In the context of 
this financial regime parking revenues offer the prospect of a significant revenue stream which 
can be allocated to transport or non-transport budgets against locally-determined motivations 
and justifications. In Amsterdam parking revenues make up 25% of total local tax revenues. 
In our analysis of the emergence of Park-and-Ride in chapter 8 the role of policies was an 
important concern. Most of the six cities have introduced the three instruments in the chrono-
logical order as we just described them, and currently apply a combination of the three. 
However, the cities apply the instruments to a different extent, resulting in a differing pressure 
to curb the dominant regime of central parking, as well as a different promotion of the P+R 
niche. 
Since none of the cities combined strong regime restriction with strong P+R niche investment, 
none of the cities has maximized the potential to transfer parking to P+R. Nevertheless, 
Amsterdam, Oxford and York were the cities with the strongest pressure on city centre traffic. In 
the case of the first two, particularly strong parking restrictions and pricing on city centre 
parking were the key features, and in the case of York, a particularly attractive P+R offer. In 
Amsterdam this resulted in 25% less car use in the (core) city centre, though without much use 
of P+R. In Oxford it yielded an interception ratio by P+R of 10% (by 1993). The case of Amster-
dam shows that even strong parking restriction and taxes can not automatically result in strong 
increase of P+R usage. In Amsterdam travellers favoured use of public transport over P+R use. In 
Oxford too car travellers shifted to bus use after 1993, with no major change in P+R use. 
We found that neither Rotterdam nor Utrecht nor Bristol has applied strong parking restrictions 
and taxing in the research period. Rotterdam emerged as an intermediate case, where limited 
disincentives for city centre parking to some extent counteracted the strength of the public 
transport offer. In the case of Bristol and Utrecht, the policy rhetoric was insufficiently trans-
lated into delivery, with weak regime restrictions and weak niche promotion. Neither of the 
cities has shown great positive impacts of P+R use, in terms of depressurizing urban car use and 
congestion. 
In summary, few cities aspired to stimulate a regime shift to low-traffic centres, and hardly 
treated the niche and regime as competing and moving targets. In most of the six cities we 
found an overall increase in parking supply for the city centre, even if the regime was curbed 
though parking restrictions and pricing. At the same, all cities refined central parking through 
investments in parking indication systems. In addition, cities invested in P+R sites, but mostly as 
isolated projects. To different extents in the six case-studies then, we find echoes of Kauffman’s 
(2000) conclusion that: promoting the use of public transport by improving it, whilst simultane-
ously constructing new car parks for commuters in the city centre, is mutually incompatible. As a 
result, we found parking policy instruments were effective for incremental refinement of the 
central parking regime, temporarily solving congestion issues. When traffic levels grew in time, 
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new measures were necessary. The application of the instruments did not lead to low-traffic city 
centres. 
 
Policy advice 
How can city planners aiming for low-traffic city centres exploit P+R most effectively? The 
complexity of the issue does not allow distilling a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for a 
city government policy in order to achieve successful, city-centre traffic reducing P+R facilities. A 
city government can not control the subtle practices of travellers, and these stay a source of 
some uncertainty. Further, the local government cannot decide upon these issues purely on its 
own and needs to participate with local stakeholders to achieve enough support for their 
policies. The co-evolutionary analysis has highlighted though some of the niche-regime 
dynamics, and these provide some hints to alternative policy options from an evolutionary 
steering perspective. Similar as in the first case study, we suggest that an urban transport 
platform is a suitable way for learning and to encourage coordination between the relevant 
stakeholders. The platform should be a diverse group ranging from local shops and businesses, 
citizens, tourist organizations, local government, NGO’s (especially on air quality), private 
parking firms, parking experts, public transport organizations etc. They could jointly sketch 
various possible futures of urban transport with special attention to the role of cars. Collectively 
they should discuss and address the niche-regime interactions, including the relative attractive-
ness of central parking, P+R use and use of public transport, which are a major reason of why 
congestion issues are indeed difficult to mitigate. The broad range of transport organizations 
makes the platform an excellent place to promote and design ways of inter-modality: the 
smooth linking of various transport modes. 
Our analysis did provide a few guidelines to how the urban transport platform can exploit P+R 
best to stimulate a shift of the urban car use regime towards low-traffic city centres. It should 
discuss and design the various policy instruments concertedly. Two elements seem essential 
here, even though each needs to be tailored for local issues: 
• the central parking regime needs to be curbed through strong parking restrictions and high 
pricing; central parking tariffs need to be considerably higher then tariffs at P+R sites. 
• high-quality and smooth P+R facilities need to be available at all major inbound roads. 
The second without the first is ineffective, as the cases of Rotterdam and Bristol show, 
confirming older studies. If both are absent, the case of Utrecht confirms that P+R use will be 
minimal. Finally, experiences in Oxford and studies of Bos and Molin (2006) suggest that, in 
order to reduce car traffic in the city centre, both initiatives are necessary, though the case of 
Amsterdam shows that they are not certainly sufficient to create expanding use of P+R facilities. 
Investing in P+R, whilst simultaneously constructing new car parks for commuters in the city 
centre, is mutually incompatible. Stabilizing or even decreasing central parking availability is 
challenging for city governments, giving the opposition from shop owners and possibly car 
owners. However, in order to reduce problems related to car use in city centres it seems 
unavoidable. Otherwise, P+R will likely be nothing more than ‘some additional parking space’. 
Finally, with regard to the economic risks that local governments perceive (chapter 7), national 
governments are advised to support city governments financially for P+R development. Analysis 
of the three Dutch cases (chapter 8) has confirmed that national subsidies are an important 
enabler for local government to develop P+R. Also, the parking policies should not be viewed an 
end in themselves but be undertaken within a wider perspective of sustainable mobility which 
seeks to fulfil individual mobility needs in a more sustainable way. 
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10.4 CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter we have analyzed the role of policy in our two cases from a co-evolutionary 
perspective. We found that policy instruments were mostly applied in a technology-blind 
manner, leading mostly to adoption of existing technologies and incremental innovation. We 
have suggested options for evolutionary policy to promote the niche innovation in our two case 
studies, as these may mitigate the CO2 and congestion issues with greater drive. As a red line 
through the policy advice in both cases we find the suggestion to try and modulate innovation 
dynamics through a sectoral platform, which: 
• engages in niche-regime coordination: coordinate regime policies with bottom-up (niche) 
initiatives. Experience from local experiments should be shared for policy making at the 
(supra-)national level and there should be strategic experimentation for system innovation, 
two things that have happened only incidentally in the past. There should be more and 
better coordination between top-level and local policies. National strategies should be 
coordinated with international policies because go-it-alone initiatives can be harmful unless 
there are clear first-mover advantages. 
• deals with existing path-dependencies but in doing so avoids getting locked into suboptimal 
solutions. This calls for anticipation of outcomes and the use of markets for coordination 
and context control instead of planning. A second way of circumventing lock-ins is by ex-
ploring different configurations through support of a portfolio of niches, instead of support-
ing just one alternative. 
thesis_Dijk_v07.pdf
 thesis_Dijk_v07.pdf
  155 
 
Chapter 11 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
thesis_Dijk_v07.pdf
Chapter 11 
 156 
11 Conclusion 
 
This chapter addresses the five research questions that were formulated in section 1.4. 
Questions 1 and 2 relate to the theoretic side of this thesis, while questions 3 and 4 relates to 
the methodology, and question 5 to the policy side 
 
 
11.1 QUESTION 1: HOW TO COMBINE SCOT AND EVOLUTIONARY ECONOMICS?  
 
How can the objectivist approach of evolutionary economics (EE) with its attention to prices and 
markets be combined with the constructivist approach of SCOT (social construction of technol-
ogy) with its attention to frames and actor groups? 
In Chapter 2 we have combined evolutionary economic concepts with SCOT through a micro-
macro framework. At the micro level, the innovation is described through the eyes of stake-
holders, whereas at macro level aggregated indicators such as total sales and prices are 
incorporated. We hold (groups of) actors as the basic element of analysis, stepping into their 
shoes, mapping their mental framing and attitudes. Further, we incorporate feedback loops 
between the levels, and we extended the notion of feedback effects through scale and learning 
with the effect of consumer taste formation, including social connotation. 
Though in the field of sociological and historic studies it is unconventional to combine a micro 
and a macro approach in one framework (Lorenz, 2006), our analysis revealed that there are 
crucial feedbacks between the two. In economics it is more common. A seminal contribution is 
Thomas Schelling’s Micro-motives and Macro-behaviour. Macro level characteristics are the 
aggregate of individual practices and decisions, but also individual practices and decisions are 
shaped by aggregate characteristics. This highlights the relevance of an integrated analysis of the 
micro and the aggregate level as wells as the feedbacks between the two. 
In the economic tradition the micro level usually refers to the firm level. The neo-Schumpeterian 
tradition within evolutionary economics has, much more than mainstream economics, also 
incorporated direct and indirect institutions in the economic analysis, in terms of research and 
imitation heuristics and companies operating within or outside a technological paradigm. 
Nevertheless, the studies are based on the assumption of an objective innovation, neglecting the 
various social meanings a technology or product may have to different social groups. The social 
dynamics during technological change are overlooked, especially at the consumer side. 
Geels (2005) has already combined elements of SCOT and of EE to a certain extent. In his case 
studies he incorporates the views of stakeholders frequently. However, in the conceptual three-
leveled niche, regime and landscape model (MLP) the actor perspectives have remained 
somewhat problematic: they may be at any of the three levels. In the TIS approach there is little 
attention for the role of stakeholder perspectives. Our micro-macro framework provides an 
alternative model for socio-technical change in which the position and perspective of actors is 
more evident (at the micro level), and their role is incorporated in the feedback effects. The MLP 
and TIS approach are however stronger in highlighting structures of relations between actor 
groups (through formal and informal rules) and sub-regimes, whereas SCOT is stronger in 
highlighting the social and political dynamics (lobbying, power plays) during technological 
change. 
We have worked out the micro-macro framework through an explanatory case study in chapter 
6 (HEV) and chapter 8 (P+R), and through a simulation analysis in chapter 9 (HEV). We found that 
the micro-macro distinction is a useful way to integrate objectified and subjectivist knowledge 
elements in a systematic way. The case studies provided rich and explanatory descriptions of 
socio-technical and economic change in our two cases. The extensive attention for stakeholder 
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perspectives, based on elements of SCOT, was instrumental to improve understanding of the 
role of stakeholders. The simulation analysis has incorporated stakeholder perspectives too (of 
firms and consumers), and has highlighted some dynamics that can not easily be traced by non-
computer methods or told in words. 
The applicability of the two-levelled framework is bounded by the high demand for both micro 
and aggregated level data. Further, the understanding of the complex dynamics of feedback 
mechanisms remain a source of some uncertainty, since we had difficulties to identify the 
relative strength of feedback loops in practical cases. This issue is an important direction for 
future research. 
 
 
11.2 QUESTION 2: IS A CO-EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH REASONABLE AND RELEVANT FOR STUDYING 
THE EMERGENCE OF (H)EVS AND P+R? 
 
(H)EVs and P+R are both consumer products or practice, and in both cases a combination of 
‘hardware’ (technology and/or infrastructure) and ‘socio-ware’ (stakeholder perspectives and 
institutional factors) is likely important, as we stated in Chapter 1. Co-evolutionary approaches 
have emerged in EE to include more the dynamics of social institutions, and therefore, we 
expected it to be relevant. Still, as Saviotti (2005) notices, the current understanding of co-
evolving institutions and technologies is poor. In our framework we have elaborated co-
evolution as co-evolution of demand and supply. We have sought to highlight more than 
previous approaches the key processes underlying the coevolving components. We now turn to 
the three sub-questions of research question 2: 
 
. . . regarding the diffusion dynamics it highlights? 
The case study on (H)EVs has highlighted that a variety of technological solutions has appeared 
at the market (where some have been launched as market vehicles, and others as concept cars 
at motor shows). At firm level most firms have selected only a few technologies for further 
development. At the consumer side, we have found a variety of (three) consumer frames of car 
engines. Aggregate sales level trends have illustrated which engines have mostly been selected. 
Other studies have addressed the emergence of (H)EV, but mostly with a narrower focus. Some 
(Pilkington et al., 2002; Hekkert and Van den Hoed, 2004; Oltra and Saint Jean, 2009b) focused 
only on firms, while ignoring consumers. Others (Haan et al., 2006) focused on consumers, 
whilst disregarding car firms. Our two-leveled, co-evolutionary approach integrates consumers 
and firms, and competition between technologies. Therefore, this approach helps to highlight 
dynamics between consumers (and demand structures) and suppliers (and supply structures). In 
chapter 6 we have discussed feedback mechanisms underlying the two coevolving components 
in an historic case study. It proved possible to identify empirically the feedback loops, in an 
approximate manner. In chapter 9 we investigated the interaction between techno-economic 
and social mechanisms through a simulation method, something that has hardly been explored 
systematically before. The co-evolutionary analyses in chapter 6 and 9 have therefore contrib-
uted understanding of demand –supply interaction in the car propulsion sector with respect to 
previous studies. All in all, we find that the co-evolutionary approach is very relevant to study 
the emergence and diffusion of (H)EVs. 
P+R is quite a different case. Here we have addressed the diffusion of use of the facilities at the 
local level in a number of cities. We have highlighted the process of progressive innovation of 
urban car parking as an outcome of interactions of the city councils’ policy, infrastructures and 
the daily practices of travellers (chapter 8). By offering parking at various locations and prices, 
city governments and parking companies create a variation of parking supply. Of the possible 
options to park, some are selected to a higher extent, to the exclusion of others. Heterogeneity 
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of travellers translates into a heterogeneity or variety of parking demand, in which we found 
three types of traveller groups. City governments select foci for their innovation and develop-
ment efforts. They built new garages, develop parking indication systems, improve bus or metro 
lines, or develop P+R. 
Few other studies have addressed the emergence of P+R, and these tend to focus on quantita-
tive data around the factors influencing users of P+R sites (cf. Bos et al., 2004) or on effects of 
P+R schemes on urban car use (cf. Parkhurst, 2000). In our study we have analyzed the evolving 
stakeholder perspectives, and how they interact with aggregate trends (regulation, infrastruc-
tures, prices). We suggest that the two-layered co-evolutionary framework is more than 
previous approaches, instrumental to highlight the key systemic processes, i.e. the interaction of 
the city councils’ policy and the daily practices of travellers, which shape the diffusion of use of 
P+R. 
Our approach has been less successful in highlighting the social and political dynamics in and 
around the city authority. More than being a single decision maker, the local authority is 
composed of departments (economy, transport, environment etc.) as well as the city council, 
who are lobbied by stakeholders and sensitive to their own constituencies and professional 
groups. In our analysis we have left out such dynamics, and just addressed the policies and 
regulation that passed the city council. In future research this part of our framework needs to be 
elaborated. Also, the character of learning and economies-of-scale at local governments should 
be further elaborated. For both these issues, we see the co-evolutionary framework as a good 
starting point. 
 
. . . regarding what it learns about path dependence and path creation (i.e. niche-regime 
dynamics)? 
Other studies (Kemp et al., 1998; Garud and Karnoe, 2001) have already stressed that despite 
the ‘burden’ of history new paths may get created through forward-looking choices. By strategic 
choices of agents, entrepreneurs, consumers or policymakers may stimulate creation of and 
momentum at new innovation paths. In our study our two case studies provide further 
elaboration on this issue. 
In the (H)EV case we have identified a strong ICE regime and indicated various sources of lock-in 
(Chapter 6). Moreover, we have described how an (H)EV trajectory has emerged, first as BEV, 
later as HEV. Especially Toyota and CARB have played a prominent role on this. In chapter 10 we 
illustrated how European emission regulation provided little incentives for firms to focus on 
longer term and more radical innovation for the reduction of greenhouse gases. Learning and 
scale economies for incremental innovation (at the regime) have as a result been much larger 
than for non-ICE technologies (in outer-regime niches). We have discussed policy options that 
may deal with niche and regime as two moving targets, and which can therefore be more 
effective in promoting the niche, if aspired. 
In the P+R case we found initially a strong established regime of urban car use and central 
parking in all of the six cities (chapter 8). We have described how each city invested in the P+R 
niche in its own way. Few cities aspired to stimulate a regime shift to low-traffic centres, and 
hardly treated the niche and regime as competing and moving targets. In most of the six cities 
we found an overall increase in parking supply for the city centre, even if the regime was curbed 
though parking restrictions and pricing. At the same time, all cities refined central parking 
through investments in parking indication systems. In addition, cities invested in P+R sites, but 
mostly as isolated projects. We have discussed policy options which can be more effective in 
promoting the niche, if aspired. 
With this analysis we offer a third way to analyze niche-regime dynamics: 
1. Geels (2005) describes developments at the regime and the niche for a number of cases in 
successive sub-periods, and then points at a number of patterns (fit-stretch, niche accumu-
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lation, etc.). Geels and Schot (Geels and Schot, 2007) identified four transition path-
ways (transformation, de- & re-alignment, technological substitution, and reconfiguration). 
This typology of pathways however neglects the many cases of niche-regime dynamics 
when transition does not occur. 
2. Raven and Verbong (2007) describe developments in two distinct but interacting re-
gimes (also in successive sub-periods), and then point to four types of relations between 
the two: competition, symbiosis, integration and spill-over. 
3. In our analysis we described niche-regime interaction through a discussion of four key 
underlying feedback mechanisms, which constitute co-evolution of demand and supply, 
and deliver niche and regime innovation trajectories, with four possible futures: reproduc-
tion of the regime (and incremental innovation), technological transformation, diversifica-
tion, and socio-technical transition. 
In summary, we suggest that the exposition of underlying processes of learning and scale 
economies and taste formation, shaped by the regulatory context, has shed fresh light on niche-
regime dynamics as moving targets. 
 
. . . regarding the incorporation of both aggregate and agent-based elements so as to give a 
micro-underpinning of macro patterns with feedback loops from macro to micro? 
With respect to established economic co-evolutionary approaches we have extended attention 
for stakeholder perspectives at the micro level, based on concepts of SCOT. In this way 
heterogeneity at the user side and producer side can be incorporated more explicitly. It delivers 
a few important novelties to the study of innovation and diffusion. First, the two-layered, agent-
based approach allows a micro-underpinning of macro patterns which incorporates feedback 
loops from macro to micro (such as done in the emerging field of social simulation, see 
Squazzoni (2008). Various innovation and diffusion studies have hinted at the importance of 
different systemic or feedback effects, such as increasing returns to scale, learning economies, 
imitation of use etc. In such complex issues as innovation diffusion in changing social contexts 
there is often not just one or two salient factors, but there are a number of mechanisms that are 
salient for the innovation dynamics. In chapter 6 we have suggested four key mechanisms (and 
three key stakeholders) being significant during the emergence of (H)EV. In chapter 9 we have 
incorporated these mechanisms in a simulation analysis. For instance we considered the 
interaction between (macro level) social connotation, in which micro level consumers may 
become inclined, and how this affects firm R&D levels and technological progression. This 
simulation analysis is not all-encompassing in the sense that the model is a ‘truth machine’, 
perfectly replicating the social systems and predicting the future. It should be seen as a 
simplified but integrated model which can nevertheless provide useful insight in the principle 
dynamics of complex issues or sectors. One of the tough issues is to assess the relative speed of 
the various feedback loops. These should probably be assessed outside the modelling analysis 
(for instance through stakeholder participation), and reconsidered for each case. This is an 
important issue for future research. 
All we all we suggest that the incorporation of both aggregate and agent-based elements has 
illuminated the role of social institutions and demand structures (three consumer groups) more 
than established economic co-evolutionary approaches, such as Windrum and Birchenhall 
(2005). On the other hand, the latter approach is richer in terms of price-quality strategies and 
recombination of innovation. 
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11.3 QUESTION 3: CAN WE MEASURE USER FRAMES AND SOCIAL CONNOTATIONS OF INNOVATIONS 
AND INCORPORATE THE RESULTS IN COMPUTER SIMULATIONS AND IN HISTORIC-ANALYTICAL ANALYSES OF 
SOCIO-TECHNICAL CHANGE? 
 
Mapping or measuring user frames and social connotation is not easy, since they are not directly 
observable. Though frame analysis has a long history in political sciences (Rein and Schon, 1977; 
Schon and Rein, 1994), communication sciences (Iyengar, 1991; Reese et al., 2001), and more 
recently sociology of technology (Bijker 1995), currently no fully fledged, standard methodology 
exists to analyse frames (König, 2008). In this thesis we have mapped user frames through 
discourse analysis (chapter 4). We have developed a way to track the attributes that storytellers 
use, and how they evaluate the various attributes. We used this method to analyze market 
stories of one regime technology (diesel, incremental innovation) and two niche markets 
(electric and hybrid-electric engines), and we found clear differences in the way these innova-
tion are framed. 
As one of the frame attributes we tracked the adjectives and adverbs that were used when 
speaking about the engine whilst not referring to functional aspects, and this is what we labeled 
as ‘social connotation’. In this way we could compare the attention for functional attributes and 
social connotation, and compare framing of different innovations and their evolution over time. 
The analysis served as an input of the consumer perspective for the explanatory historic analytic 
case study (chapter 6) with a two-levelled framework. We first addressed the two layers 
separately (section 6.2 and 6.3). Then we addressed feedbacks processes within and between 
the layers (section 6.4). In these descriptions trends of objectified at the upper level, were 
combined with interpretations of stakeholders (of these trends), their subsequent response, and 
in return the impact on the aggregate trends. In chapter 9 we formalized this analysis in a 
simulation model. Accordingly this model also combined subjective notions of stakeholders with 
objective aggregate trends. 
For P+R we started with analyzing the innovation though the eyes of local policymakers (chapter 
7). We have benefitted from a recent PhD-study on the attitude of the travelers towards P+R 
(Bos, 2004), and therefore did not include a separate chapter on the view of traveler. In chapter 
8 we added objective knowledge elements. For each of the three Dutch cities we first addressed 
the two layers separately (section 8.2 to 8.7). Then we addressed feedbacks processes between 
the layers (section 8.8). 
The frame analysis (chapter 4) also served as an input for the computer simulation. In the 
simulation model we wanted to incorporate the effect of conflicting frames between consumer 
groups. Our discourse analysis method is less suited for identifying different consumer groups. 
For this we made a detour, analyzing actual car engines sales data, in combination with 
interviews of car salesmen. Through integration of the results of the various methods, conflicting 
frames of consumer groups were sketched, and these served as an input for the simulation 
model. 
In this thesis we thus combined a number of methods. As we discussed in chapter 3, authors 
have argued that combining methods has advantages (Rotmans 2001; Yin 1994). In our cases we 
can recognize these advantages. For example, objectivistic analyses of electric vehicles easily 
overlook the role of consumers. They often conclude that most drivers drive less than 100km a 
day, so will be happy with an EV with a range of 120km. A closer look at the consumer view-
point, as in the subjectivist approach of chapter 4, suggests that consumers do not make such a 
narrow trade-off. They have got used to the convenience of a 500 or 800km. Moreover, many 
consumers choose their vehicle or engine for the most critical trip of the year: their summer 
holidays. If that requires a strong engine and long range, they are happy to drive with an 
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oversized and over-ranged vehicle for the rest of the year. In other words, we need subjectivist 
approaches to incorporate such effects in the broader analysis. 
As we also discussed in chapter 3, combining methods has difficulties. There is an issue of 
whether the methods do not have the same bias, i.e. whether the methods are really orthogo-
nal, very different. In our study we have applied various methods, sometimes for the different 
objects of study (chapter 4 on consumers, chapter 5 on firms), but also on the same phenome-
non (both chapter 6 and chapter 9 on the emergence of (hybrid-) electric cars). In the latter case 
we have applied an explanatory case study and a simulation method respectively. These are very 
distinct methods, the first being richer in its descriptions, the latter being more abstract and 
suitable for dynamic analysis. Though it is difficult to prove that these approaches have do not 
share biases, the distinct character of both methods provided a complementary strength. 
Moreover, we applied the model to develop scenarios. Scenario analysis is distinctive for its 
quality to deal with uncertainties in the phenomenon of study. Our scenario analysis, although 
brief, was useful for exploring uncertainties in the role of social connotation of engines in the 
emergence of new engines. The analysis was however only model-based. For future research we 
recommend a participatory scenario analysis, which can provide additional richness from 
stakeholder perspectives and their interactions. Such an analysis can provide scenarios of car 
mobility in a collaborative and participating setting with relevant stakeholders and scientist from 
relevant fields. The practicalities for such a project are however challenging. 
 
 
11.4 QUESTION 4: DOES THE INCORPORATION OF COMPETING TECHNOLOGIES IN A DIFFUSION 
MODEL LEAD TO DIFFERENT RESULTS? 
 
The simulation model developed in chapter 9 pays attention to dynamic competition between 
two or more products or technologies. Most diffusion models do not pay attention to competi-
tion. They study diffusion independent from all other innovation(s) (Mahajan et al. 1990). 
Incorporating competing technologies has the principal advantage that for most new technolo-
gies the competition with established technologies, i.e. niche-regime dynamics, is key. For our 
two cases, (H)EVs and P+R, this was certainly the case. 
In contrast to diffusion models, some evolutionary innovation models have addressed competi-
tion between technologies (i.e. Arthur, 1989; Pistorius and Utterback, 1997), though typically in 
an abstract way. Recently, Windrum and Birchenhall (2005) have model development competi-
tion of product designs through the interaction of heterogeneous consumer preferences and 
heterogeneous firm knowledge bases. Their framework is rich in terms of price-quality strategies 
and recombination of innovation. 
We have developed an agent-based model tailored to the case of car engine technologies. In our 
model we have incorporated R&D and progression of the technologies (because of R&D and 
dynamic learning and scale economies). Suppliers' R&D decisions and product offerings during 
diffusion are modelled. Further, the model is a hybrid model by combining endogenous 
mechanisms with exogenous mechanisms. The endogenous mechanisms are: epidemic learning 
and consumer taste formation (at the consumer side), learning economies and scale economies 
(at the supply side). This methodology can be applied in principle to any diffusion process both 
retrospectively and prospectively. It cannot be used for prediction (because diffusion is not a 
deterministic process and because we lack data on certain variables) but can be used for 
exploration on the basis of proxy data. 
We found that the agent-based methodology was especially instrumental to incorporate 
competing technologies, since they can easily acknowledge the character of knowledge as being 
cumulative, entail spill-over to other firms, and being a combination of R&D investments 
(dollars) and tacit learning. 
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Limits to our methodology are the requirement for a significant amount of micro level data (time 
series of agents’ attitudes and frames for evaluation), which is for many cases rather difficult to 
obtain. Also, it is hard to determine the relative speed of the various feedback loops in each 
case. These should probably be assessed outside the modelling analysis, where probably expert 
opinion can be of great value. 
 
 
11.5 QUESTION 5: WHAT IS THE VALUE OF A CO-EVOLUTIONARY CONCEPTUALIZATION OF 
INNOVATION DYNAMICS FOR POLICY? 
Does it lead to different policy implications than the technology-blind economic welfare 
perspective and those of the innovation system perspective? 
 
In chapter 10 we have analyzed the role of policy in our two cases from a co-evolutionary 
perspective. We found that policy instruments were mostly applied in a technology-blind 
manner which fits with the neoclassical welfare perspective, and found four types of instru-
ments in the case of (H)EVs and three in the case of P+R. Though they were applied simultane-
ously, they were not designed and introduced in coherence at a certain moment, but were 
typically introduced at different points in time to address a (relatively) separate issue or 
problem. 
With help of the co-evolutionary analyses of the two cases (chapter 6 and 8), highlighting the 
niche- regime dynamics, we found that the classic policy instruments that were applied in 
Europe, have mostly supported adoption of existing technologies and incremental innovation of 
the established regime, and not supported shifts to alternative outer-regime niches (EV and 
P+R). 
Whereas the economic welfare perspective is useful to assess which instruments spur innova-
tion to a higher or slower extent, the co-evolutionary approach is instrumental to highlight also 
where the innovation is located and supported: at the regime or at outer-regime niches. By 
providing insight in underlying processes of niche-regime dynamics, the approach provides clues 
on how to promote regime shifts (as we have done in chapter 10). 
The more institutional, system-based perspective of Innovation Systems (IS) on the other hand is 
richer than the welfare perspective through incorporation of social and institutional factors 
during an innovation process. However, most national, regional and sectoral IS studies take little 
account of innovation dynamics and feedbacks. TIS studies are an exception to this, and 
incorporate more and more evolutionary elements, and can thus be instrumental for evolution-
ary steering approaches too, as the co-evolutionary approach can. However, in TIS studies there 
is more focus on the niche, and less on the niche-regime dynamics, which makes the TIS 
approach less suitable to inform niche-regime (or multi-level) coordination, compared to the co-
evolutionary perspective. 
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Appendix A: Method of analysis of stories  
 
For each of the accounts, we analyze the ‘story’ around an innovation in the following way. We assess the 
three aspects of stories as defined by Rosa and Spanjol (2005): complexity, ordinality, and subjective-
evaluative centrality. In addition, we make the appraisal of the various attributes explicit (if evaluated at all). 
To make appraisal operational, qualitative descriptions seem most appropriate. Quantification may be 
possible however, on a ‘quick and dirty’ way. In the case the statement around the attribute contains a 
subjective evaluation we apply five scales: the (attribute of the) innovation is seen as a large improvement, 
improvement, comparable, decline or large decline with respect the existing product. The scales are graded 
with +2, +1, 0, -1 and -2. All subjectively evaluated attributes in all accounts (in a year) are examined. The 
number of times an attribute is mentioned (with that grade) can be taken as a weight factor. For example, if 
we assume that attributes of an innovation are evaluated 12 times: seven are seen as decline, three as large 
decline, and two as an improvement. Appraisal can then be quantified to: 
 
 
 
7 * (-1)  +  3 * (-2)  +  2 * (1)  =  -11 
 
 
The method is ‘dirty’ since it doesn’t account well for priority of attributes in the user frame. It can well be 
that a large decline of the range a car is an insurmountable factor for many users. In reality it can then not 
be compensated with high improvement of the environmental impact (or other attributes), while in the 
‘quick and dirty’ method it can. While this method is therefore certainly not very accurate, it does indicate 
roughly what the appraisal of the innovation is. 
During the analysis, it turned out that a number of types of accounts can be distinguished. Some are based 
on user experience; others are informative observations of the car engine sector, sometimes with future 
expectations. Some accounts are part of policy discussions of announcements; others are related to product 
launches or research announcements of producers. The percentage of accounts that are based on user (i.e. 
as a driver) and producer experiences is also an important indicator, since it indicates to what extent 
judgments are based on stories of others, or on actual experiences with the innovation. Therefore it will be 
taken into account as a fifth aspect of market stories. 
 
 
decline
Mentioned seven times
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Appendix B: Definition of attributes 
 
All attributes that are brought up in stories may be grouped in three groups: 
• ‘True engine attributes’: attributes that strictly relate to the electromotor or IC engine, or the 
combination. These are in bold. 
• Vehicle propulsion attributes: attributes relate (directly) to the use of an engine in a vehicle. 
These are in italics. 
• Socio-interface attributes: attributes broadly relate to the use of an engine in a vehicle, for user, 
producer or society. These are in the regular font style. 
 
Attribute Definition Ordinal? Conventional? 
Engine volume Labels remarks on the size of the combustion chamber; 
usually indicated with number of liters, e.g. 2.0 liter 
Yes Yes 
Engine structure This is the label for all remarks on valves, turbo's, common 
rail, injection systems, combinations of electromotors & ICE's, 
etc. Also remarks on batteries are put under this label 
Not 
Ordinal 
Yes 
Engine capacity Label for when amount of pk (horsepowers) or KW is 
mentioned 
Yes Yes 
Acceleration Labels indication of how fast the vehicle speeds up, either 
qualitatively or quantitatively (e.g. 0 to 100 time) 
Yes Yes 
Noise level Relates to the level of noise/sound the engine produces Yes Yes 
Price (of engine) This labels remarks on the (purchase) price of the engine, not 
the vehicle. This may be both quantitatively or qualitative 
Yes Yes 
Fuel (or energy) 
efficiency  
Fuel efficiency or output (‘rendement’ in Dutch) of a type of 
engine (e.g. 'diesel is more fuel efficient than gasoline') 
Yes Yes 
Fuel (or energy) use Fuel use of a specific vehicle Yes Yes 
Environmental 
impact 
Labels general remarks on environmental friendliness, e.g. 
'this engine is better for the environment' 
Yes Yes 
Social connotation This is the label for adjectives or adverbs before (or behind or 
around) 'engine'; e.g. sportive, modern, revolutionairy, 
powerful, super, boring - engine 
Not 
Ordinal 
Yes 
Engine weight When the speaker refers to the weight of the engine (not 
vehicle) quantitatively (usually kg) or qualitatively 
Yes Yes 
Maximum speed Maximum or top speed of the vehicle Yes Yes 
Performance The label is used when the storyteller uses phrases like 'this 
vehicle performs…' 
Yes Yes 
Torque When speaker explicitly refers to number of Nm Yes Yes 
Range When the maximum number of kilometers (that can be 
driven without refuelling) is indicated 
Yes Yes 
Production cost Indicates (usually general) remarks on the cost to produce an 
engine (not to be confused with 'price') 
Yes Yes 
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Attribute Definition Ordinal? Conventional? 
Drivability Labels remarks on the easiness and comfortability of DRIVING 
the vehicle - ONLY as far as the speaker relates this to the 
engine (and e.g. not to the transmissions). Not to be confused 
with performance. 
Yes Yes 
Tax on engine Lables remarks on the tax that needs to be paid, or is 
discounted from the price, thus a benefit. May be quantita-
tive. 
Yes No 
Emission level When the speaker refers to emission of gases in general, or 
to emission level in regulation (Euro 3, 4 etc.)('this engine 
meets euro 5') 
Yes Yes 
SO2 emission When SO2 emission is explicitly mentioned Yes No 
NO emissions When NO emission is explicitly mentioned Yes No 
CO2 emissions When CO2 emission is explicitly mentioned Yes No 
NOx emissions When NOx emission is explicitly mentioned Yes No 
Particle emission When emission of soot or particles is explicitly mentioned Yes No 
HC emissions When HC emission is explicitly mentioned Yes No 
Maintenance level 
(necessary) 
Labels remarks on the amount of maintenance that is 
required when using the engine 
Yes, low 
precision 
No 
Refuel time Labels remarks on the time it takes to refuel the vehicle Yes No 
Way of refuelling Labels remarks on how the vehicle needs to be refuelled Not 
Ordinal 
No 
Engine dimensions 
(size) 
Labels remarks on the physical dimensions of the engine as a 
whole; not to be confused with engine volume (see above) 
Yes No 
Profitability Labels remarks on how profitable it is to develop and produce 
and sell an engine 
Yes Yes 
Operation cost Refers to cost of use of the engine (usually combining fuel 
cost with maintenance, and or new batteries) 
Yes Yes 
Number of passengers Labels remarks on the number of passengers - ONLY in the 
case this is related (by the speaker) to engine volume or size 
(e.g. if the amount of batteries on board resulted in less 
passenger seats) 
Yes No 
Re-use of braking 
energy 
Labels remarks on whether the propulsion systems re-uses 
braking energy, to re-load batteries 
Yes, 
binary 
No 
Way of heating Labels remarks on the way of heating in the cabin - ONLY if 
this is related (by the speaker) to the engine. E.g. 'Since the 
engine produces to less heat, an extra electric heater is 
necessary in the cabin' 
Not 
Ordinal 
No 
Choice of propulsion Labels remarks on how the engine 'chooses' to drive on 
electromotor or ICE; the driver may have control on this as 
well 
Not 
Ordinal 
No 
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Attribute Definition Ordinal? Conventional? 
Automatic start/stop Labels remarks on whether the propulsion systems 
automaticly stops when vehicle speed is zero 
Yes, 
binary 
No 
Aerodynamic styling Labels remarks on aerodynamic styling of the vehicle - ONLY 
if this is related to the engine. E.g. to save engine power and 
fuel, the vehicle is shaped faily sharp, which will not be 
appreciated by many. 
Not 
Ordinal 
No 
Engine visualization Labels remarks on visualization of the engine process in the 
cabin 
Yes No 
Zero emission range Refers to the range (usually in km) that the vehicle runs on 
electricty, thus (locally) emission free 
Yes No 
Product availability 
/variety 
Labels remarks on the number of models that are available of 
the specific innovation, or also remarks on delivery time  
Yes No 
Fuel price Marks comments on fuel price, when related to evaluation of 
an engine 
Yes No 
Vibration level Labels remarks on vibaration level in (parts of) the vehicle, as 
a rult of the engine 
Yes No 
Tax certainty Marks comments on the possibility that tax levels may soon 
or later change 
Yes No 
Parking cost Labels remarks on the parking cost (in a city), ONLY when this 
differs from the normal level because of the engine type (e.g. 
hybrid engines may have free parking in some cities) 
Yes No 
Life time batteries Remarks on when batteries need replacement Yes No 
Danger of 
electricfication 
Marks comments on the danger for emergency services when 
assisting vehicles with a certain engine type 
Yes No 
Max trailer weight Labels remarks on the maximum trailer weight that a vehicle 
with a certain engine can bear 
Yes No 
Turning circle Refers to the turning circle of a vehicle ONLY if the is related 
(by the speaker) to the type of engine (for example when the 
size of the engine caused a large decrease of the turning 
circle of a vehicle) 
Yes No 
Refuel locations The number of places where the engine can be refuelled Yes No 
Dirty whether speed The maximum speed in case of heavy rain fall Yes No 
Durability Refers to general remarks on how long a product lasts Yes Yes 
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Appendix C: Example of all HEV stories in 1996 
 
There were 7 newspaper accounts on hybrid-electric vehicle in 1996, and we found the following attributes:  
 
 
Attribute Precision Appraisal* Total 
freq. 
Price High Improvement (1) vs. n.e. (1) 2 
Environmental impact Low large improvement (1); improvement (5) 6 
Engine structure Not Ordinal improvement (1) vs. n.e.(6) 7 
Maximum speed High n.e. (2) comparable (1) 3 
Fuel efficiency /use High large improvement (1) improvement (1) n.e. (1) 3 
Engine weight High n.e.(2) decline (1) 3 
Number of passengers High n.e.(2) 2 
Character Not Ordinal improvement (1) 1 
Tax Low improvement (1) 1 
Way of refueling Not Ordinal Comparable (1) 1 
Choice of propulsion Not ordinal improvement (1) Comparable (1) 2 
Operation cost Low large improvement (1) 1 
Engine volume H(2) n.e. (2) 2 
Engine capacity H(2) n.e. (2) 2 
Durability L(1) improvement (1) 1 
Acceleration H(1) n.e. (1) 1 
(Range) H(2) n.e. (1) comparable (1) 2 
Torque H(1) decline (1) 1 
Noise L(1) n.e. (1) 1 
* When appraisals are conflicting between accounts, the term ‘vs.’ is used. When attributes are not 
evaluated, this is indicated with n.e. 
 
Further analysis reveals: 
1 Complexity: 19 attributes 
2 Average number of attributes used per account: 42/7= 6 
3 Ordinality: 4 attributes not ordinal (15/19=79%) 
4 Overall appraisal: applying the formula of Appendix A the overall appraisal of the hybrid-electric vehicle 
in 1996 was: 3x(+2) + 12x(+1) + 2x(-1) + 0x(-2) = +16. 
5 Subjective-evaluation:  in 50% of the cases that an attribute was mentioned, it was subjectively 
evaluated. 
6 Frequency: it shows that engine structure is the most frequent mentioned attribute: in seven of seven 
accounts. Environmental impact is second, with six out of seven. 
7 User or producer experience: the analysis showed that none of the seven accounts was based on actual 
user or producer experience.  
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Appendix D: Analysis of engine choice 
 
Customers of new vehicles can choose their preferred type (and size) of engine out of a range of alterna-
tives. For example, as Figure 1 below shows, Ford Focus consumers could choose between four gasoline 
engines and three diesel engines in 2007. 3.3% of them choose for the smallest gasoline, 1400cc, and 81.8% 
choose for the smallest diesel, 1600cc. Car salesmen have explained that these consumers typically buy the 
cheapest engine in the range. We did this same analysis for the 30 most sold vehicles in the Netherlands. For 
all these models we found that on average 34.8% choose for the cheapest and lightest engine in 2007. The 
average number significantly differs between brands, models and fuel. Typically, the larger models of the 
premium brands with gasoline engines have the lowest percentage of this group (e.g. Audi A6, Mercedes S-
class), whereas consumers of smaller vehicles or diesel engines have a higher preference for the cheapest 
version.  
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Figure D.1: Sales figures for three Ford models (source: Ford Nederland / RDC). 
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Trend of A-segment 
In the last few years consumer choices for various car sizes were fairly stable, though there is some tendency 
towards smaller models (see Table D.1 and Figure D.2 below for trends in the Netherlands). Smallest cars 
segment A and B increased a few percentages, while C & D decreased 10 percentage points in eight years. 
However, segment J/K, medium and large MPVs, increased from 5 to 18 percents. These consumers likely 
came from segments C and D. 
 
Table D.1: Trends in market segments (Examples: A = Fiat Panda, B = Peugeot 206, C = Volkswagen Golf, D = 
Audi A4, E = Volvo V70, J/K = Renault Scenic, Chrysler Voyager) 
 Trends in sales per market segment NL 
Segments 1998  2000  2002  2004  2006 
A 9  11  10  10  13 
B 19  20  22  21  22 
C 30  26  23  22  18 
D 27  21  20  17  16 
E  6  5   5   4   3 
J/K  5  11  13  19  18 
Others  4   6   7   7  10 
 
Despite the soft trend to smaller vehicles, average vehicle mass increased with around 10 percent in this 
period, compensating part of the weight decrease. 
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Figure D.2: Trend in size of segment A 
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Appendix E: Stakeholder consultation 
 
This appendix provides the details on the consultation of the stakeholders for both the P+R case and the car 
engine case. It describes which stakeholders where involved in the interviews and questionnaires, what their 
role in the organization is, and how they were contacted. 
 
E1: Questionnaire survey respondents (all spring-summer 2005) 
 
For the Park-and-Ride case (Chapter 7) we contacted city authorities with the request of completing a 
questionnaire on Park-and-Ride. In most cases we were put through to the traffic and transport department. 
Sometimes were we advised to contact a specific person that they chose (by email or telephone), and 
sometimes it was distributed further internally outside our influence. Almost all respondents have indicated 
their position on the questionnaire form (though not all). In southern Europe and France some people 
complained about the difficulty of the English language of the questionnaires, and this affected response 
rates negatively in these areas. In total 45 questionnaires were completed and returned (see Table E1), 
whereas about 80 were sent out. The questionnaire is printed below in appendix F. 
 
Table E1: Respondents for the questionnaire surveys in chapter 5 and 7 
Case Organization Respondent Position 
Renault Fabien Boudjemaa Team Leader 
Peugeot Mr. Bruné Engineer (alternative energies) 
Saab Tommy Lindholm Project leader (Engineering) 
Audi René van Doorn 
 
chief engineer 
 
Honda Thomas Brachmann - 
Nissan Yukimasa Ban Engineer 
Car engine 
(Chap. 5) 
Daimler/Chrysler anonymous - 
Madrid Mayte Sánchez Cabinet Adviser 
Luxemburg Hoffmann Paul head of staff service de la circulation 
Sheffield David Budd Transport Planner 
Bern Juerg Staehli Projektleiter, Verkerhrsplanung Bern 
Berlin Joachim Krey 
head of the group implementation of transport 
policy 
Edinburg Chris Day 
Professional Officer at City Development, 
Transport, Parking Operations 
Sofia Mariana Krasteva head expert 
Florence Anonymous sent to: Deputy Mayor of Urban Traffic Plan 
Belgrade Zoran Tasic Assistant in the traffic department 
Torino BIAGIO BURDIZZO TOP MANAGER - TURIN CITY COUNCIL 
Rotterdam Judith Boelhouwers Urban planner/ traffic & transport dep. 
P+R (Chap. 
7) 
Bratislava Vladimir Mikus head of dept. for transport planning and traffic control 
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Case Organization Respondent Position 
Warshau Stanisław Jedliński main specialist 
Bergen Rune Herdlevær Senior Executive Officer 
Muncih Elisabeth Zorn officer for transport planning 
Luzern Simone Fedderke project manager in transportation planning 
Prague Jaroslav Mach Prague City Hall 
Helsinki Tuomas Rajajärvi Director, City Planning Department 
Oxford Graham Smith Business Manager for Transport & Parking 
Tallinn ENO SAAR head of transport department 
Birmingham CHRIS HAYNES POLICY MANAGER, TRANSPORTATION 
Dortmund Burckhard Kahrmann Leader of workgroup "public transport" 
Gothenburg Hans Magnusson Parking manager 
Stuttgart Ulrich Steimer Mayor's Office, Department of Engineering 
Zurich christoph suter transportation engineer; traffic planning division 
Vienna Roman Riedel  
Leeds Louise Holliday Transport Planner (Policy) 
Gent Peter de Gra. Chef Mobiliteit en Transport 
Genève Jean-Yves Go. Managing director 
Bochum Anonymous Head department of Traffic 
Hamburg Mr. Franke Directorate … 
Copenhagen Brian Hansen Transport planner 
Riga Anonymous Traffic and Transport Affairs Committee 
The Hague Jeroen Golstein  Beleidsmedewerker 
Eindhoven Jacques Splin. Head department of Traffic 
Oslo Knut Galta engineer 
Lodz Mr. Marek Ci. Operation manager 
Belfast Tom McCourt Deputy div. 
Glasgow Patti MacLeo. Transport … 
Nottingham Mark Garlick Senior Public… 
Plymouth Alex Huke Public Transp. 
Southampton Pete Brunski Principal transport planning (policy) 
Wolverhampton Lydia Barnst. Head Transport strategy 
 
London Simon Williams Senior Business manager 
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We can be confident that respondents were sufficiently knowledgeable about the city’s policies and 
initiatives on P+R for two reasons. First, the city organizations helped in finding an appropriate person to 
complete the questionnaire after our request for information ‘concerning barriers and drivers to the 
adoption of Park & Ride facilities in your city’ in the cover letter of the questionnaire. Second, from the 
respondents who indicated their position we find that a majority works at senior level in the traffic and 
transport department (team leader, head of a group), whereas a minority is junior policy employee. 
We assume both these types of respondents to have voiced the vision of their organization. In various 
statements in the questionnaire we use the phrase ‘in our city’, and there is no reason to presume that these 
transport professionals would not be able to indicate the field of influence around P+R in their city, 
especially since many are at senior level.  Nevertheless, the respondent’s assessment of various pressures on 
the city government will be slightly colored by the personal opinion on P+R or position in the organization. In 
our analysis we neglect these personal biases, and assume that the respondent perfectly voiced the view of 
the city government and the considerations behind current policies. We realize that this is a fairly strong 
assumption. 
 
As mentioned in chapter 3 we have used an existing questionnaire format that has proved to be valid in an 
earlier innovation study (Montalvo 2002, 2003). Consequently, we also inherited a jargon that was not 
always very familiar in our respondent community of transport planners, such as ‘market place’ and 
‘organizational capabilities’, see question 4 and 8 in the questionnaire. Also, the distinction between 
‘community pressure’ and ‘signals from the market place’ (question 4 and 5) may have been slightly 
confusing. In our analysis we have interpreted the ‘signals (demand) from the market place’ as the ‘demand 
of car motorist for P+R’, and ‘community pressure’ as ‘signals from local NGO’s or citizens groups’. Our 
assumption that respondent have unvaryingly understood our questions may be a strong assumption for a 
few questions, such as the above mentioned cases.  In a future version of this questionnaire (as we are doing 
in a new survey in spring 2010), we have for instance amended ‘the market place’ into ‘car motorists’.
  
 
For the car engine case (chapter 5) respondents were contacted at the Electric and Hydrogen Vehicle 
Symposium (EVS 21) in Monaco in the spring of 2005. At this type of symposiums company engineers 
present the latest developments of their firm with regard to electric and hydrogen technology. Some people 
we contacted completed the questionnaires at the spot, some asked to transfer it to a colleague and return 
it later. A number of requests were later rejected by email, referring to the confidential nature of the 
information. Seven questionnaires were returned completed (see Table E1). Not all respondents have 
indicated their position in the organization, but the majority is, as observed in Table E1, at senior engineer-
ing level. Therefore, we can be confident that respondents were sufficiently knowledgeable about the firm’s 
strategy on hydrogen. (The questionnaire is printed below in Appendix. F.) 
We assume these people to have voiced the vision of their organization. Regarding the seniority of most 
respondents and the way we have asked the question (‘for your organization’) this is plausible. Nevertheless, 
the response may be slightly biased for two reasons. Apart from the personal bias (as in the case of P+R), 
there may be strategic PR considerations involved. At this point it is very difficult to assess to what extent 
this has played a role for the respondents. The way we validated the questionnaire survey was by 
interpreting the data in the light of (a few) stakeholder interviews that had been performed beforehand (see 
section 5.3 and section E2 of this Appendix). Therefore we can be fairly confident about the responses to the 
survey questions. 
 
 
E2: Stakeholder interviews 
 
For the Park-and-Ride case (chapter 7 and 8) we contacted city authorities with the request of doing an 
interview on Park-and-Ride in their city. In most cases we were put through to the traffic and transport 
department, and the secretary of the department typically asked her head to whom the questionnaire would 
be sent. In most cases the choice fell on a senior employee. It was fairly easy to plan a meeting with a senior 
policy officer in the traffic and transport department who was willing to elaborate on the city transport 
policy. We applied a semi-structured interview format; see section E3 in this appendix. 
For the car engine case (chapter 5) we applied a similar strategy and contacted a few car firms in Germany 
and France with the request of doing an interview on hybrid and hydrogen car technology. We were typically 
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put through to senior engineers, and it was often hard to actually get a reply of the particular person and, 
when prepared to an interview, to make an appointment in their busy calendars. Some people who were 
contacted did not want to participate in an interview (e.g. Volkswagen), typically because of strategic 
sensitivity of the information. Nevertheless, the three interviewees were fairly open about the conflict of 
interest between their business and environmental concerns. Also, their level of seniority suggests that we 
can be confident that respondents were sufficiently knowledgeable about the firm’s strategy on hydrogen. 
We applied a semi-structured interview format; see section E4 in this appendix. This interview format gave 
the opportunity to continue to ask for elaboration and examples, and confront the interviewee with other 
information (e.g. data on market trends or patent information). Therefore, we find this interview method to 
be slightly less vulnerable for personal bias of the interviewee and strategic or PR considerations of the 
organization in comparison to the questionnaire survey, and the responses were very useful for interpreting 
the survey outcomes in chapter 5. 
For chapter 4 we interviewed car salesmen at car dealer of three different brands (Peugeot, Audi, and Opel). 
In these interviews we provided them with the data of national sales figures of different engine types (2003-
2007, see Appendix D), and we asked them whether they could explain why consumers choose for the 
various types of engines. 
 
Table E2: Respondents for our interview surveys in chapter 4, 5, 7 and 8 
Case Organization Interviewee Position Date 
Peugeot-Citroen  
(Parijs) 
Dénis Depuis 
 
senior research 
engineer 
Summer 2004 
Audi  
(Ingolstadt) 
Ingrid Paulus 
 
head of transport & 
environment 
Summer 2004 
DAF Trucks 
(Eindhoven) 
Peter van der Heijden
 
manager performance Summer 2004 
Peugeot-dealer  
(Maastricht) 
Mr. Van der Cluijs Salesman Spring 2005 , 
Spring 2009 
Opel-dealer 
(Maastricht) 
Frank Geurts Salesman Spring 2005 , 
Spring 2009 
Audi-dealer 
(Maastricht) 
Jean Lucassen Salesman Spring 2005, 
Spring 2009 
Car 
engine 
(Chap. 5 
and 4) 
Ford Nederland bv. 
(Amsterdam) 
Roland Roordink Sales & Marketing 
department 
Spring 2009 
Rick Batelaan Senior policy advisor Spring 2008 Amsterdam City 
Government 
Frans Heijnis Policy Advisor Traffic Spring 2007 
Judith Boelhouwers  Policy advisor P+R Rotterdam City Govern-
ment 
Eric Arnold Policy advisor P+R 
Spring 2007 
Spring 2008 
Niek Tijhuis 
 
Head of Traffic 
department (including 
P+R) 
Spring 2007 
 
Utrecht City Government 
Harry Servaas Policy advisor Spring 2008 
P+R 
(Chap. 7 
and 8) 
Maastricht City govern-
ment 
John Aarts 
 
city alderman for 
transport 
Summer 2004 
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E3 Format for interview at city government (P+R) 
 
Focus: P+R & parking policy in the periods that P+R was introduced (mainly between 1995 & 2005) 
Tone: we try to understand how things have been going, not to value whether the right choices have been 
made. 
 
A. What has been your city government’s policy regarding P+R, after the middle of the 1990s? 
  
• If necessary continue to ask about the relation with general parking policy, congestion, public 
transportation policy, air quality concerns. 
 If necessary continue to ask about: (1) policy aim / strategy, and (2) policy initiatives 
 
B. Were there within the city government (and or within the city council) conflicting insights / opinions 
towards P+R and parking policy in general? If yes, which? 
 
C. How did the city government acquire information or (expert) knowledge around the introduction and 
development of P+R? (If necessary, continue to ask about contacts with other cities, platforms etc.) 
 
D. What were outcomes of the actual policies (around P+R) in your city? 
 
E. Has there been a change in traveller patterns (especially travels towards and from the city centre) in the 
period that P+R was introduced? Do the changes relate to the introduction of P+R? 
 
 
E4 Format for interview at car (or truck) manufacturer 
 
A (Attitude) 
• What do you see as the advantages/gains/benefits of your (company’s) engagement in the adop-
tion (or development) of < hydrogen vehicles>? 
 
• What do you see as the disadvantages/drawbacks of your (company’s) engagement in the adop-
tion (or development) of < hydrogen vehicles >  
 
o If necessary: Is there anything else, either positive or negative, that you associate with 
in the adoption (or development) of < hydrogen vehicles > for your company? 
 
• What could be the effect on the environment derived from the adoption? 
 
B (Social pressures) 
• Are there any people, organisations or institutions who you think want/push you / your company 
to engage in the adoption (or development) of << hydrogen vehicles >>? 
 
• Are there any people or institutions that you think oppose that your company adopt (or develop) 
<< hydrogen vehicles >? 
 
o Does anybody else come to mind when you think about your company adopting (or 
developing) << hydrogen vehicles >>? 
 
• Do you have any examples of policy instrument or measures put in place to encourage adoption 
or development of <<hydrogen vehicles >>? 
 
o If necessary: Do you have any examples of barriers/difficulties made by peo-
ple/institutions to the development/uptake of << hydrogen vehicles >>? 
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C (Control of innovation) 
What kind of skills or abilities do you think you /your company needs to adopt (or develop) << 
hydrogen vehicles >>? 
 
If necessary ask further about: 
What experience,  information , additional resources in terms of time/money,  do you 
think your company needs to engage < hydrogen vehicles>? 
 
Are there any particular circumstances/opportunities you think your company relies on for devel-
oping hydrogen vehicles? 
 
Are there any constraints you think are stopping your company from developing hydrogen vehi-
cles? 
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Appendix F: Questionnaires 
 
 
F1 Questionnaire ‘Park and Ride facilities in the City’49 
 
 
Section I: General information 
 
      
City’s name:               
European Member State within which you are based:         
Respondent name:                               
Position:                             
Date:               
 
 
 The size of your city population is:     <500k         500k-1M          >1M            >2M                 
 
 
 
Section 2: P+R information 
 
1. To what extent is your city presently engaged in develop-
ing P+R facilities?                                   
2. To what extent does your city have existing plans to 
develop P+R facilities?                                   
3. Regarding the environmental effects generated by the 
usage of our cars in the city centre, the relevance of P+R 
is: 
At the moment 
                                  
4. In general it can be said that the signals (demand) that 
we perceive from the market place (for example: citi-
zens, suppliers and other cities) tell us that we should 
develop and offer P+R facilities are: 
 
At the moment 
                                  
5. In general, the pressure from the community (local 
NGO’s, mass-media, shops & businesses, etc.) that this 
city faces to develop and offer P+R facilities are:  
 
At the moment 
                                   
6. There are several regulatory institutions (e.g. the EU and 
national authorities) pushing us to develop and offer P+R 
facilities. 
 
At the moment 
                                  
 
                                                                        
49 The original questionnaire was much longer and was part a European FP6 project. We have left out many 
detailed questions that were not included in our analysis. 
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7. We find that the level of state of the art knowledge 
available in the marketplace for our city to engage in the 
development and implementation of P+R facilities is: 
 
At the moment 
                                  
 
8. Our city government has the necessary organizational 
capabilities to reshape our organizational structures to 
develop and implement P+R facilities in our city. 
At the moment 
                                  
9. Our city finds the performance of strategic alliances (with 
companies, organisations or other cities) to develop P+R 
facilities: 
 
At the moment 
                                    
10. Establishing networks of collaboration to acquire know-
how to develop and implement P+R facilities  for our city 
is: 
 
At the moment 
                                    
 
11. For our city the venture of development of P+R facilities 
would imply economically 
 
At the moment 
                                     
 
12. ‘Increasing the prices to park’ is one of the measures of 
my city to decrease car-use in our city-centre: 
 
                                   
 
13. Current parking price in the centre for 1 hour is:  
< 2 euro   <2.51 euro    < 3.1 euro    > 3.1 euro             
14. P+R facilities are one of the measures my city imple-
ments to decrease car-use in our city-centre. 
 
                                   
 
15. ’Expanding parking capacity in the city centre’ is one of 
the measures of my city to solve parking problems: 
 
                                   
 
16. ‘Expanding capacity of the roads to the centre’ is one of 
the measures of my city to solve congestion. 
 
                                   
 
17. ’Decreasing the number of vehicles in our centre’ is 
chosen as a policy aim to increase the quality of the city 
centre environment: 
 
                                   
 
18. The effectiveness of ‘limiting or decreasing places to park 
in the city centre’ as a measure to decrease car-use in 
our city-centre is. 
 
                                   
19. ‘Increasing the prices to park’ would be a good measure 
my city could implement to decrease car-use in our city-
centre 
 
                                   
 
20. P&R-facilities would be a good measure of my city to 
decrease car-use in our city-center. 
 
                                   
 
21. I believe that other available technologies / practices are 
more effective. (to increase environmental quality of the 
city centre): 
a. …namely:       
 
 
                                   
 
 
 
This concludes the survey. Thank you for your time.  
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F2 : Questionnaire ‘Hydrogen fuel cell car’50 
 
 
Section I: General information 
 
      
Organisation’s name:              
European Member State within which you are based:         
Respondent name:                               
Position:                             
Date:               
 
 
 
Section 2: Hydrogen car information 
 
1. To what extent is your firm presently engaged in develop-
ing a fuel cell car?                                   
2. To what extent does your firm have existing plans to 
develop a fuel cell car?                                   
3. The environmental effects generated by the usage of our 
current cars models are likely to be: 
At the moment 
                                  
4. In general it can be said that the signals (demand) that we 
perceive from the market place (for example customers, 
suppliers and competitors) tell us that we should develop 
and sell a fuel cell car are: 
 
At the moment 
                                  
5. In general, the pressure from the community (local and 
global NGO’s, mass-media, unions, etc.) that this firm 
faces to develop and sell a fuel cell car is :  
 
At the moment 
                                   
6. There are several regulatory institutions (e.g. the EU and 
national authorities) pushing us to develop and sell a fuel 
cell car. 
 
At the moment 
                                  
 
7. We find that the level of state of the art knowledge avail-
able in the marketplace for our firm to engage in the de-
velopment of a fuel cell car is: 
 
At the moment 
                                  
 
8. Our firm government has the necessary organizational 
capabilities to reshape our organizational structures to 
develop and implement a fuel cell car in our firm. 
At the moment 
                                  
                                                                        
50 The original questionnaire was much longer and was part a European FP6 project. We have left out many 
detailed questions that were not included in our analysis. 
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9. Our firm finds the performance of strategic alliances (with 
suppliers, customers or competitors) to develop a fuel cell 
car: 
 
At the moment 
                                    
10. Establishing networks of collaboration to acquire know-
how to develop a fuel cell car  for our firm is: 
 
At the moment 
                                    
 
11. For our firm the venture of development of a fuel cell car 
seems to imply economically 
At the moment 
                                     
 
12. After evaluating the outcomes, pressures and capabilities 
to develop a fuel cell car what is the likelihood that your 
city engages in the development of this new product? 
At the moment 
                                     
In the next 5 to 10  
                                     
 
 
This concludes the survey. Thank you for your time. 
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Appendix G: Diffusion of VVT and DI after 1990 
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Source: own calculations, based on data provided by Bosch and Delphi 
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Appendix H: Individual firm strategic activities 
 
 
Honda R&D focus on gasoline. Pioneer in 
variable valve timing (VTEC). First 
launch in 1989 Honda Civic 
(Europe), gradually appeared in 
other vehicles (CRx, 1990; Accord & 
Civic mid-90s. New generation of 
VVT around 2000. In 1999 concept 
of VVT combined with (gasoline) 
direct injection. 
Diesel DI first borrowed from Rover 
(1995), by 2004 first own launch: I-
CDTI. Second generation diesel (in 
2008) combines DI with VVT: i-DTEC 
Launched Honda EV 
plus by 1996. Sold 
around hundred 
annually. 
Shift of focus away 
from BEV in 1996 
(after relaxation of 
ZEV), towards HEV 
and fuel cells. 
Followed Toyota with launch 
of Honda Insight in 1998. 
Honda has had three hybrid 
models now (Accord, Civic, 
Insight), though sales 
numbers are 50-80% lower 
than Toyota. 
Daimler-
Chrysler 
 
VVT launched on various production 
vehicles (1990, 1993, 1999). After 
1997 focus on common rail DI, first 
launch in 1998. Common rail (CDI) 
soon became standard for diesels. 
Launch of the Chrysler 
EPIC in 1997. Sold only 
a few hundred yearly 
up to 1999. 
After relaxation of ZEV 
mandate (1996) 
research focus shift 
towards fuel cell 
technology 
Until 2004 skeptical about 
hybrids. In 2006 research 
collaboration was 
established with GM and 
BMW. Chrysler will follow 
the launch of GM SUV with 
launch of Dodge Durango by 
2008. Mercedes has shown 
prototypes of S-class hybrid 
(already in 2005). Launch 
data? 
Ford Slow follower of engine innovation. 
First launch of VVT (called variable 
cam timing) by 1998 (Ford Sigma). 
Bought diesel TDCi from PSA in 
2002. Soon applied for all diesel 
models. 
Ford launched the 
Ranger in 1998, and 
sold a few hundred 
vehicles annually. 
After relaxation of ZEV 
mandate (1996) 
research focus shift 
already towards fuel 
cell technology. 
Until 2004 skeptical about 
hybrids. Groups-member 
Volvo experimented with 
hybrid (Desiree concept in 
1999) This knowledge was 
later used in Ford Escape 
(launch in 2004). Sales are 
under targets. 
Fiat Launch of VVT system was early (in 
Twin Spark engine 1980s), applied in 
Alfa Romeo models. Later only in 
some sporty version of Fiat. 
Launch gasoline DI in 2000 (in Alpha 
Romeo, dubbed JTS), soon became 
standard. 
Co-pioneered (with VW) on diesel DI 
systems: first launch in 1987 
(Croma). Pioneering launch of 
common-rail in 1997 (Alfa 156). By 
2002 all diesels had Di/common rail 
(called JDI). 
Experimented with 
Panda electric already 
in 1992. Sales were 
very low. In 1998 Fiat 
tried again and 
launched the Seicento 
Electra. There were 
only 294 produced, 
unto 2002, when the 
production stopped. 
Presented batch of Multipla 
hybrid in 2000. No launch, 
due to low expected sales. 
Reluctant on business 
opportunities for current 
launch. 
PSA Launch of VVT only in 2005 (called 
CVVT: Continuous-VVT. Launched 
Was initially serious 
about EVs: by 1993 
PSA is skeptical about full 
hybrids. Only prototype of 
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gasoline DI engine in 1999 (under 
license of Mitsubishi). Succeeded by 
in- house developed HPi engine in 
2000 (for 406/C5). 
Launched DI diesel in 1998 (for 406), 
called HDi. Soon adopted in more 
diesels; by 2002 all diesels were 
HDi. 
Peugeot aimed at 
producing 50.000(!) 
electrics in 1998. 
Several versions were 
launched. Disap-
pointments followed 
when sales were only 
around 2.000 annually 
(even though these 
were highest in the 
sector). 
Citroen Berlingo. Launch of 
mild hybrid: Citroen C3 with 
start & stop since 2005. 
VW-Audi Pioneered with diesel direct 
injection in 1989 (Audi 100 TDI). 
Gradually adopted in more engines; 
by 1996 all diesel had DI. 
VVT launched on various (gasoline) 
production vehicles, 1996, 1999. 
Pioneer in DI for gasoline engines in 
2000 (Lupo), which they dubbed FSI. 
Gradually available for all model 
classes (A4 2001, Golf 2002, etc.). 
Launch of VW 
CityStromer in 1995. 
Only 150 vehicles 
were sold. 
Pioneered with Audi-duo in 
1997 (plug-in HEV). Sold only 
60 vehicles. Disappoint-
ments created skepticism on 
market potential of hybrids. 
After 2005 R&D increased 
(with Posche) and hybrid 
versions of VW Touareg, 
Audi Q7 and Posche Cayenne 
are studied, but no launch 
data announced. 
Nissan Production launch of VVT (known as 
VVL) in 1997 (Primera and others). 
Second generation in 2001. 
Nissan launched the 
electric Altra by 1998, 
but only sold around 
50 vehicles annually. 
Nissan announced an Altima 
hybrid for 2007, with 
technology bought from 
Toyota. With in-house 
technology launch 
announced for 2010. 
Renault Adopted DI on some diesels in 1998 
(from Bosch), dubbed dTi or dCi. By 
2002 all diesels had DI. 
Pioneered with DI on gasoline in 
1999 (Megane coupe, later Laguna). 
Not widely adopted yet. 
Adopted VVT in 1999 in one model. 
Was initially serious 
about EVs: Renault 
planned in 1993 to 
produce 4000 electrics 
in 1995. Disappoint-
ment when actual 
sales of Clio and 
Express were only a 
few hundred annually.
Renault is still skeptical 
about full hybrids, and has 
not announced any 
launches. 
Mitsubishi Pioneered with direct injection in 
gasoline market in 1997 (Charisma). 
Adopted VVT in some by 1992 and 
1994. 
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Appendix I: Statistical Details 
 
This appendix provides the details of the statical analysis in chapter 7. Table J.1 present a summary of the 
various model combination we found through a backward regressiosn procedure with dependent variable i2 
(current behavior). The model numbers refer to the following combinations of predictors (see chapter 3 for 
definitions): 
1. Model 1: Strategic alliances (al), Market pressure (mp), Economic risk (er), Environmental rele-
vance (evr2), Regulatory pressure (rp), Technological capability (tc1), Networks of collaboration 
(nk), l Learning capability (l), Community pressure (cp) 
2. Model 2: mp, er, evr2, rp, tc1, nk, l, cp 
3. Model 3: mp, er, evr2, tc1, nk, l, cp 
4. Model 4: mp, er, evr2, tc1, l, cp  
5. Model 5: mp, er, evr2, l, cp 
6. Model 6: mp, er, evr2, l  
7. Model 7: mp, er, l 
 
Table J1: Model summary 
Model 
Number of 
(indep.) 
variables R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Significance 
(p <0.01) 
1 9 0.644 0.415 0.227 0.895 0.053 
2 8 0.644 0.415 0.254 0.879 0.030 
3 7 0.643 0.414 0.277 0.865 0.016 
4 6 0.637 0.406 0.291 0.857 0.009 
5 5 0.630 0.397 0.303 0.849 0.005 
6 4 0.626 0.392 0.318 0.840 0.002 
7 3 0.619 0.383 0.328 0.834 0.001 
 
Table J.2 provides correlation between the predicators for model 7. 
 
Table J2: Correlations for model 7 
    
mp Market 
pressure 
l Learning 
capability 
er Economic 
risk 
mp Market pressure Pearson Correlation 1 .148 -.128 
  Sig. (2-tailed)  .374 .430 
  N 40 38 40 
l Learning capability Pearson Correlation .148 1 .084 
  Sig. (2-tailed) .374  .607 
  N 38 40 40 
er Economic risk Pearson Correlation -.128 .084 1 
  Sig. (2-tailed) .430 .607  
  N 40 40 43 
 
 
Table J.3 provides details of the coefficients of the various models. 
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Table J3: Linear regression coefficients for dependent variable i2 (current behavior)  
Model 
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
    B 
Std. 
Error Beta B 
Std. 
Error 
1 (Constant) .712 1.037  .687 .498 
  evr2 Environment. Relevance  -.082 .115 -.112 -.711 .483 
  mp Market pressure .207 .123 .303 1.689 .102 
  cp Community pressure .082 .151 .115 .542 .592 
  rp Regulatory pressure .026 .121 .043 .219 .828 
  tc1 Technological capability .130 .156 .165 .836 .410 
  l Learning capability .223 .150 .310 1.484 .149 
  nk Networks of collaboration -.096 .174 -.101 -.554 .584 
  er Economic risk .238 .105 .342 2.277 .031 
  al Strategic alliances -.009 .133 -.014 -.069 .946 
2 (Constant) .715 1.019  .701 .489 
  evr2 Environmental Relevance -.081 .113 -.112 -.722 .476 
  mp Market pressure .209 .118 .305 1.770 .087 
  cp Community pressure .081 .147 .113 .547 .589 
  rp Regulatory pressure .027 .119 .043 .226 .823 
  tc1_ Technological capability .130 .153 .164 .848 .403 
  l Learning capability .218 .132 .303 1.655 .109 
  nk Networks of collaboration -.101 .156 -.106 -.646 .523 
  er Economic risk .239 .102 .343 2.329 .027 
3 (Constant) .712 1.003  .710 .483 
  evr2 Environmental Relevance  -.076 .109 -.105 -.702 .488 
  mp Market pressure .208 .116 .303 1.790 .084 
  cp Community pressure .098 .125 .137 .782 .440 
  tc1_ Technological capability .124 .148 .156 .834 .411 
  l Learning capability .223 .128 .311 1.746 .091 
  nk Networks of collaboration -.095 .151 -.100 -.626 .536 
  er Economic risk .237 .100 .340 2.356 .025 
4 (Constant) .512 .941  .544 .590 
  evr2 Environmental Relevance -.080 .107 -.110 -.742 .464 
  mp Market pressure .201 .114 .294 1.757 .089 
  cp Community pressure .086 .122 .121 .707 .485 
  tc1_ Technological capability .095 .139 .119 .679 .502 
  l Learning capability .216 .126 .301 1.718 .096 
  er Economic risk .235 .099 .338 2.366 .024 
5 (Constant) .819 .819  1.000 .325 
  evr2 Environmental  Relevance  -.066 .105 -.091 -.631 .532 
  mp Market pressure .200 .113 .292 1.765 .087 
  cp Community pressure .065 .117 .091 .555 .583 
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Model 
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
  l Learning capability .262 .106 .365 2.480 .019 
  er Economic risk .226 .098 .325 2.313 .027 
6 (Constant) .876 .804  1.090 .284 
  evr2 Environmental Relevance  -.071 .103 -.098 -.692 .494 
  mp Market pressure .234 .095 .341 2.460 .019 
  l Learning capability .268 .104 .373 2.575 .015 
  er Economic risk .229 .096 .329 2.375 .023 
7 (Constant) .618 .706  .875 .388 
  mp Market pressure .232 .094 .339 2.466 .019 
  l Learning capability .247 .099 .344 2.500 .017 
  er Economic risk .234 .095 .336 2.451 .020 
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Appendix J: Model description 
 
The model we used for the model runs in this paper consists of 1000 consumers, 10 firms and 3 technologies 
and a few exogenous factors. We aim to simulate developments after (approximately) 1990, so initialize for 
the 1990 situation. 
 
Agent rules 
 
Consumers /users 
The principal characteristic of a consumer is receptiveness R for technology i: 
Ri = (w1 * PFi + w2 * SCi - w3 * EIi ) – w4 * Pi 
With Perceived functionality (PF), Social connotation (SC), Environmental impact (EI), and Price (P) of an 
innovation, and four frame weights of the 4 factors: w1 to w4. There are two sets of weights representing 
two consumer groups (see Table K1 below). PF and P are endogenous; SC and EI are exogenous in the model.  
Consumers: 
- initially own a car with an ICE 
- update their receptiveness for each technology [i] in every time step 
- start to consider re-adoption after they have owned a vehicle for at least 10 (15) time steps (i.e. readop-
tionTime = 10): 
ownershipPeriod = counter - adoptionTime; 
if (ownershipPeriod >= readoptionTime) 
 for(int i = 0; i < nrTech; i++)  
if (adoption[i] > 0)  
   adoption[i] = 0; 
 with ‘counter’ as the number of the time step of the run, adoptionTime as the time step of the 
last purchase, adoption indicating whether the agent has adopted the product (1) or not (0). 
- consider re-adoption of a vehicle with either an old ICE (i.e. the version at the start of the model), or a 
refined ICE, or a (hybrid-) electric version  
- select the technology depending both the (micro level) relative receptiveness level for the three 
technologies), and the macro level peer pressures (within their consumer group or frame). This works as 
follows. A macro level (logistic) spread function determines the number of agents (i.e. a threshold) that 
adopts the technology in that time step (resembling the social imitation pressure for it). The agents on the 
micro level are ranked for each technology on the basis of their receptiveness for it. When an agent is 
ranked above the threshold of the time step, it adopts the product. When an agent is above the threshold 
for more than one product, it adopts the one for which it has the highest receptiveness. This is implemented 
as: 
for(int i = 0; i < nrTech; i++) { 
 rankUser = findRank(technologies(i).rank[groupID], ID, 1); 
 if ((rankUser < adoptionLevel[groupID] {      
  adoption[i] = 1; 
  adoptionTime = counter; 
  } 
} 
 if (multipleAdoption(adoption, nrTech)) { 
  double max = -1; 
  int imax = -1; 
  for(int i = 0; i < nrTech; i++) { 
   if (receptiveness[i] > max && adoption[i] == 1)
 {  
    max = receptiveness[i]; 
    imax = i; 
   } 
   adoption[i] = 0; 
  } 
  adoption[imax]=1; 
 } 
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The total group of 1000 consumer consists of two sub-groups which are represented by two distinct sets of 
weights (frames). One group consists of 900 consumers and one of 100 consumers, and their respective 
frame-structure is as follows:  
 
 Frame group 1 (900x) Frame group 2 (100x) 
Weight 1 0.75 0.4 
Weight 2 0.3 0.3 
Weight 3 0.1 0.5 
Weight 4 0.2 0.2 
Table K1: Two weights sets representing two consumer groups 
 
In chapter 4 we have analyzed consumer frames of car engines in more detail. Our estimations are based on 
that analysis. In the analysis we found that frames change in the course of market development. Neverthe-
less, in this version of model, for brevity and simplicity, we assume that frames are static, and we have 
chosen an average of the frames we found for 2000 and 2005. Also, we have simplified the number of 
consumer group from 3 to 2 groups. 
 
Consumers are initialized with a certain level of initial perceived functionality of the two technologies. We 
set their perceived functionality of (hybrid-) electric vehicles slightly lower than ICE by 1990, applying normal 
distributions over the group of consumers (with first the standard deviation, then the average): 
perceivedFunctionality[ICE] = normal(1, 3); 
perceivedFunctionality[Electric] = normal(1, -1); 
 
 
Firms /developers 
The key characteristics of firms are Technological Capabilities (TC) for a technology, and perceived Business 
Opportunity (BO). Technological capabilities for a technology are initially uniformly distributed over the 
firms: 
techCap[i] = uniform_discr(minTC,maxTC);  
with minTC a parameter indicating the lowest capability level of a firm of the group, and maxTC as the 
highest in the group (see values below in ‘parameter values’). 
 
Firms consider launching new ICE versions and electric versions by assessing the business opportunity of the 
technology. 
Business Opportunity (for developer d): BO = B - C 
with B as the benefits (that the developer expects after the investment): 
benefit[i] = techES * techPrice;  
with techES the expected sales and techPrice as the price. 
The cost for the developer Cd is composed of two parts: fixed cost (resembling investments in R&D, 
engineering and production facilities and launch marketing), and variable cost (from material and labor): 
cost[i] = techFR - techCap[i] + launchInvest + (techES * techVC); 
with techVC as the variable cost, techFr as the capabilities of the most advanced firm, and launchInvest is the 
investments in production facilities and launch marketing. 
 
Firms launch a product as soon as (expected) returns on investments are higher than 10%. 
BO[i] = ((benefit[i] - cost[i]) / (techFR - techCap[i] + launchInvest)); 
if (BO[i] > targetROI) 
  launch[i] = true; 
with targetROI as the return on investments. 
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Firms learn: 
• from R&D. The amount they invest in R&D in a technology is driven by (a) the number of launch-
ing competitors (LD), (b) the (current) level of positive social connotation of a technology (SC), 
which also reflects the socio-regulatory expectation of a technology. The two components have 
equal weights:  
InvestmentRD[i] = maxRD*( techLD + techSC)/2;           with maxRD as 
the maximum available R&D budget for a firm in the time step  
• Learning-by-doing: after launch, the variable cost of a technology decrease in time, 1% in each 
time step. 
• Learning-from-the-market: 
o Learning-from-Use (LFU): firm capabilities increase with the level use trough a logistic 
function (Mukoyama, 2006):  learnFromUse[i] = techA *  maxLFU * 
(1 - techA), with total marketshare of technology A as techA and max LFU as a 
maximum value. 
o Emulative learning: firms reduce their lag in technological capabilities (w.r.t. most ad-
vanced firm)  through learning from competitors in the market: by 5% from each 
launching firm: 
emulativeLearn[i] = techFR - techCap[i] - ((techFR - tech-
Cap[i])* pow(0.95, nr_LaunchDev));                                       
with techFr as the capabilities of the most advanced firm, and nr_LaunchDev as the 
number of firms that have launched a market vehicles of that technology in the mar-
ket. 
 
So, firms capabilities for technology [i] increase through: 
techCap[i] =+ (investmentRD[i] + learnByUse[i] + emulativeLearn[i]) 
 
Before and after (its) market launch, each company computes a (virtual) price at which it would still make a 
profit: 
After launch: 
price[i] = (launchInvest / techEI) + pm*techVC;  
Or before launch: 
price[i] = (techFR - techCap[i]+ launchInvest)/techEI + pm*techVC; 
 
with techEI as the of expected interest for the technology [i] and techVC as the variable cost of the 
technology, and pm as the profit margin. 
 
 
Macro level rules 
 
Price 
Price develops endogenously: Market price p of the innovation (at launch) is set by the developer d which 
can, at the relatively lowest price, still make a profit. In other words, it is the lowest price of these virtual 
firm prices: 
Price = MIN (priced) 
 
This means that the company with highest technological capabilities TC will set the market price.  
 
Aggregate technological progress 
The firm with highest technological capabilities is regarded as the technological front: 
for( Developer d :) { 
 if (d.techCap[ID] > front) 
  front = d.techCap[ID]; 
This front moves because of R&D investments of the firm in every time step, and also through learning from 
the market. Other firms catch up through emulative learning. 
TechProgression (in a time step) = investmentRD[i] + learnByUse[i] + 
emulativeLearn[i]) 
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The perceived functionality (PF) of all consumers increases with increasing technological progress of the 
technology. This is plausible since engineers and businessmen at firms try to overcome user-problems as 
they continue to develop an innovation, from what’s already there. So in one time step:  
PF = PF (in previous step) +  TechProgression; 
 
Launching developers 
The number of firms that have launched a market vehicle of that technology in the market is counted every 
time step (nr_LaunchDev). (For the micro decision to launch or not: see above.) 
 
Aggregate demand and sales 
The distributions of (consumer) receptiveness for each of the technologies are tracked. In each time step and 
for each technology the consumers are ranked on the basis of their receptiveness. A macro level (logistic) 
spread function determines the number of agents (i.e. a threshold) that adopts the technology in that time 
step (resembling the social imitation pressure for it):  
newAdopters[i] = (1 - adoptionLevel[i]) * adoptionLevel[i] * infA; 
adoptionLevel[i] +=newAdopters[i]; 
 
with infA being the level of infectiousness  for adoption. 
As we described above in the consumer paragraph, actual adoption will only happen if a consumer has 
owned a previous vehicle for at least 10 (or 15) time steps, and derived from a combination of the (micro 
level) receptiveness for the various technologies and the strength of the imitation bandwagon for the 
technologies. 
Expected sales are derived from both the distribution of consumer receptiveness, and the number of other 
firms expected in the market. A consumer is considered as interested in (i.e. as a potential buyer of) the 
product when its perceived utility (that is receptiveness without the price term) is higher than certain 
threshold: 
If  (w1 * PFi + w2 * SCi - w3 * EIi ) > AdoptionExp 
expInterest ++; 
 
By combining the size of the potential market, and the current firms who have launched on this market, the 
space for a new launching firm is computed and correspondingly a number of interested firms (i.e expected 
competition).  We assume that the market is equally shared between the launching firms. Firms calculate 
expected sales for each product technology (which they use for computing their business potential) based 
on the expected consumer interest and expected competition. 
 expSales =  expInterest / (launchDev  + 1) ; 
 
Learning-by-doing 
After launch, the variable cost of a technology decreases in time (or production levels) by a progress ratio: 
varCost *= learnByDo; 
 
Social construction of connotation 
This mechanism is considered exogenous. It is such a socially shaped phenomenon that is does not make 
sense to link it to techno-economic variables (e.g. investments levels or prices). In the model it progresses 
with time. The start of the process for a technology is however endogenous, that is: it only starts when sales 
(and thus use) of the technology is >0. Therefore, at the start of the model run the initial value for new 
version of ICE and for electric propulsion is 0, whereas for the contemporary version of ICE it is 1. This means 
that social connotation is adding value to the product for the consumers which adhere to this connotation.   
The formation of social meaning for the new technologies is modelled as follows. Individual consumers 
become inclined to either the positive connotaion (+1) or the negative connotation (-1) through an epedemic 
spread function:  
newPositivists = (1 - positivists - negativists) * positivists * infP; 
newNegativists = (1 - positivists - negativists) * negativists * infR; 
with infp and infR being the level of infectiousness for the two processes. These are the two variables with 
which the two scenarios in chapter 9 are developed: 
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 RUN 1 RUN2 
 ICE new (H)EV ICE new (H)EV 
infP 0.1 0.75 0.75 0.75 
infN 0.75 0.1 0.1 0.1 
 
The connotations spread uniformly distributed over the user population: 
while (counter < pro && loop < 1000) { 
 i = uniform_discr(0, get_Main().nrUsers -1); 
 userSC = get_Main().users.get(i).socialMeaning[ID]; 
 loop ++; 
  
 if (userSC == 0) { 
  userSC = 1; 
  counter ++; 
  get_Main().users.get(i).socialMeaning[ID] = userSC; 
 
We assume that the social connotation of the technologies affects the regulatory pressure for the two 
technologies (e.g purchase subsidies, tax benefits). Therefore the social connotation is an important driver 
for the firm R&D investments.  
 
Parameters 
Symbol Description Value Remarks 
envImpact Environmental impact of 
the technologies 
[ICE new]= 4; 
[Electric]= 1; 
[ICE old]= 4; 
This is an exogenous 
parameter. We assume that 
the actual emissions of 
electric vehicle are 4 times 
lower that ICE. Obviously, 
this depends to a high 
degree on the way 
electricilty is generated. 
(Initial) minTC 
& maxTC 
Technological capabilities 
for a technology are 
initially uniformly 
distributed over the firms, 
these the boundary values 
For ICE new: 
minTC = 6; and maxTC = 
14; 
For electric: minTC = 0; 
and maxTC = 6; 
For ICE old: 
minTC = 15; and maxTC = 
20; 
We assume capabilities for 
contemporary ICE 
technology being greatest, 
followed by calpabilities for 
refined ICE, wheras 
capabilities for (H)EV are 
initially lowest. 
(Initial)PF  Initial perceived 
Functionality of the 
technologies, which is a 
normal distribution over 
the group of consumers 
ICE (old and new): 
Normal (1, 3) (so 
standard deviation 1 and 
average 3) 
(H)EV: 
Normal (1, -1) 
Initially ICE old and new are 
the same. The average of 
perceived functionality of 
(H)EV around is much lower 
than ICE, therefore minus 1 
compared to 3. 
max LFU  Maximum Learning-from-
Use 
1.2 Parameter that inidcates 
the strenght of increasing 
capabilities from increasing 
use. We calibrated this in 
comparison to learning 
from R&D investments.  
PM Profit margin applied on to 
the variable cost in the 
price computation. 
2.5  
learnByDo Parameter that indicated 0.99 Ratios for industrial 
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Symbol Description Value Remarks 
the price decraese in each 
time step 
production are typically 
80% (Ford model T was 
87%). This means: first if 
first 1000 units cost 100 
dollars, the next 100 cost 80 
dollars. We apply however 
the progress ratio in time 
(not in production 
quantity). We found that 
99% in each time step 
delivers a similar effect.  
EL Emulative learning from 
each launching firm 
5% We assume that firms 
reduce their lag in 
technological capabilities 
(w.r.t. most advanced firm)  
through learning from 
competitors in the market: 
by 5% from each launching 
firm 
launchInvest Investments relating to the 
market launch of a 
technology, such as 
production facilities and 
laucnh marketing 
0.3 We calibrated this relative 
to R&D investments 
ROI Return on Invetsments 0.1 
 
This means that expected 
returns should be 10% 
higher than investments 
before a firm starts 
launching. 
maxRD the maximum available 
R&D budget for a firm in 
the time step 
2 We calibrated this on the 
progression of the 
technology. 
varCost  Variable cost of the 
technology 
2 (initially, and will not 
become smaller than 1) 
We chose the same value 
for all technologies, to keep 
this effect out of the 
analysis. 
infA 
 
Infectiousness level of 
adoption 
0.8 This is the strengh of 
imitation among consumers 
(in their groups). We 
calibrated this for the 
spread of direct injected 
diesel engines. 
Re-adoption 
period 
Average Ownership period 15 (time steps) This is a fairly random 
choice, after which other 
parameters were 
calibrated. 
AdoptionExp A threshold value for a 
consumer being counted 
as ‘interested’ in the 
technology 
2.5  
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Appendix K: Model analysis  
 
 
B1. Model Calibration 
 
We calibrate the model by mimicking the actual data of diffusion of new engines after 1990 in the first half 
of the model (broadly up to step 50). We match the first half of the model and the period of 1990-2010 in 
the following way. Some research suggests that the average re-purchase time of new cars is 6.3 years {Boyd, 
2006 #152}, and in the model we choose 15 steps as the re-purchase period. Therefore, 50 modeling steps 
represent about 22 years. Since we take the start of the model as 1990s, we have calibrated the model 
(through the initialization of relative firm capabilities and initial perceived functionality of consumers) in 
order to launch new diesel engines from the beginning of the 1990s onwards (that is after about 4 or 5 time 
steps), and electric and hybrid-electric versions from the mid-1990s onwards (i.e. after about 10 or 12 time 
steps). 
Further we have calibrated the model so that diffusion of new diesel engines replace all old diesel engines at 
about 2010 (corresponding approximately to step 40 to 45), mainly by tuning the parameter of the logistic 
imitation function (InfA). This way we mimic the actual data of diffusion of new diesel engines on the world 
market, see Figure L1, and of (hybrid-) electric vehicles, which have gradually grown to a market share of 
about 3.5 % worldwide by 2010. 
 
 
 
Figure L1a: Diffusion levels of Direct Injection systems (Source: Beise and Rennings, 2005). After 2001 
diffusion levels have continued to rise and, on average, we estimate that by 2008-2010 all diesels have direct 
injection systems. 
Figure L1b: Model output of Run 1 and 2.Tthe red line resembles diffusion of DI Diesel. 
 
 
B2 Sensitivity analysis 
 
In section 9.3 we have discussed the results of the model, where we focused on the role of social connota-
tion for the development of market shares, by comparing two runs. Here we assess how other parameters 
may have a similar effect on market shares. We vary a few key parameters with +/- 25 to 50% and observe 
the impact on the output values, i.e. on the market share trends. As a starting point we take scenario run 1 
(see Figure L2 left). 
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Figure L2: Market shares in the calibrated model in run 1 and 2 
 
Consumer frame weights 
Here we vary with the weight of Perceived Functionality in the frame of the 900 members of consumer 
group 1. 
 
W (PF) = 0.5 (instead of 0.75) W (PF) = 1.0 (instead of 0.75) 
  
Figure L3: Market shares in the case of deviating values for weight of PF. 
 
So, if functionality becomes significantly less important for the largest group of consumers (those who value 
functionality most), the market share of (H)EVs will start rise much earlier and stronger (Figure L3, left). This 
makes sense, since inferior appreciation for the functionality of (H)EVs is an important reason for why it 
takes so much time to diffusion: it takes time for firms to built up their capabilities. Alternatively (Figure L3, 
right), an even higher weight of perceived functionality does not have much effect. 
 
Readoption period 
Here we vary with the readoption period from 15 time steps to 10 and 20. 
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readoption = 10  (not 15) readoption = 20  (not 15) 
  
Figure L4: Market shares in the case of deviating values for readoption time. 
 
We find that when consumer are faster in buying a new vehicle (readoption = 10, Figure L4 left), the slope of 
diffusion of the innovation increases. However, it does not so much affect the relative investment levels of 
firms, and therefore (H)EV still overtakes ICE in terms of perceived functionality around time step 50. 
Subsequently, the diffusion slopes of (H)EV is steeper as well.  
When consumers are slower in replacing their vehicle, we find the opposite effect. All in all, the model is 
fairly sensitive for variations in readoption time, which is reasonable regarding the actual market develop-
ments. 
 
Maximum R&D per step 
Here we vary with the maximum R&D budget available at each firm from 2 to 3 and 1. 
 
maxRD= 3  (not 2) maxRD= 1  (not 2) 
  
Figure L5: Market shares in the case of deviating values for maxRD. 
 
When the maximum R&D budget is 3 instead of 2 the market share of (H)EV rises slightly stronger in the 
second phase of the run (see Figure L5 left). Total investments in (H)EV accumulate faster, and perceived 
functionality overtakes that of ICE at a slightly earlier moment, which makes the sensitivity reasonable. 
Alternatively, when the RD budget is 1, we find precisely the opposite (Figure L5, right). The progression of 
(H)EV is still on its way to overtake ICE, but the slope is lower here, and therefore it takes more time to pass 
ICE (and therefore adoption of (H)EV only start growing after 100 time steps, outside the plot). 
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B3 Conclusion 
 
This model analysis shows that the model is similarly sensitive for many other parameters as it is for social 
connotation. Variations in these parameters deliver similar variations in the output (i.e. market shares) as 
the two runs in discussed in section 9.3. It is not surprising that indeed many factors play a role in innovation 
dynamics, as our conceptual model has proposed, and it is good to know that the model reflects that. The 
formation of social connotation is however one of the most uncertain, intangible factors in unfolding 
innovation trajectories; much more than, for instance, the average re-adoption time or the maximum R&D 
level. Therefore, it was reasonable to base the two model runs and the respective scenarios on this variable 
of social connotation. 
All in all, we find that the model gives a sufficient ‘order-of-magnitude’ indication of cause-and-effect 
relationships of social connotation with investments, prices, technological progression and adoption. The 
model should not be seen as a ‘truth model’, incorporation all the subtleties of explanatory case studies 
(such as in chapter 6), and the time dimension in the model should not be seen as a precise measure of 
when what will happen, especially not as predictions of the future. There is much more to tell about other 
possible runs, the salience of various variables and lessons or propositions we can draw from this model. We 
recommend other interesting applications of this model, such as the role of changing consumer frames, as a 
topic for future research.  
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Summary  
 
 
In the last 20 to 30 years people have travelled more often and further. Worldwide, more people 
have obtained access to car and air transport, and road traffic movements have grown strongly. 
In Europe, total passenger road kilometres doubled since 1980. Alongside the gains in freedom 
to travel there are some clear drawbacks of the steady increase of road traffic. Our society, in 
particular urban areas, has been burdened with the severe impact of congestion, harmful 
emissions, traffic accidents, noise, scarcity of fossil fuels, and fragmentation of landscapes.  
Policymakers at local, national and international levels have been challenged firmly to deal with 
these negative effects of car mobility. Mobility issues are multi-faceted, since they include social, 
economic, ecological as well as technological aspects. Policy concerns are typically intercon-
nected and cross several policy fields. Societal stakeholders have conflicting perceptions of the 
problem, whereas gains and burdens of transport activities are distributed unevenly over various 
societal groups. Furthermore, the outcomes of transport policies are often difficult to under-
stand, let alone predict. 
Nevertheless, transport policies have been partially successful in the last 20 to 30 years. The 
increase of safety levels and decrease of polluting gases (such as particulate matter and nitrogen 
oxides) can be attributed directly to transport-related policies. However, some effects have 
remained critical or have even grown. Congestion levels in urban areas are growing, and 
greenhouse gas emissions from road transportation are steadily growing as well. It raises the 
question how policies concerning these two issues can be improved. Two innovations may play a 
prominent role in the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions and congestion levels, respec-
tively: car engine technology and Park-and-Ride facilities (P+R)51. Therefore it is relevant to study 
the emergence of these two innovations and the role of policy, since the deeper understanding 
of recent transport sectoral innovation dynamics may possibly enhance outcomes of transport 
policies.  
In this thesis our aim is twofold. We aim to contribute to theories of innovation through the 
proposition of a co-evolutionary framework, and furthermore we aim to provide transport policy 
practitioners with additional insights in order to support policymaking in their sector, especially 
with respect to car engines and P+R. 
Studies in various scientific disciplines and fields have addressed the emergence of new 
technology and innovation. Broadly there are three strands of literature. Although most 
economists treat innovation as just another investment opportunity, one strand originates from 
the Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter (1883–1950), who bequeathed us with a scheme of 
technological change consisting of invention — the first practical demonstration of an idea; to 
innovation — the first commercial application of an invention to the market; to diffusion — the 
spread of the innovation into the market. In this tradition a new wave of economists revitalized 
evolutionary theorizing of innovation from the early 1980s onwards. Studies in this strand have 
explained the domination of a technology or practice in a sector as lock-in through path 
dependency. The models are, however, as yet less applied to consumer products in a changing 
social context. For consumer products symbolic meaning of products may play a significant role. 
Symbolic value is as a social connotation or meaning attributed to the product, and individual 
consumers will have a certain degree of inclusion in such a social construct. Though in itself a 
multi-dimensional phenomena, the construct may at a balance be positive or negative (even at 
                                                                        
51 P+R is a service provided by a city to motorists who can park their vehicle at the edge of a city (centre) and 
continue their journey by means of public transport. 
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the same time for different groups of consumers), thus adding value in the eyes of a consumer, 
or reducing it. Progression of such connotation will affect the further development (supply side) 
and diffusion process (demand side) of the technology. There are currently few theories in this 
economic strand that incorporate this interaction of such social and technological aspects and as 
Pier Paolo Saviotti noticed, these dynamics are still poorly understood. 
A second strand of innovation studies, innovation diffusion studies, is conceptually broader and 
originates from social geography, later adopted in marketing studies. The focus in most diffusion 
studies is on aggregate patterns, which are often found to be S-shaped. In the field of marketing 
the symbolic meaning or value that goods and innovations hold is well established, where it is 
typically distinguished from the functional value. The seminal work of Everett Rogers offers a 
typology of adopters based on when they adopt but does not offer a dynamic model of 
innovation diffusion in terms of endogenous and exogenous mechanisms.  
A third strand of innovation literature originating from the sociology and history of technology, 
where authors have emphasized the social context in which technology is created and used. A 
key concept is the social construction of technology (SCOT, developed by Wiebe Bijker), where 
‘technology’ is viewed not as an objective entity (as in economic and technical studies), but 
rather described ‘through the eyes of social groups’. These authors demonstrated how various 
social interpretations of technology shape various directions of technological development. 
Authors in the latter two strands have addressed the interaction of technology and social 
factors. Most recently Arie Rip and René Kemp elaborated on co-evolution of ‘the social’ and 
‘the technical’, analysing the emergence, transformation and decay of socio-technical systems. 
Their ‘multi-level’ model of innovation distinguishes between the macro level of the sociotechni-
cal landscape, the mesolevel regime, and the microlevel niche. Frank Geels added the key idea 
that radical innovations come about through interactions between processes at these three 
levels. That is: the breakthrough from niche to regime level occurs gradually, as a new technol-
ogy ‘branches’ or ‘penetrates’ different application domains, before entering mainstream 
markets. These studies have highlighted more than previous studies the patterns in which 
established technologies are sometimes abandoned and overthrown by emerging niches. A 
number of scholars have argued that these studies have been less clear on why some niches are 
‘successful’ in growing and even overtaking a regime, while other niches die. Interactions 
between niche and regime are claimed to be important, yet the interactions are not specified in 
terms of processes; feedback effects, such as scale and learning, and taste formation mecha-
nisms are neglected. In this thesis we suggest a conceptual, co-evolutionary framework that 
highlights feedback effects and actor perspectives. 
In chapter 2 we elaborate our co-evolutionary approach to innovation, building upon the 
integrating bridge of evolutionary economics and sociology of technology, initiated by Rip, Kemp 
and Geels. We develop a micro-macro model (more familiar to the economic tradition), thus 
deviating from the three-levelled niche, regime and landscape model. At the micro level, the 
innovation is described through the eyes of stakeholders, whereas at macro level aggregated 
indicators such as total sales and prices are incorporated. We hold (groups of) actors as the basic 
element of analysis, stepping into their shoes, mapping their mental framing and attitudes. A 
frame is the way in which the innovation is described or interpreted by an actor. Further, in our 
scheme we extend the notion of feedback effects through scale and learning with the effect of 
consumer taste formation, including social connotation. We discuss the advantages and 
disadvantages of this approach for the notion of co-evolution. We aim to contribute to 
evolutionary economic co-evolutionary studies (in the neo-Schumpeterian tradition), as well as 
to co-evolutionary approaches in the broader field of innovation studies. 
Before we perform two explanatory case studies in the core of this thesis, applying our co-
evolutionary framework to the case of automotive engines and P+R, we amplify on our 
methodology (in chapter 3). Explanatory case studies are suitable for applying pre-defined 
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frameworks to a new case, testing causalities and explanatory value. As an input to our 
explanatory case studies we analyze the frames of the key stakeholders, employing a range of 
other methods, most notably discourse analysis (chapter 4) and questionnaire surveys (chapter 
5 and 7). In addition to the explanatory case studies we develop scenarios, supported by a 
simulation model analysis (chapter 9). 
Such a combination of methods has a few advantages. The simultaneous use of various methods 
can improve the quality and adequacy of a study considerably, and conclusions are usually more 
convincing if they are based on several different sources of information. Combining methods can 
compensate for one-sidedness. In complex issues, one method easily results in only partial 
explanation of a phenomenon, as in the blind men and the elephant tale. Combining methods 
has difficulties too. Integration of outcomes and knowledge elements is difficult to validate 
scientifically, and methods may have a similar bias. Although a theory on the use of different 
methods is still in development, we will include evidence from a range of methods in our 
explanatory case study, to facilitate the understanding of the multifaceted phenomena of the 
emergence of hybrid-electric vehicles and P+R. 
In chapter 4 we analyze how car users frame car engines. Car engines have been build on 
internal combustion (IC) technologies for more than hundred years now; however, in the last 
decade hybrid-electric engines have been successfully introduced. The coexistence of conven-
tional and unconventional technologies raises the interesting question to what extent these 
different engine technologies are framed differently, and how they change over time. Studies of 
technological frames and mental models suggest that frames of established technologies are 
more obdurate. In this chapter we analyse technological frames of three types of car engines: 
the incremental innovation of the diesel engine, the unconventional electric and the hybrid-
electric engine, and furthermore we study how these frames have shifted during market 
evolution between 1990 and 2005. We find that engines are framed rather differently. Frames of 
conventional diesel engines emphasize engine capacity (measured in kW), engine volume 
(measured in liters) and torque (measured in Nm), whereas for hybrids fuel-efficiency is by far 
the most prominent attribute.  Further we find that the frame of the conventional engine 
(diesel) is more stable than that of an unconventional engine (hybrid and full-electric), which 
confirms the obduracy hypothesis that is raised in earlier studies of technological frames. 
In chapter 5 we analyze technological frames of car firms towards development of Ultra Low 
Emission Vehicles (ULEV). We examine the framing of firms by studying their belief systems and 
actual engagement. The central question is: Which underlying beliefs significantly drive the 
engagement in the development of ULEV technology? A second question concerns whether we 
can map out diversity between firms. We thus ‘step into the shoes’ of the car firms and analyse 
their social, business, technological and environmental considerations. In order to achieve 
enough focus, we will focus on hydrogen vehicle technology as an example of an ULEV. Scholars, 
industry strategists as well as policy makers acknowledge hydrogen as an important future 
energy carrier for transportation. The study reveals that different firms deal differently with 
hydrogen vehicle development. Broadly, three groups of firms were distinguished concerning 
their engagement level in ULEV: uncertain firms, unwilling firms and optimistic firms. It addition, 
it was found that the level of technological and organisational capabilities is highly correlated to 
the actual engagement of firms in hydrogen technology development: firm who consider their 
capabilities higher (lower), are stronger (weaker) engaged. Although firms differ in their 
engagement in hydrogen technology, we found no evidence from additional interviews that 
frame-structures of car firms towards hydrogen technology differ significantly, i.e. regarding the 
weights they attach to economic opportunity, environmental risk etc. All firms are part of the 
same global market, with fierce competition. All firms emphasize business opportunities, both 
immediate and future opportunities, when considering development of hydrogen technology. A 
main question for them is: do consumers expect and value cleaner engines? Secondary, their 
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relative position regarding competitors is important. Further, social expectations and pressures 
for novel technologies, such as hydrogen, affect R&D expenditures of firms to some extent, 
whereas emission regulation is a boundary condition that needs to be met. 
In chapter 6 we describe and explain the emergence of electric engines in the automobile 
market after 1990.  Hybrid-electric vehicles have experienced a significant rate of growth in the 
last 10 years. This is remarkable, since the automotive sector is typically averse to the more 
radical technological change of engines. The internal combustion engine has been around for 
more than 100 years after all. In this chapter we provide rich descriptions of how and why 
propulsion technologies were developed and adopted after 1990, tagging the two levels of the 
framework. First we focus on aggregate patterns (sales levels and technological progress), while 
in the next section we address the micro level perspectives of stakeholders (firms, consumers, 
and regulators). Subsequently, the previous sections are integrated into a co-evolutionary 
framework. We discuss the role of techno-economic mechanisms alongside social and regulatory 
mechanisms (including the social meaning of an engine). The co-evolutionary analysis is novel in 
the integrated conception of actor perspectives, feedback effects and competition between 
products. We find three sources of lock-in through path dependency: from demand, supply as 
well as the regulatory side. We find that automotive engines were locked into an established 
trajectory of internal combustion technology sector due to techno-economic mechanisms, which 
produced inertia despite some sustainability pressures. In the 1990s the creation of a new 
innovation path of electric engines initially stalled, since the vehicles were broadly regarded as 
expensive and unpractical due to little autonomy, various stakeholders were unsuccessful in 
marketing their electric or hybrid-electric vehicles in the 1990s, such as Peugeot/Citroen with 
various electric models, or Audi with their Duo in 1997. However, after 2000 it recurred through 
hybrid-electric engines, mostly triggered by efforts of Toyota to find a new market, and 
stimulated by the gradual social formation of a positive connotation of hybrid-electric technol-
ogy.  
In chapter 7 we study how P+R is framed by policy makers through a questionnaire survey 
amongst 45 major cities in Europe. Traffic congestion and the quality of the air in city centres is a 
major concern for urban planners. In recent years Park and Ride (P+R) facilities have been 
increasingly introduced by local authorities as an alternative for or addition to parking supply in 
the city centre. We study how deployment of P+R is framed by policy makers in the broader 
transport policy. The chapter offers three things. First, we report on present adoption levels of 
P+R in Europe. The survey outcomes reveal that P+R is adopted fairly unevenly across Europe. 
We find that a quarter of the responding cities are extensively engaged on implementing P+R, 
whereas another quarter has little or no engagement. It raises the question, if congestion is a 
problem present in most major cities across Europe, why adoption is so uneven? Therefore, 
secondly, we map out diversity in framing of P+R throughout European cities, by revealing 
current beliefs about P+R. We show how diversified policy-makers interpretation of P+R is. 
Thirdly, we track the salient beliefs underlying the policy frames that determine P+R implemen-
tation. Linear regression analysis suggests that economic implications of P+R, perceived demand 
for P+R, and organisational learning capabilities are the most important drivers for city 
governments whether or not to engage in P+R development, explaining 40% of the variance in 
their actual  engagement in P+R deployment. 
Chapter 8 explores the introduction of P+R as a niche solution and its potential transformative 
impact on urban mobility in two of the densest European states, UK and the Netherlands, 
dealing with similar urban sustainability problems. We examine three examples of implementa-
tion from each state: Oxford, York, Bristol, Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Utrecht. Our explanatory 
case study addresses the two-layers of the co-evolutionary framework, by describing P+R from 
the perspective of the city government and that of urban travellers (micro level), and further 
through aggregated indicators such as total parking availability and prices (macro level). The 
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framework is applied to examine how and why P+R was developed in the six cities and whether 
the introduction of P+R has contributed to transition towards low-traffic city centres. It is found 
that whilst in most cities there has been a shift in policy aims and implementation from 
providing more parking towards transfer of parking locations and influencing modal choice, no 
significant reduction in overall parking intensity as an outcome can be observed; P+R has been 
largely used as a way to provide more parking capacity. 
In chapter 9 we explore future scenarios of car engine technology with support of a simulation 
model. Whereas chapter four to eight were devoted to the recent history of our two cases, we 
now turn to the question: what could happen? We develop plausible but simplified descriptions 
of two possible trajectories. These descriptions involve both techno-economic aspects as well as 
the formation of social connotation. To consider the complex and uncertain dynamics between 
the latter and the former phenomena, we benefit from a simulation model analysis. Therefore 
we formalize the two-layered innovation framework (see section 2.4), and make it ‘tailored’ to 
the case of car engine innovation. We deliver a model, simulating the co-evolution of demand 
and supply, giving rise to various possible trajectories. We formalize stakeholder perspectives, 
based on the empirics of chapter 4, 5 and 6. The main duty of the model is to support the 
analysis of the role of social connotation in innovation dynamics. The model is applied, both in 
retrospect, and to explore the future, and draws lessons on the role of social connotation. In the 
model, actor behaviour is modelled explicitly on the basis of actor frames which shape the 
appraisal of technology options by potential adopters and by suppliers. The model is analytically 
novel by incorporating five feedback loops: interactive learning between suppliers and users, 
scale and learning economies, endogenous taste formation among consumers, and social 
learning (attribution of meaning). The model is applied to explore future diffusion scenarios of 
vehicle engines, though it starts with simulating recent historic trends (about 20 years), including 
the quick diffusion of direct fuel injection systems (for diesels) and slow diffusion of electric 
vehicles. It is shown that the success of hybrid electric vehicles critically depends on suppliers 
shifting towards HEV development and production (resulting in greater supply of refinement of 
(H)EV models) and on consumers valuing (hybrid-)electric vehicles more than environmentally 
improved diesel vehicles. 
We have developed two narrative scenarios. In the first scenario the social connotation of (H)EV 
technology becomes predominantly positive, whereas ICE predominantly negative. Here we find 
a gradual increase of the state-of-the-art of electric propulsion, within 10 years surpassing the 
state-of-the-art of ICE. After the initial adoption of electric propulsion in a limited group of green 
consumers, wider adoption occurs after 2020.  
In the second scenario new ICE versions acquire a similar positive connotation as (H)EV. Here, 
the state-of-the-art of ICE remains ahead of (H)EV, and after some adoption of electric models, 
even some green consumers shift back to refined versions of ICE. 
In chapter 10 we analyze what our co-evolutionary approach learns about the role of policy in 
the innovation process in the two cases. There are two main perspectives on environmental and 
innovation policy in the literature, the welfare perspective and an evolutionary perspective. We 
argue that in our two case studies policy instruments were mostly applied from a welfare 
perspective. In this perspective the instruments aim to spur innovation but in a technology-blind 
manner, leading mostly to adoption of existing technologies and incremental innovation. 
In a (co-) evolutionary perspective, which conceptualizes alternative technologies as outer-
regime niches, it is not just a question of ‘does an instrument spur innovation’, but also: ‘does an 
instrument spur innovation to refine the existing regime or does it spur an alternative trajec-
tory’? Such a key question has not been investigated systematically by research and is given only 
scant attention by policy makers. 
We have suggested options for evolutionary policy to promote the niche innovations in our two 
case studies, as these may mitigate the CO2 and congestion issues with greater drive. As a red 
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line through the policy advice in both cases we find the suggestion to try and modulate 
innovation dynamics through a sectoral platform, which: 
• Engages in niche-regime coordination: coordinate regime policies with bottom-up (niche) 
initiatives. Experience from local experiments should be shared for policy making at the 
(supra-)national level and there should be strategic experimentation for system innovation, 
two things that have happened only incidentally in the past. 
• Deals with existing path-dependencies but in doing so avoids getting locked into suboptimal 
solutions. This calls for anticipation of outcomes and the use of markets for coordination 
and context control instead of planning. A second way of circumventing lock-ins is by ex-
ploring different configurations through support of a portfolio of niches, instead of support-
ing just one alternative. 
In chapter 11 we summarize the key findings by answering the five research questions: (1) How 
to combine SCOT and evolutionary economics?, (2) Is a co-evolutionary approach reasonable 
and relevant for studying the emergence of (H)EVs and P+R?, (3) Can we measure user frames 
and social connotations of innovations and incorporate the results in computer simulations and 
in historic-analytical analyses of socio-technical change?, (4) Does the incorporation of 
competing technologies in a diffusion model lead to different results?, and (5) What is the value 
of a co-evolutionary conceptualization of innovation dynamics for policy? In summary we find 
that the main merit of our co-evolutionary, micro-macro approach lies in the integration of 
consumers and firms, and competition between technologies. Therefore, this approach helps to 
highlight dynamics between consumers (and demand structures) and suppliers (and supply 
structures). Other studies have addressed the development of (H)EV or P+R, but typically with a 
narrower focus, focusing only on supply, while ignoring consumers and user, or vice versa. 
Limits to our methodology are the requirement for a significant amount of micro level data (time 
series of actor frames and attitudes), which is for many cases rather difficult to obtain. Also, it is 
hard to determine the relative speed of the various feedback loops in each case. These should 
probably be assessed through expert opinion or participation of stakeholders. 
Our approach has been less successful in highlighting the social and political dynamics within the 
city or (supra-) national authority and within car companies. More than being a single homoge-
nous entity, the government authorities are composed of departments (economy, transport, 
environment etc.) as well as a city council or parliament, who are lobbied by stakeholders and 
sensitive to their own constituencies and professional groups. Within firms various departments 
(business development, environmental affairs, research etc.) may have conflicting opinions on 
the best strategy to go. In our analysis we have left out such dynamics, and just addressed the 
policies and regulation that passed the city council, or R&D investment and product launches 
that we undertaken by car firms. In future research this part of our framework needs to be 
elaborated. Also, the character of learning and economies-of-scale at local governments should 
be further elaborated. For both these issues, we see the co-evolutionary framework as a good 
starting point. 
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Samenvatting 
 
 
In de afgelopen 20 à 30 jaar zijn mensen vaker en verder gaan reizen. Wereldwijd hebben meer 
mensen toegang tot weg- en luchttransport, en wegverkeersbewegingen zijn sterk toegenomen. 
In Europa is het totaal aantal passagierskilometers over de weg sinds 1980 meer dan verdub-
beld. Naast de pracht van een toegenomen vrijheid om te reizen is er ook een schaduwkant aan 
het groeiende wegverkeer. Onze samenleving, in het bijzonder het leven in de stad, wordt flink 
belast met neveneffecten zoals files, schadelijke uitlaatgassen, verkeersongelukken, geluid, 
gebruik van schaarse fossiele brandstoffen en doorsnijding van het landschap. 
Beleidsmakers op lokaal, nationaal, en internationaal niveau zijn sterk uitgedaagd om de 
neveneffecten van automobiliteit aan te pakken. Verkeersvraagstukken zijn vaak divers en 
hebben verschillende aspecten, zoals sociale, economische, ecologische en technische facetten. 
Verkeer- en vervoersbeleid raakt aan al die aspecten, en doorkruist daarmee vaak verschillende 
bereidterreinen. Verschillende groepen in de samenleving hebben een andere kijk op wat 
precies een probleem is, en de lusten en lasten van het toenemende verkeer zijn ongelijk over 
de verschilleden groepen verdeeld. Ook zijn de uitkomsten en effecten van verkeersbeleid vaak 
moeilijk te doorzien, laat staan te voorspellen. 
Niettemin is transportbeleid in de afgelopen 20 à 30 jaar gedeeltelijk succesvol geweest. De 
daling van dodelijke ongevallen en van de uitstoot van vervuilende deeltjes en gassen (zoals fijn 
stof en stikstofoxiden) kunnen er direct aan worden toegeschreven. Toch zijn sommige 
negatieve neveneffecten van wegtransport kritiek gebleven of zelf verergerd. Het congestieni-
veau in stedelijke gebieden is gegroeid en de uitstoot van broeikasgassen evenzo. Dit doet de 
vraag rijzen hoe beleid rond deze twee zaken verbeterd kan worden. Twee innovaties in het 
bijzonder zouden hierin een rol kunnen spelen: respectievelijk automotortechniek en parkeer-
en-reis (P+R) voorzieningen52. Daarom is het relevant om de opkomst van deze twee innovaties 
te bestuderen en de rol van beleid daarin: een beter begrip van de innovatie dynamica in de 
sector zou immers de uitkomsten van transport beleid kunnen verbeteren. 
Het doel van dit proefschrift is tweeledig. We beogen een bijdrage aan innovatie theorie door 
het voordragen van een raamwerk voor co-evolutie van vraag en aanbod. Daarnaast beogen we 
een bijdrage aan transportbeleidprofessionals, vooral aan hen die te maken hebben met beleid 
rond de automotor en P+R. 
Studies in verschillende wetenschappelijke disciplines en velden hebben een bijdrage geleverd 
aan theorie over innovatie en de opkomst van nieuwe techniek. Grofweg zijn er drie stromingen 
in de literatuur. Alhoewel de meeste economen innovatie eenvoudigweg behandelen als één 
van de investeringsmogelijkheden, is de eerste stroming ontstaan uit het werk van de Oosten-
rijkse econoom Joseph Schumpeter (1883-1950), die ons een schema over technische verande-
ring heeft nagelaten wat achtereenvolgens bestaat uit: uitvinding - de eerste praktische 
demonstratie van een idee; uit innovatie - de eerste commerciële toepassing van een uitvinding; 
en uit diffusie - de verspreiding van de innovatie over de markt. In deze traditie hebben een 
nieuwe reeks economen zogenaamde evolutionaire theorieën een nieuwe impuls gegeven na 
1980. Studies in deze stroming hebben de dominantie van een bepaalde techniek of werkwijze 
in een sector verklaard als technologische insluiting ('lock-in') door padafhankelijkheid. De 
modellen zijn echter op dit moment nog weinig toegepast op consumenten producten in een 
veranderende sociale context. Voor consumenten kan de symbolische waarde van een product 
                                                                        
52 P+R is een voorziening voor automobilisten waar ze hun auto kunnen parkeren aan de rand van de stad (of 
het stadscentrum) en hun reis kunnen vervolgen per openbaarvervoer of publieke fiets. 
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een belangrijke rol spelen. Symbolische waarde is als een sociale betekenis toegekend aan een 
product, en individuele consumenten zullen in een bepaalde mate deelgenoot zijn van het 
sociale construct. Alhoewel het construct een multi-dimensionaal fenomeen is, zal het (per 
saldo) een positieve of negatieve klank hebben (mogelijk op het zelfde moment voor verschil-
lende groepen consumenten) en dus waarde toevoegen aan de functionele waarde of verminde-
ren in de ogen van consumenten. De formatie en reformatie van die sociale betekenis zal zowel 
de technische ontwikkeling (aanbod zijde) als het diffusie proces (vraag zijde) van de innovatie 
beïnvloeden. Op dit moment zijn er weinig theorieën in deze economische stroming die de 
interactie tussen sociale en technische aspecten meenemen en, zoals Pier Paolo Saviotti 
opmerkt, is het begrip van deze dynamica nog gebrekkig. 
Een tweede stroming binnen innovatie studies, innovatie diffusie studies, is conceptueel breder 
en is voortgekomen uit de sociale geografie en later opgenomen in marketing studies. De focus 
van de meeste diffusie studies is op aggregate patronen, welke vaak S-vormig blijken te zijn. 
Symbolische waarde van producten is in deze stroming een gevestigde notie, welke veelal wordt 
onderscheiden van de functionele waarde. Het baanbrekende werk van Everett Rogers levert 
een typologie van innovatie adopters op basis van wanneer ze adopteren, maar levert geen 
dynamisch model van innovatie diffusie in termen van endogene en exogene mechanismen.  
Een derde stroming in de innovatie literatuur komt voort uit de sociologie en geschiedenis van 
de techniek, waarin auteurs de sociale context waarin een techniek is ontworpen en wordt 
gebruikt hebben benadrukt. Een kernbegrip is de sociale constructie van techniek (SCOT van 
Wiebe Bijker), waarbij techniek niet wordt gezien als een objectieve entiteit (zoals in economi-
sche en technische studies), maar wordt beschreven 'door de ogen van maatschappelijke 
groepen'. Deze auteurs laten zien hoe verschillende sociale interpretaties van een techniek, 
richting geven aan verschillende paden van technische ontwikkeling van die techniek.  
Auteurs in de laatste twee stromingen hebben ook de interactie van technische en sociale 
factoren behandeld. Meest recent hebben Arie Rip en Rene Kemp co-evolutie van 'het sociale' 
en 'het technische' uitgewerkt, en daarmee de opkomst, transformatie en het verval van socio-
technische systemen geanalyseerd. Hun 'multi-level' model van innovatie onderscheid het 
macro niveau van het socio-technische landschap, het regiem op meso niveau en niches op het 
micro niveau. Frank Geels heeft de notie toegevoegd dat radicale innovaties voortkomen uit 
interactie tussen processen op deze drie niveaus. Dat wil zeggen: de doorbraak van een niche tot 
een regiem geschied geleidelijk, wanneer een nieuwe techniek zich vertakt en doordringt in 
verschillende toepassingsdomeinen, voordat het op de mainstream markt komt. Deze studies 
hebben, meer dan eerdere studies, het licht geworpen op patronen waarin gevestigde technie-
ken soms worden verlaten en overvleugeld worden door nieuwe (voormalige niche) technieken. 
Een aantal innovatie onderzoekers heeft echter betoogd dat deze studies minder duidelijk zijn 
over waarom sommige niches 'succesvol' zijn in het groeien en omverwerpen van het regiem, 
terwijl (vele) andere niches een stille dood sterven. Interacties tussen niche en regiem worden 
belangrijk genoemd, maar deze interacties zijn nog weinig uitgewerkt in termen van processen 
en terugkoppeleffecten, zoals schaalvoordelen, leerprocessen en smaakvormingsmechanismen 
van consumenten. In dit proefschrift bieden we een co-evolutionair raamwerk aan wat de 
nadruk legt op terugkoppeleffecten en actor perspectieven. 
In hoofdstuk 2 werken we ons co-evolutionaire raamwerk uit, voortbouwend op de brug tussen 
evolutionaire economie en sociologie van de techniek welke Rip, Kemp en Geels begonnen zijn. 
We ontwikkelen een micro-macro model (meer gebruikelijk in de economie), en laten dus het 
niche, regiem en landschap model even links liggen. Op ons micro niveau wordt de innovatie 
beschreven door de ogen van belanghebbenden ('stakeholders'), terwijl op het macro niveau 
aggregate indicatoren zoals totale verkopen en prijzen worden meegenomen. We nemen 
(groepen van) actoren als het basis element van de analyse, stappen in hun schoenen (op het 
micro niveau) en brengen hun mentale voorstellingen ('frames') en attitudes van de innovatie in 
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kaart. We zien een frame als de manier waarop de innovatie wordt geïnterpreteerd door een 
actor. Vervolgens breiden we de notie van terugkoppeleffecten door schaal- en leerprocessen 
uit met de smaakvorming van consumenten, inclusief de sociale betekenis van een product. We 
bediscussiëren de voor- en nadelen van deze benadering voor de notie van co-evolutie. We 
beogen hiermee een bijdrage aan de co-evolutionare studies in de evolutionaire economie (in de 
Neo-Schumpeteriaanse traditie), alsmede aan co-evolutionaire benaderingen in het bredere veld 
van innovatie studies. 
Voordat we in de kern van dit proefschrift twee verklarende gevalstudies uitwerken, waarbij het 
co-evolutionaire raamwerk wordt toegepast op de casus automotor en P+R, etaleren we de 
onderzoeksmethodologie (hoofdstuk 3). Verklarende gevalstudies (explanatory casestudies) zijn 
geschikt voor het toepassen van vooraf gedefinieerde raamwerken op een nieuwe casus, waarbij 
causaliteiten en verklarende waarde worden getest. Als input voor de gevalstudies analyseren 
we de frames van de meest relevante belanghebbenden, waarbij we een aantal andere 
onderzoeksmethoden gebruiken, zoals discours analyse (hoofdstuk 4) en vragenlijstenonderzoek 
(hoofdstuk 5 en 7). Aansluitend aan de verklarende gevalstudies ontwikkelen we toekomst 
scenario’s, ondersteund door een simulatiemodel analyse (hoofdstuk 9). 
Zo een combinatie van methoden heeft een aantal voordelen. Het gebruik van verschillende 
methoden in samenhang kan de kwaliteit en adequaatheid van een onderzoek aanzienlijk 
vergroten, en conclusies zijn vaak overtuigender als ze gebaseerd zijn op een aantal verschillen-
de bronnen. Het combineren van methoden kan compenseren voor eenzijdigheid. In complexe 
kwesties leidt een enkele methode gemakkelijk tot een deelverklaring van een fenomeen, zoals 
in de parabel van de blinde mannen en de olifant. Het combineren van methoden brengt ook 
moeilijkheden met zich mee. Integratie van uitkomsten en kenniselementen is moeilijk 
wetenschappelijk te valideren, en methoden kunnen een zelfde bias hebben. Alhoewel een 
theorie over het gezamenlijk gebruik van verschillende onderzoeksmethoden nog in ontwikke-
ling is, nemen we in dit proefschrift resultaten uit een aantal methoden mee (als input) in onze 
gevalstudies, ten dienste van het begrip van de veelzijdige fenomenen van de opkomst van 
(hybride-)elektrische voertuigen en P+R. 
In hoofdstuk 4 analyseren we hoe gebruikers van auto's de automotor 'framen' (dat wil zeggen: 
mentaal voorstellen). Automotoren zijn al meer dan 100 jaar gebaseerd op interne verbran-
dingstechniek; echter, in het laatste decennium zijn hybride-elektrische motoren succesvol 
geïntroduceerd. Het naast elkaar bestaan van een conventionele en onconventionele techniek 
doet de interessante vraag rijzen in hoeverre deze (technisch) verschillende motoren ook 
verschillend worden geframed, en hoe dit door de tijd heen verandert. Studies over technologi-
sche frames suggereren dat frames van gevestigde technieken meer star zijn. In dit hoofdstuk 
analyseren we technologische frames van drie type automotoren: de incrementele innovatie van 
de dieselmotor, de onconventionele elektrische en hybride-elektrische motor, en vervolgens 
bestuderen we hoe deze frames veranderd zijn tussen 1990 en 2005. We vinden uit de analyse 
dat de motoren nogal verschillend worden geframed. Frames van de conventionele dieselmotor 
benadrukken motorvermogen (uitgedrukt in kW), motorvolume (uitgedrukt in liter) en motor-
koppel (uitgedrukt in Nm), terwijl bij hybride motoren brandstofverbruik (km per liter) op 
afstand het meest voorname attribuut is. Verder suggereren onze bevindingen dat het frame 
van de conventionele motor (diesel) meer stabiel is door de tijd dan een onconventionele motor 
(hybride en elektrisch), wat de hypothese uit eerder onderzoek bevestigt. 
In hoofdstuk 5 analyseren we technologische frames van autobedrijven in de ontwikkeling van 
ultra schone voertuigen (zogenaamde ultra low emission vehicles, ULEV). We bekijken de frames 
van bedrijven door hun systeem van overtuigingen te onderzoeken, alsmede hun (door henzelf 
gestelde) daadwerkelijke toewijding aan de ULEV ontwikkeling. De centrale vraag is: welke 
overtuigingen dragen significant bij aan de toewijding aan de ontwikkeling van ULEVs? Een 
tweede vraag is in hoeverre we diversiteit hierin tussen de bedrijven in kaart kunnen brengen. 
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We stappen dus in de schoenen van autobedrijven en analyseren hun zakelijke ('business'), 
technische, sociale en milieu overtuigingen. Om voldoende focus te verkrijgen in de analyse, 
concentreren we ons in dit hoofdstuk op waterstoftechniek, als een voorbeeld van een ULEV. 
Veel wetenschappers, industrie strategen en beleidsmakers zien waterstof als een belangrijke 
toekomstige energiedrager in transport. Uit onze studie blijkt dat verschillende bedrijven 
verschillend omgaan met de ontwikkeling van waterstof voertuigen. Grofweg kunnen drie 
groepen onderscheiden worden op basis van hun toewijding aan ULEV ontwikkeling: onzekere 
bedrijven, onwillige bedrijven, en optimistische bedrijven. Verder suggereren onze resultaten 
dat technische en organisatorische competenties gecorreleerd zijn aan de toewijding aan de 
ontwikkeling van waterstof voertuigen: bedrijven die hun capaciteiten hoger (lager) inschatten, 
zijn sterker (zwakker) geëngageerd in de ontwikkeling. Alhoewel bedrijven verschillende 
afwegingen maken rond waterstof, vinden we geen verschillen in de framestructuur van 
autobedrijven, dat wil zeggen het gewicht wat ze hangen aan economische kansen en milieu-
overwegingen, etc. Alle bedrijven zijn onderdeel van een globale markt met scherpe concurren-
tie, en allen benadrukken ze daarom business opportunities, zowel op dit moment als in de 
toekomst. Een belangrijke vraag voor hen is daarom: verwachten en waarderen consumenten 
schonere motoren? Ten tweede is hun relatieve positie ten opzichte van concurrenten 
belangrijk. Tenslotte beïnvloeden sociale verwachtingen en druk op nieuwe (schone) techniek, 
zoals waterstof, hun R&D uitgaven enigszins, terwijl emissie regulering een randvoorwaarde is 
waar aan voldaan moet worden (nu en in de toekomst). 
In hoofdstuk 6 beschrijven en verklaren we de opkomst van elektrische motoren op de 
automarkt na 1990. Hybride-elektrische voertuigen hebben een significante groei laten zien in 
de afgelopen tien jaar. Dit is opmerkelijk, aangezien de automobiel sector een karakteristieke 
aversie heeft tegen radicale technische verandering van motoren. De interne verbrandingsmotor 
is immers al bijna 100 jaar dominant. In dit hoofdstuk geven we een veelzijdige beschrijving van 
hoe en waarom aandrijftechnieken zijn ontwikkeld en verkocht na 1990, waarbij we de twee 
lagen van het co-evolutionaire raamwerk volgen. Eerst concentreren we ons op de aggregate 
patronen (zoals verkoopaantallen en technische voortgang), terwijl in de volgende sectie de 
perspectieven van de meest relevante belanghebbenden beschreven worden (bedrijven, 
consumenten, beleidsmakers). Vervolgens worden voorgaande secties geïntegreerd in een co-
evolutionair raamwerk. We bediscussiëren de rol van technisch-economische mechanismen 
naast die van sociale mechanismen (inclusief de sociale betekenis van een motor), en de rol van 
beleid daarin. De co-evolutionaire analyse is nieuw in de integrale voorstelling van actor 
perspectieven, terugkoppeleffecten en competitie tussen producten. De analyse suggereert dat 
automotoren zijn ingesloten in een traject van de interne verbrandingsmotor ('lock-in') door 
padafhankelijkheid wat oorzaken heeft aan zowel de aanbod zijde, vraagzijde en de zijde van de 
regulering. Door een interactie van de vraag- en aanbodzijde hebben technisch-economische 
mechanismen stabiliteit of traagheid geboden aan het traject van de interne verbrandingsmotor 
ondanks de groeiende maatschappelijke aandacht voor duurzamer geachte alternatieven. In de 
jaren '90 bleef een opkomend innovatietraject van elektrische motoren aanvankelijk steken, 
toen elektrische voertuigen veelal duur en onpraktisch (als gevolg van hun kleine bereik) 
gevonden werden. Verschillende bedrijven waren onsuccesvol in het op de markt brengen van 
hun elektrische en hybride-elektrische voertuigen, zoals Peugeot/Citroen met verschillende 
elektrische modellen na 1995 en Audi met hun Duo in 1997. Echter, na 2000 kwam het traject 
weer op in de vorm van hybride-elektrische voertuigen, vooral door activiteiten van Toyota wat 
op zoek ging naar nieuwe markten voor hun competenties rond elektrische motoren, en 
gestimuleerd door het geleidelijk ontstaan van positieve sociale betekenis van hybride-
elektrische technologie. 
In hoofdstuk 7 bestuderen we hoe P+R wordt geframed door beleidsmakers, door middel van 
een vragenlijst die door 45 grote steden in Europa is ingevuld. In de stad zijn verkeersdrukte en 
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kwaliteit van de lucht belangrijke kwesties voor de ruimtelijke planning. In de afgelopen jaren 
zijn Parkeer-en-Reis (P+R) voorzieningen in toenemende mate geïntroduceerd door lokale 
overheden als een alternatief voor of uitbreiding op het parkeeraanbod in het centrum. We 
onderzoeken hoe P+R als beleidsoptie wordt geframed in het bredere transportbeleid. Het 
hoofdstuk levert drie zaken op. Als eerste rapporteren we over het huidige adoptieniveau van 
P+R in Europa. De resultaten laten zien dat P+R vrij ongelijkmatig over het continent verspreid is. 
Een kwart van de steden is uitvoerig bezig met de ontwikkeling van P+R, terwijl een ander kwart 
weinig of niets met P+R doet. Dit doet de vraag rijzen: als congestie in vrijwel alle steden een 
probleem is, waarom is de adoptie van P+R dan zo ongelijkmatig? Daarom, als tweede, schetsen 
we de diversiteit in de manier waarop P+R geframed wordt, door de overtuigingen rond P+R in 
de verschillende steden expliciet te maken. We laten zien hoe divers beleidsmakers P+R 
interpreteren. Ten derde analyseren we of sommige overtuigingen voornamer zijn dan anderen 
bij het besluit om P+R te ontwikkelen. Een lineaire regressie analyse suggereert dat de economi-
sche implicaties van P+R, gepercipieerde vraag voor P+R en de vaardigheden om als organisatie 
te leren de meest voorname factoren zijn voor locale overheden om wel of niet betrokken te zijn 
bij de ontwikkeling van P+R, omdat deze drie factoren zo'n 40% van de variantie in daadwerkelij-
ke betrokkenheid verklaren. 
Hoofdstuk 8 bestudeert de introductie van P+R en haar potentiële transformerende impact op 
stedelijke mobiliteit in twee van de landen met de hoogste bevolkingsdichtheid in Europa, 
Nederland en het Verenigd Koninkrijk, die te maken hebben met vergelijkbare stedelijke 
duurzaamheidproblemen. We bekijken drie voorbeelden van P+R implementatie uit ieder land: 
Oxford, York en Bristol, Amsterdam, Rotterdam en Utrecht. Onze verklarende gevalstudie volgt 
de twee lagen van het co-evolutionaire raamwerk door P+R te beschrijven vanuit het perspectief 
van de stadsoverheid en dat van de reizigers (micro niveau), en vervolgens door aggregate 
indicatoren zoals totale beschikbaarheid van parkeerplaatsen en parkeertarieven (macro 
niveau). Het raamwerk wordt toegepast om te bestuderen hoe en waarom P+R wordt ontwik-
keld in de zes steden en of de introductie van P+R heeft bijgedragen aan een transitie naar een 
centrum met een lage (auto)verkeersintensiteit. Onze bevindingen laten zien dat alhoewel er in 
de meeste steden een verschuiving is geweest in beleid van het voorzien in meer parkeerplaat-
sen naar het verplaatsen van parkeerlocaties en het beïnvloeden van modaliteitkeuzes, er geen 
significante verlaging is te zien in de algemene parkeerintensiteit; P+R heeft vooral geleid tot 
een uitbreiding van het parkeeraanbod. 
In hoofdstuk 9 exploreren we toekomst scenario's van automotortechniek, ondersteund door 
een simulatiemodel. Waar hoofdstuk 4 tot 8 zich richten op het recente verleden, richten we ons 
nu op de vraag: wat zou er kunnen gebeuren? We ontwikkelen plausibele maar gesimplificeerde 
beschrijvingen van twee mogelijke toekomsten. Deze beschrijvingen betreffen zowel technisch-
economische aspecten alsmede de vorming van sociale betekenis van een techniek. Om 
rekening te houden met de complexe en onzekere dynamica tussen de twee type fenomenen, 
gebruiken we een simulatie analyse. Hiertoe formaliseren we het twee-lagen raamwerk en 
maken we het op maat voor de casus van de automotor. Dit levert een model wat de co-evolutie 
van vraag en aanbod simuleert met als uitkomst verschillende mogelijke trajecten. We 
formaliseren stakeholder perspectieven gebaseerd op de empiri uit hoofdstuk 4, 5 en 6. De 
voornaamste rol van het model is de analyse van de rol van sociale betekenis in de innovatie 
dynamica. Hiervoor wordt het model toegepast, zowel retrospectief als met het oog op de 
toekomst, om lessen te trekken over de rol van sociale betekenis. In het model is het gedrag van 
actoren expliciet gemodelleerd op basis van de actor frames, welke de waardering van de 
technische opties kleuren, zowel voor potentiële consumenten als producenten. Het model is 
analytisch vernieuwend omdat het vijf terugkoppelmechanismen meeneemt: schaal- en 
leervoordelen, interactief leren tussen producten en consumenten, endogene smaakvorming 
van consumenten, en de formatie van sociale betekenis. Het model wordt toegepast om 
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toekomstige diffusie scenario's van automotoren te schetsen, terwijl het begint met het 
simuleren van de recente historie (ongeveer 20 jaar), inclusief de snelle diffusie van directe 
inspuitsystemen (voor diesels) en de langzame diffusie van elektrische voertuigen. De analyse 
suggereert dat het succes van (hybride-)elektrische voertuigen vooral afhangt van de mate 
waarin producenten hun onderzoek- en ontwikkelingswerk hierop richten (resulterend in een 
groter en kwalitatief verbeterend aanbod van (hybride-)elektrische modellen) en op het aandeel 
consumenten dat (hybride-)elektrische modellen hoger waardeert dan schonere diesels.  
We hebben twee narratieve scenario's ontwikkeld. In het eerste scenario wordt de sociale 
betekenis van (H)EV technologie wijdverbreid positief, terwijl ICE negatief wordt. Hier vinden we 
de gestage voortgang van de state-of-the-art van elektrische aandrijftechniek, welke binnen tien 
jaar de state-of-the-art van ICE inhaalt. Na de initiële adoptie van (hybride-)elektrische 
voertuigen in een beperkte groep groene consumenten, vind er bredere adoptie plaats na 2020. 
In het tweede scenario verwerven nieuwe ICE versies een vergelijkbaar positieve sociale 
betekenis als (H)EV. Hier blijft de state-of-the-art van ICE die van (H)EV vooruit, en na de adoptie 
van enkele (hybride-)elektrische modellen, schuiven zelfs de groene consumenten terug naar 
vernieuwde ICE modellen. 
In hoofdstuk 10 analyseren we wat onze co-evolutionaire benadering leert over de rol van 
beleid in het innovatie proces in de twee cases. Er zijn twee voorname perspectieven op milieu- 
en innovatiebeleid in de literatuur: het welvaartperspectief en het evolutionaire perspectief. We 
beargumenteren dat in onze twee cases beleidsinstrumenten vooral zijn toegepast vanuit een 
welvaartperspectief. In dit perspectief beogen instrumenten innovatie te stimuleren op een 
techiek-blinde manier, wat vooral leidt tot de adoptie van bestaande technieken en incremente-
le innovatie. In een (co-)evolutionair perspectief worden onconventionele technieken gezien als 
niches buiten het regiem en is het niet alleen de vraag of een instrument innovatie stimuleert, 
maar ook of het instrument innovatie stimuleert in het bestaande regiem of in een alternatief 
niche traject. Zo een vraag is nog niet systematisch onderzocht en heeft slechts gebrekkig 
aandacht gekregen van beleidsmakers. 
We schetsen mogelijkheden voor evolutionair beleid om niche innovatie in onze twee cases te 
stimuleren. Als een rode lijn door het beleidsadvies in beide cases zit de suggestie voor de 
vorming van een sector platform, wat de innovatie dynamica in de sector kan beïnvloeden door: 
• zich te richten op niche-regiem interactie: het coördineren van regiem beleid met bottom-
up (niche) initiatieven. 
• rekening te houden met bestaande padafhankelijkheden, maar daarbij voorkomen opnieuw 
ingesloten te worden in suboptimale oplossingen, bijvoorbeeld door de ondersteuning van 
een portfolio van niches. 
In hoofdstuk 11 worden de voornaamste bevindingen samengevat door het beantwoorden van 
de vijf onderzoeksvragen: (1) hoe kan het evolutionair economische perspectief verrijkt worden 
met SCOT? (2) Is een co-evolutionaire benadering relevant voor het bestuderen van de opkomst 
van (H)EV en P+R? (3) Kunnen we consumenten frames en de sociale betekenis van innovaties 
meten en meenemen in computer simulaties en in historisch verklarende gevalstudies van socio-
technische verandering? (4) Leid het meenemen van concurrerende technieken in een diffusie 
model tot andere resultaten? en (5) Wat is de waarde van een co-evolutionair raamwerk voor 
beleid? Samengevat vinden we dat de belangrijkste waarde van een co-evolutionaire, micro-
macro benadering ligt in de integratie van consumenten en producenten en competitie tussen 
technieken. Daardoor helpt deze benadering het licht te werpen op de dynamica tussen 
consumenten (of: vraagstructuren) en producten (of: aanbodstructuren). Andere studies hebben 
de ontwikkeling van (H)EV en P+R ook behandelt, maar typisch met een nauwere focus; dan wel 
op het aanbod gericht met verwaarlozing van consumenten, dan wel vice versa. 
Begrenzingen van onze methodologie liggen in de noodzaak voor een behoorlijke hoeveelheid 
micro niveau data (zoals gegevens over de actor frames en attitudes, liefst als tijdreeksen), wat 
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voor vele gevallen vrij lastig te verkrijgen is. Ook is het moeilijk om de relatieve sterkte tussen de 
terugkoppelmechanismen te bepalen in iedere casus. Deze moeten waarschijnlijk gevonden 
worden door het raadplegen van experts of door participatieve sessies met belanghebbenden. 
Onze benadering is minder succesvol in het belichten van de sociale en politieke dynamica 
binnen de lokale of (supra-) nationale overheid en binnen een autobedrijf. Meer dan een 
enkelvoudige en homogene organisatie is een overheidsorganisatie opgebouwd uit departemen-
ten (economische zaken, transport, milieu, etc.) alsmede een wetgevende en controlerende 
gemeenteraad of parlement, en deze staan allemaal onder invloed van lobby activiteiten door 
belangengroepen, hun achterban of beroepsgebruiken. Ook in bedrijven kunnen er verschillen 
van visie zijn tussen departementen (marktontwikkeling, onderzoek, milieuzaken, etc.) over wat 
de beste strategie is. In onze analyses hebben we deze dynamica weggelaten en enkel gekeken 
naar het beleid wat door de gemeenteraad werd goedgekeurd, of naar het investering- en 
productbeleid wat een autobedrijf voerde. In toekomstig onderzoek moet dit deel van het 
raamwerk beter uitgewerkt worden. Ook zullen leerprocessen en schaalvoordelen bij een locale 
overheid beter uitgewerkt moeten worden. Voor deze beide zaken zien we het co-evolutionaire 
raamwerk als een geschikt startpunt.  
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